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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - PRIOR RESTRAINT OF FREE SPEECH -
DISCHARGE OF STATE AGENCY EMPLOYEES FOR FAILURE TO SIGN A
MEMORANDUM PROHIBITING ANY AND ALL DISCUSSION OF AN
UPCOMING PLEBISCITE CONSTITUTES AN EFFECTIVE PRIOR RESTRAINT
IN VIOLATION OF RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH GUARANTEED BY
THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS.
Alderman v. Philadelphia Housing Authority (1974)
Plaintiffs, four former employees of defendant, the Philadelphia Hous-
ing Authority (PHA),' were dismissed from their jobs for refusing to sign
a memorandum issued by defendant, Gilbert Stein, Executive Director of
the PHA.2 This memorandum required an averment from all PHA em-
ployees that they would refrain from any discussion concerning a plebiscite,
called to settle a controversy between the PHA and the Resident Advisory
Board, Inc. (RAB), a group which purported to :represent PHA tenants.3
1. The PHA is a public agency created, in part, for the purpose of providing
low income housing. It administers and maintains upwards of 20,000 housing units
in which more than 100,000 persons reside. Alderman v. Philadelphia Housing Auth.,
496 F.2d 164 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 77 (1974).
2. Alderman v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 365 F. Supp. 350, 362 (E.D.
Pa. 1973).
3. Id. at 361. At the time defendant Stein became Executive Director, a con-
troversy existed between the agency and RAB over whether RAB representation of
PHA tenants by RAB should continue. For this reason, the PHA scheduled a pleb-
iscite for December, 1972, and in November, 1972, defendant issued the restrictive
memorandum. The avowed purpose of the memorandum was to insure PHA im-
partiality, since it was the Executive Director's opinion that, if permitted to do so,
many PHA employees would campaign against the RAB. Id.
The memorandum read in pertinent part:
No PHA employee shall engage in any form of interference during the up-
coming tenant plebiscite to determine whether residents of PHA-managed prop-
erties want to be represented by RAB Corporation.
It is the policy of this Authority to encourage all tenants to exercise their
right of choice ... but there should be no attempt by PHA employees to discuss
RAB politics with tenants, either pro or con.
Any employee who engages in such activity will be subject to immediate
dismissal.
/s/ Gilbert Stein
I have read the above and understand that as an employee of the Philadelphia
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Following their discharge, 4 plaintiffs brought suit pursuant to the
Civil Rights Act of 18715 for reinstatement, back pay, interest and accrued
seniority, alleging, inter alia, that the memorandum, as implemented by
discharge from employment, amounted to an unconstitutional prior restraint
upon speech.6 The district court, finding plaintiff's "purely hypothetical"
interests were outweighed by the government's interest, granted judgment
for the defendants. 7 The Third Circuit reversed and remanded, holding
that the memorandum prohibiting all discussion of the plebiscite by PHA
employees was an effective prior restraint in violation of the plaintiffs' first
and fourteenth amendment rights which was not justified by the agency's
interest in prohibiting such discussion. Alderman v. Philadelphia Housing
Authority, 496 F.2d 164 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 77 (1974).
First amendment freedoms occupy a "preferred position" among con-
stitutional guarantees. 8 This priority has been manifested by the traditional
judicial distaste for prior restraints - i.e., official restrictions imposed upon
speech or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication.9
4. Of the 65 to 70 PHA employees who apparently failed to sign the memo-
randum, only the four plaintiffs were discharged. Id. at 356. One plaintiff, at the
time of her refusal to sign, stated, in a letter, her belief that the memorandum con-
stituted a waiver of her first amendment rights of free speech. 496 F.2d at 166.
Another plaintiff indicated a willingness to sign if the memorandum represented an
attempt to comply with a stipulation, made in a law suit instituted by RAB to enjoin
the election, that the PHA would refrain from taking an active part in the election.
365 F. Supp. at 357-58. However, none of the plaintiffs ever interfered with the RAB
election, nor did they discuss RAB policies with public housing tenants prior to their
dismissal. Id. at 357.
5. The Civil Rights Act of 1871 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
6. 365 F. Supp. at 352. Plaintiffs also claimed that the memorandum was vague
or overbroad, and that their dismissals lacked procedural due process. Id. The Third
Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of these claims. 496 F.2d at 167.
7. 365 F. Supp. at 372.
8. See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). The free speech clause
of the first amendment provides that Congress shall make no law "abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court of the
United States has recognized the "preferred position" of freedom of speech against
governmental regulation or restraint, placing the burden of proof upon the govern-
ment to establish its overriding interest in so restricting this freedom. See Schneider
v. New Jersey, supra at 161 (1939). The Court in Gitlow v. New York, 298 U.S.
652 (1925), held that freedom of speech and of the press, protected by the first
amendment against encroachment by the federal government, were also protected by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment against infringement by the states.
In Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962), the Court held that federal constitutional
standards, relating to the first amendment, must be used in determining the validity
of any restraint placed upon free speech by state action.
9. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 648
(1955). It should be noted that prior restraint must be distinguished from subsequent
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The Supreme Court of the United States discussed the doctrine of
prior restraint extensively for the first time in Near v. Minnesota,10 in which
it held unconstitutional a Minnesota statute 1 which had permitted prior
restraint upon the publication or circulation of any periodical found to be
"obscene, lewd and lascivious" or "malicious, scandalous and defamatory."' 2
In dicta, however, Chief Justice Hughes noted that there might be "excep-
tional cases" in which a prior restraint upon expression would be allowed.
13
Although some subsequent Supreme Court decisions seem to have
followed the exceptions suggested in Near, a careful analysis thereof indi-
cates these cases were not questions of prior restraint, but of subsequent
punishment. 14 Thus, the only relevant prior restraint of free speech, which
has been sanctioned by the Supreme Court, would appear to be the Hatch
Act.15
The Hatch Act, promulgated in 1940, prohibits the participation by
federal employees in partisan political campaigns."' The catalyst for passage
of the Act was congressional recognition of a "danger to the [civil] service
punishment which is imposed as a penalty for engaging in a form of expression. Id.
The antipathy of the Anglo-American legal system toward prior restraint of free
speech may be traced to the Licensing Act of 1662 which was enacted in England
specifically to impose prior restraint upon all printed material. However, the Act
was abandoned near the end of the 17th century due to adverse public sentiment. Id.
at 650-51. It has been suggested that this repugnance toward this form of censorship
was carried over from England and prompted adoption of the first amendment. Thus,
it has been argued that the primary aim of the amendment was prohibition of prior
restraints, rather than prevention of the imposition of sanctions upon an individual
for expression already engaged in. Id. at 652.
10. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
11. Law of April 20, 1925, ch. 285, [1925] Minn. Laws 358.
12. 283 U.S. at 702. In so doing, Chief Justice Hughes stated:
The exceptional nature of its limitations places in a strong light the general
conception that liberty of the press, historically considered and taken up by the
Federal Constitution, has meant, principally although not exclusively, immunity
from previous restraints or censorship.
. .. The fact that the liberty of the press may be abused by miscreant
purveyors of scandal does not make any less necessary the immunity of the press
from previous restraint . . . . Subsequent punishment for such abuses . . . is
the appropriate remedy.
Id. at 716, 720.
13. Id. at 716. For example, he observed that such censorship might be per-
missible: 1) to maintain military operations during wartime; 2) to shelter public
decency from obscene publications; and 3) to protect the security of the community
against incitement to acts of violence and the overthrow of government by force. Id.
14. E.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Quantity of Books v.
Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964) (dealing with obscene materials). See also Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) ; Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) ; Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (dealing with subversive speech) ; Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (dealing with fighting words).
15. 5 U.S.C. § 7324 et seq. (1970).
16. The Hatch Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) An employee in an Executive agency or an individual employed by the
government of the District of Columbia may not-
(2) take an active part in political management or in political campaigns.
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in that political rather than official effort may earn advancement, and to the
public in that governmental favor may be channeled through political con-
nections. 117 Recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the constitutionality
of the Act in United States Civil Service Commission v. National Asso-
ciation of Letter Carriers.'" It also upheld a state statute similar to the
Act in Broadrick v. Oklahoma.19
Since any system of prior restraint upon first amendment freedoms
20
bears a heavy judicial presumption against its validity, 21 the government
must offer compelling proof that the restriction is essential to a vital govern-
ment interest before the restraint may be justified. 22 The rights of the
individual must be balanced against the necessities of government, and,
it is submitted that, because of the heavy burden imposed upon the govern-
ment, the balance will almost invariably tip in favor of the individual.
Writing for the court and attempting to strike this balance, Judge
Adams initially noted that the district court had interpreted the memo-
randum as prohibiting all discussion of RAB politics and, in light of the
employees' discharge, the defendants conceded that the memorandum op-
erated as a prior restraint upon the speech of PHA employees. 23 Defendants
sought to justify this restraint by invoking the PHA's significant and vital
interest in preventing violent confrontations and interference in the plebi-
scite, and its interest in protecting PHA tenants' freedom to choose elected
representatives.2 4
In finding for the PHA, the district court had drawn an analogy to the
Hatch Act's restraint upon partisan political activity by federal employees, 25
and had noted that the method of enforcing the Hatch Act, that is, removal
from employment, and the restraint imposed in the instant case, were
identical.
26
The Third Circuit disagreed with the lower court's analogy, and stated
that the cases upholding the Act did not justify restraint of "any and all
17. United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 98 (1947).
18. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
19. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
20. Although Near involved restraint of the press, the Alderman court found
no significant distinction between liberty of speech and of the press. 496 F.2d at
169 n.29.
21. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per
curiam) ; Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
22. Alderman v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 496 F.2d 164, 170 (3d Cir. 1974).
The government must carry this burden of proof because prior restraint "subjects to
government scrutiny and approval all expression in the area controlled - the innocent
and borderline as well as the offensive," and because a prior restraint, by its very
nature, seeks absolutely to exclude the speech from the market place of ideas. Emerson,
supra note 9, at 656-57.
23. 496 F.2d at 170.
24. Id.
25. 365 F. Supp. at 365.
26. Id. at 371. Section 7325 of the Hatch Act specifically authorizes removal
from government employment for violation of section 7324. 5 U.S.C. § 7325 (1970).
[VOL. 20
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discussion," 27 but instead, only permitted prohibition of partisan political
activity, 28 and thus, in the Third Circuit's view, carved out a carefully
circumscribed exception to the first amendment's proscription of prior
restraint.
29
The court pointed to the Supreme Court's statement in Letter Carriers
that this limited proscription was manifested in the language of the Hatch
Act itself,30 by the Civil Service Commission Rules3 l which could be used
to "flesh out" the statute, and by the language of Senator Hatch.32 The
Alderman court also noted the Supreme Court's use of a similar rationale
in Broadrick.33 The court further noted that the statutes challenged in Letter
Carriers and Broadrick represented a "considered legislative judgment,"
rather than a "relatively spontaneous decision of a local government admin-
istrator"34 as in the instant case. Therefore, the court concluded, these
decisions only permit prior restraint of partisan political activity, and noth-
ing else.3
5
Having disposed of any analogy to the Hatch Act, the Alderman court
directly addressed the issue of the validity of the PHA's memorandum.
Noting that the balancing task imposed by the prior restraint doctrine was
a sensitive one, and acknowledging that the PHA might have a more
weighty interest in regulating the speech of its employees than that of the
populace at large, the court concluded that it must find in favor of appel-
lants because of the dearth of case law allowing restraint of all speech, and
because of the need to carefully restrict the extent of a prior restraint in
27. 496 F.2d at 170 (emphasis supplied by the court). The court noted that since
the appellants had signed a Hatch Act pledge not to engage in partisan political
activity, a fact of which appellee Stein was aware, this memorandum must have been
intended to prohibit something more. Id. at 170 n.35.
28. See 413 U.S. at 562.
29. 496 F.2d at 172.
30. See note 16 supra.
31. 5 C.F.R. § 4.1 (1974).
32. Senator Hatch stated that employees could express their opinions about all
subjects. 413 U.S. at 572, citing 86 CONG. REc. 2943 (1940) (remarks of Senator
Hatch).
33. 496 F.2d at 171-72.
34. Id. at 173. Indeed, the record did not reveal that defendant Stein was em-
powered to make such statements. Id. at 173 n.56.
35. Id. at 172, 173. The court expressly noted that under certain circumstances,
as when the nation is at war, such restraint might be justified. Id. at 173 n.59, citing
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). See note 13 and accompanying
text supra. Furthermore, the court recognized the validity of subsequent punishment
in certain situations by indicating that, had appellants been discharged after having
made remarks interfering with the plebiscite or casting doubt upon PHA impar-
tiality, such action might have been valid. 496 F.2d at 1.73.
The court'also rejected a "right-privilege" argument which was based upon
the premise that employment is a privilege for which an employee may be required
to waive the right of free speech. 496 F.2d at 173 n.61. See Van Alstyne, The Demise
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order that it reflect only the purpose which the government seeks to
achieve. 36
While deciding that the defendant's memorandum must fail as an illegal
prior restraint, the court stated that it was addressing only the issue pre-
sented by the instant facts, and that it was unnecessary to consider the
validity of a more narrowly drawn memorandum.8 7 Thus, unlike the Su-
preme Court in Letter Carriers and Broad rick, the Alderman court did not
reach any question ,of "overbreadth" or "vagueness." 8
The Third Circuit's refusal to apply the reasoning of the Hatch Act
cases in order to sustain this blanket restriction upon speech was apparently
correct. Even though there are certain similarities between the Stein memo-
randum and the Hatch Act,8 9 a careful reading of the Act and the cases
which have interpreted it reveals that its sole purpose is to restrict partisan
political activity.
The first case in which the Supreme Court considered the validity of
the Hatch Act was United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell,40 in
which a union and several federal employees sought an injunction against
enforcement of the Hatch Act in order that they might participate in partisan
activities.41 In sustaining the constitutionality of the statute, the Court
stated:
It is only partisan political activity that is interdicted . . . . [Only]
active participation in political management and political campaigns
[is proscribed]. Expressions, public or private, on public affairs, per-
sonalities and matters of public interest, not an objective of party
action, are unrestricted by law so long as the Government employee
does not direct his activities toward party success.
42
This holding was confirmed in Letter Carriers wherein a union, several
federal employees, and both major parties sought to enjoin as unconstitu-
tional the Civil Service Commission's threatened enforcement of the Act's
36. 496 F.2d at 174. Even if the PHA's purpose had been to prevent partisan
political activity, in the court's view, the failure of the memorandum to reflect such
specificity made it incapable of meeting the heavy burden imposed by first amendment
doctrine. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. "Overbreadth" analysis involves a determination of whether a statute is
overly sweeping in coverage. Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83
HARV. L. REV. 844, 845 (1970). Recognizing that a statute might impose an un-
justifiable prior restraint and be overbroad as well, the Alderman court declined to
use the "overbreadth analysis," reasoning that such a technique serves the purposes
of allowing legislatures to redraft statutes, of removing the "chilling effect" of subse-
quent punitive measures, and of permitting plaintiffs to assert a 'us tertii, none of
which were of any significance or utility in the instant case. 496 F.2d at 173 n.57.
But see 48 TEMPLE L.Q. 192 (1974).
39. Both constitute prior restraints upon expression, enforced by the mechanism
of dismissal. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
40. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
41. Id. at 82.
42. Id. at 100.
[VOL. 20414
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prohibition against partisan activity. 43  Speaking for the Court, Justice
White said:
Our judgment is that neither the First Amendment nor any other
provision of the Constitution invalidates a law barring this kind of
partisan political conduct by federal employees.
44
In Broadrick, the Court applied a similar rationale to deny the consti-
tutional attack by three state employees on section 818 of the Oklahoma
Merit System of Personnel Administration Act,45 a state counterpart of
the Hatch Act.
46
Finally, it must be noted that the statute specifically authorizes non-
partisan political activity by Government employees.47 Therefore, the Hatch
Act, by its terms, applies only to partisan political activity, and the Hatch
Act decisions, permitting, as they do, only the narrowest of prior restraints,
do not justify the restraint imposed in Alderman.
Despite the soundness of its reasoning with regard to the inapplicability
of the Hatch Act cases, the Third Circuit, without further analysis, dis-
missed the possibility that a restraint on all the speech of public employees
might meet one of the other exceptions to the interdiction against censor-
ship.48 The facts of Alderman, however, indicate that the interests of the
PHA, in preventing its employees from interfering with the plebiscite,
appear as great as those of the Federal Government, upheld in the Hatch
Act decisions. The district court had outlined the PHA's interests while
discussing the problems the Stein memorandum had been designed to
alleviate. First, there had been a history of violent confrontation between
PHA employees and RAB advocates, 49 and because of the longstanding
antipathy of PHA employees toward the RAB, it was possible that many
would have actively campaigned against the latter organization.50 Second,
this campaigning would have created two additional sets of problems. The
PHA tenants had felt that the RAB and the PHA were conspiring to take
advantage of them, 51 but, at the same time, they had been dependent upon
43. 413 U.S. at 551.
44. Id. at 556.
45. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 818 (Supp. 1974).
46. 413 U.S. at 616-17.
47. The Statute provides in pertinent part:
Section 7324(a) (2) of this title does not prohibit political activity in connec-
tion with-
(2) a question which is not specifically identified with a National or State political
party or political party of a territory or possession of the United States.
5 U.S.C. § 7326 (1970).
48. 496 F.2d at 174.
49. 365 F. Supp. at 355.
50. Id. at 358.
51. Id. at 354. This was confirmed in the minds of the tenants by the RAB's
refusal to deal with the dope pusher problem, the conviction of the head of the RAB
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social workers and other PHA employees, and very susceptible to coer-
cion.5 2 As well as fearing problems with the tenants, the PHA officials had
believed that the RAB would accuse them of attempting to interfere with
the election and would, therefore, seek to enjoin it.
53
The desire of the PHA to conduct an open election, prevent undue
influence by its employees, and avoid violence appears to be as important
as the Federal Government's desire to prevent political influence from inter-
fering with the effectiveness of its employees. In fact, the intimidation of
voters by government employees seems quite similar to the political intimida-
tion of government employees which the Hatch Act sought to avoid. Both the
Act and the memorandum were designed to prevent corruption within the
government bureaucracy. And in the age of Watergate, it is particularly
important to ensure the impartiality and honesty of all government em-
ployees. It is arguable, therefore, that the Alderman court incorrectly struck
the balance between restraint of speech and government interest because
it failed to give adequate weight to the government's interest in maintaining
order. Moreover, this conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the plaintiffs
were PHA employees, and the Third Circuit recognized a possibly greater
agency interest in limiting the speech of its employees, than in regulating
the expression of the general populace.54 However, since there was evidence
in the instant case of only the possibility of disturbance, it seems that the
court did not substantially undervalue the government's interest.
In addition, any such underestimation of this interest appears minor in
view of the PHA's extralegal attempts to obtain employee signatures. The
clearest form of prior restraint arises when, as a result of statutory author-
ization, an executive official requires advance approval of a communication. 5
Nothing in the Pennsylvania Housing Authority Law Act,5 6 however, gives
the Executive Director of any Pennsylvania Housing Authority such a
right. It appears that the defendant, therefore, acted extralegally.
The future significance of Alderman is questionable because the court
failed to make any attempt to list various factors which courts should con-
sider when weighing the interests of the government against those of the
individual. Justice Holmes, by way of dicta, suggested some guidelines in
Schenck v. United States,5 7 when he noted that such factors as the Nation
being at war, or the possibility of panic, might justify imposing prior re-
straint upon free speech.58 It is submitted that the weight assigned to other
52. Id. at 355.
53. Id. This was a correct conclusion, since RAB brought suit to enjoin the
election on December 5, 1972. See id. at 356.
54. 496 F.2d at 173, 174. Cf. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968),
where the Court, in dicta, stated, "it cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests
as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly
from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry
in general." Id. at 568.
55. See Emerson, supra note 9, at 655.
56. PA. STAT. ANx. tit. 35, §§ 1541 et seq. (1964).
57. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
58. Id. at 52.
[VOL. 20
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factors could be important to courts in evaluating the government's interest.
Specifically, the Alderman court should have discussed the significance of
the government's interest in maintaining discipline, the probable diminution
of the agency's efficacy due to its employees' statements, the possibility of
violence caused by the employees' statements or activities, and whether the
restraint applies to working hours or at all times. It is submitted that a
discussion of the priority of these factors would avoid the application of
mechanical justice, and would aid courts in accurately weighing the interests
of both parties as well as promoting uniformity -of decision.
The need for such a discussion is clearly demonstrated by the im-
portance of applying the first amendment balancing test uniformly and
impartially. In order to do this, a court must weigh all the evidence to
determine if the government has, indeed, met the heavy burden of over-
coming the presumption that any prior restraint is unconstitutional. This
difficult task would be greatly facilitated by the existence of clear, concise
criteria. When a court has the opportunity to establish such criteria, but
instead, makes the understandable choice to be cautious and to avoid
narrowing existing precedent, it is an opportunity lost. Indeed, the Alder-
man court's failure to provide future courts with any groundwork upon
which to decide a similar question will prove counterproductive if
future courts are misled into believing that the only possible basis for im-
posing prior restraint upon the speech or actions of Government employees
is to prevent partisan political activity.
It is submitted that the Alderman court correctly refused to sanction
the district court's expansion of the rationale of the Hatch Act to uphold
an unjustified prior restraint. But, if the court had attempted to examine
the government interests more thoroughly, and thus, establish some au-
thority to assist future courts in deciding similar issues, the decision would
have been more valuable. However, since the right of free speech was
properly protected by this decision, it is difficult to harshly criticize the
Third Circuit's result.
Thomas L. Delevie
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FIFTH AMENDMENT - CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE - WAIVER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS OCCURS WHEN A SUSPECT
ANSWERS A QUESTION AND NOT WHEN HE SIGNS A WAIVER FORM.
Collins v. Brierly (1974)
Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder by a Pennsylvania
state court.' At trial, a statement he had made during custodial interroga-
1. Commonwealth v. Collins, 436 Pa. 114, 259 A.2d 160 (1969). Petitioner was
charged with driving the getaway car for an armed robbery which occurred on April
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tion 2 was admitted into evidence. 3 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania, in a plurality opinion,4 affirmed the conviction, holding that failure
to apprise petitioner of the reasons for his detention before he signed a
waiver form 5 constituted a per se violation of his constitutional rights,6 but
that the admission of the statement into evidence had been harmless error. 7
The district court, entertaining a petition for writ of habeas corpus, agreed
that admission of the statement had been a constitutional error and, unlike
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, determined that the error had been preju-
dicial and granted the writ.8 'On appeal by the state, petitioner maintained,
Stanyard, an acquaintance of petitioner, pleaded guilty to murder before petitioner's
case was tried. Id. at 116-18, 259 A.2d at 161-62.
2. Custodial interrogation is the "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into'custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way.' ' Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.' 436, 444 (1966).
3. 436 Pa. at 120-21, .259 A.2d at 163. The 'statement was an admission that
before the occurrence of the murder, petitioner had met Stanyard, the confessed
murderer, at a friend's house, and that he and two others had driven Stanyard to a
site near the scene of the crime. Id. at 122, 259 A.2d at 164.
4. Commonwealth v. Collins was a plurality decision in which only three justices
joined; the other four concurred without expressing their views. Id. at 115, 259
A.2d at 165. Subsequent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions, while not overruling
Collins, have limited or distinguished it, and no case has actually cited it as support
for its decision. See Commonwealth v. McKinney, 453 Pa. 10, 15, 306 A.2d 305, 307
(1973) (limited by implication); Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 451 Pa. 42, 48, 301
A.2d 832, 835 (1973) (distinguished by implication); Commonwealth v. Boykin,
450 Pa. 25, 28, 298 A.2d 258, 260 (1972) (distinguished Collins) ; Commonwealth v.
Swint, 450 Pa. 54, 59, 296 A.2d 777, 780 (1972) (distinguished by implication) ; Com-
monwealth v. Cooper, 444 Pa. 122, 278 A.2d 895 (1971) (precedential value questioned,
but opinion was withdrawn and revised, omitting commentary on need to specifically
inform an accused of exact crime). See Collins v. Brierly, 492 F.2d 735, 738 n.7
(3d Cir. 1974).
5. The waiver form told petitioner of his privilege against self-incrimination
and his right to counsel in compliance with the rule of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 478-79 (1966), and contained a waiver section whereby the signer subscribed
to a statement that he understood his rights but was willing to be interrogated.
Collins v. Brierly, 492 F.2d 735, 737 n.5 (3d Cir. 1974).
6. 436 Pa. at 121, 259 A.2d at 163-64. The state supreme court stated specifi-
cally that "an intelligent and understanding waiver of the right to counsel is impossible
where the defendant has not been informed of the crime which is being investigated."
Id. at 121, 259 A.2d at 163.
7. Id., 259 A.2d at 164. In determining that the error was harmless, the court
reasoned that the "statement could not have harmed appellant, for his own testimony
at trial was identical." Id. at 122, 259 A.2d at 164 (citation omitted).
8. Collins v. Brierley [sic], 336 F. Supp. 1024, 1027-29 (W.D. Pa. 1971). The
district court said that the statement was damaging to petitioner in that he had ad-
mitted being near the scene of the crime with Stanyard, who had pleaded guilty to
murder. Id. at 1027. Furthermore, petitioner's lawyer testified that petitioner did not
clect to take the stand until after the admission was inroduced ino evidence at trial.
Id. The district court reasoned that in holding the admission of the illegal statement
harmless error, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court apparently overlooked Harrison v.
United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968). Id. In Harrison, the United States Supreme
Court held that testimony given by the defendant at his first trial, after illegally ob-
tained statements had been admitted,, had been "fruit of the poisonous tree" and
hence inadmissible at trial. 392 U.S. at 222. Therefore, such information should not
have been admitted at his second trial, since the use of these statements had induced
defendant to take the stand. Id. See 336 F. Supp. at 1027-28. 10
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inter alia,9 that the waiver had been involuntary. The Third Circuit, sitting
en banc, reversed, holding that a waiver of Miranda rights does not occur
until a suspect answers a question, so that even if petitioner had been in-
formed of the nature of the crime under investigation after he signed the
waiver form,10 he nevertheless had made a knowing, intelligent waiver, and
the statement was therefore admissible. Collins v. Brierly, 492 F.2d 735
(3d Cir. 1974) (en banc).
In Miranda v. Arizona," the Supreme Court of the United States
held that a person's privilege against self-incrimination must be protected by
the observance of certain procedures during custodial interrogation. 12 The
Miranda Court also made clear that a defendant may waive these rights,
"provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently."' 3
In such cases, the prosecution has the burden of proving the voluntariness
of a waiver of these protected rights.1 4 Traditionally, courts have assessed
9. Petitioner also contended that the procedure used in Stanyard's pretrial
identification of him was so suggestive that the identification at trial was violative
of due process. 492 F.2d at 740. The Third Circuit agreed with the lower court in
dismissing this argument upon the grounds "that Stanyard's in-court identification
had an independent source and could have been based on Stanyard's prior opportunity
to observe Collins during the hours Collins admittedly spent with Stanyard." Id.
10. The evidence as to the time when petitioner had been given this information,
or whether he had been informed at all, was conflicting. The Collins majority specifi-
cally noted the existence of this conflict, but decided that the waiver had been volun-
tary upon the basis of its assumption that petitioner had been informed after he
signed the form. 492 F.2d at 739. For a discussion of the correctness of this as-
sumption and its effect upon the court's holding, see notes 46-53 and accompanying
text infra.
11. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
12. Id. at 444. The Miranda Court stated:
[U]nless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of
their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it,
the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must
be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence
of an attorney, either retained or appointed.
Id.
13. Id.
14. Upon this point, the Miranda Court stated that:
[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation ... unless it demonstrates the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.
Id.
Moreover, the Court continued to explain the prosecution's burden by noting
that even if the suspect has made a statement indicating the relinquishment of his rights:
If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and 'a statement
is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the de-
fendant knowingly and intelligently waived [his Miranda rights].
Id. at 475. A recent Supreme Court decision has indicated that the prosecution may
sustain its burden by a preponderance of the evidence. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S.
477, 489 (1972).
However, this broad language was modified in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222 (1971), wherein the Supreme Court held that statements which were inadmissible
under Miranda for the prosecution's case in chief were admissible upon cross-examina-
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the totality of the circumstances surrounding a waiver in making a deter-
mination of voluntariness. 15 The circumstances most often considered are
the "background, experience, and conduct of the accused."' 6 Although
several authorities have suggested that courts determine whether or not there
had been given a warning as to the nature of the crime involved, 17 Miranda
did not expressly require that the police, either orally or on a written form,'.
apprise a person of the reasons for his detention and interrogation.' 9
Prior to the instant decision, there had been little judicial discussion of
whether information about the reasons for detention must be included in
order to make a waiver of Miranda rights effective. No federal decision
was directly on point 20 and the only Pennsylvania decision dealing with the
issue was Commonwealth v. Collins,21 the earlier decision in the instant case
wherein the state supreme court had upheld petitioner's conviction. In
related federal decisions, the defendants had been aware ,of the circumstances
which had given rise to their interrogations, 22 but had been unaware either
15. The Supreme Court articulated this test in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
464 (1938). Although Johnson was a pre-Miranda decision, the same type of cir-
cumstances have been considered in post-Miranda decisions. Note, Criminal Procedure
- Lowering the Standard for Defendant's Understanding of his Miranda Rights,
52 N.C.L. REV. 454, 457 (1973). For a post-Miranda decision approving this test,
see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
16. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Courts have also considered
other factors. See United States v. Glasgow, 451 F.2d 557, 558 (9th Cir. 1971)
(knowledge of criminal procedure); United States v. Ramos, 448 F.2d 398, 399
(5th Cir. 1971) (refusal to sign a waiver of rights form) ; United States v. Daniel,
441 F.2d 374, 375 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (failure of the government to ask for
a waiver) ; United States v. Montos, 421 F.2d 215, 222-23 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1022 (1970) (signing a waiver after pre-custodial interrogation) ; Pettyjohn
v. United States, 419 F.2d 651, 653-54 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1058
(1970) (credibility of police officers' testimony); 19 Am. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS
56-68 (1967) (age, mental capacity, prior contact with police, length of interrogation,
fact of incommunicado incarceration, whether statement followed closely after giving
of Miranda warnings). This list is not meant to be exclusive.
17. United States v. Miller, 453 F.2d 634, 636 (4th Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 923 (1972), see note 20 infra; Schenk v. Ellsworth, 293 F.
Supp. 26, 29 (D. Mont. 1968), see note 24 infra; Elsen & Rosett, Protections for
the Suspect Under Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 645, 655 (1967) ; Com-
ment, Miranda and Waiver, 4 WILLAMETTE L.J. 205, 215 (1966).
18. 492 F.2d at 738. In complying with Miranda, some states require the signing
of a waiver form, such as that used in Pennsylvania, as evidence that a person has
been apprised of his Miranda rights and is willing to waive them. The text of the
waiver form involved in the instant case was set forth by the court in a footnote.
Id. at 737 n.5.
19. Id. at 738.
20. For example, in United States v. Miller, 453 F.2d 634 (4th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 923 (1972), the court stated: "Trial judges, who are
obligated to determine the admissibility of a statement, must ...ascertain whether
the suspect really understood the nature of the charges against him . . . ." Id. at 636.
However, this language was dicta and the case dealt with a juvenile.
21. 436 Pa. 114, 259 A.2d 160 (1969). See notes 6 & 7 and accompanying text
supra.
22. Petitioner in the instant case claimed to have been completely unaware that
any crime had been committed. He told police that he took the confessed murderer
for a drive on the night of the crime, dropped him off two blocks from the scene of
the crime, and did not see him again that night. 436 Pa. at 122, 259 A.2d at 164.
[VOL. 20
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of further developments - for example, the victim's subsequent death 23 -
or of the possible criminal sanctions involved.
2 4
In the instant case, the court, in effect, adhered to the traditional
totality ,of the circumstances approach in considering whether a suspect must
receive a warning about the reasons for the investigation before he is able
to make a voluntary waiver. The Collins court initially determined that the
trial court had made a finding of fact that petitioner had been apprised of
the reasons for his detention after he had signed the waiver form but before
he had made the statement.25 Then relying upon language in Miranda to the
effect that all waivers are freely revocable at any time,26 the Third Circuit
reasoned that "a 'waiver' in its usual sense does not occur until a witness
actually answers a question. ' 27 The court stated that petitioner's signing
of the waiver form "had no legally compulsive effect," 28 and was -only a
"freely revocable statement of intent." 29 Thus, the court held that peti-
tioner had made a voluntary and knowing waiver and that his statement
had therefore been admissible.30
By placing the time of waiver at the suspect's affirmative response to
an inquiry, and by concluding that the state trial court found that petitioner
had known why he was being questioned before he answered, the Third
Circuit avoided the question of whether information about the reasons for
detention must be given as part of the "pre-interrogation litany" required
to make the Miranda warnings effective.31 However, in dicta, the majority
did indicate its disapproval of a per se rule which would require inclusion
23. United States ex rel. Hardy v. McMann, 292 F. Supp. 191, 193 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). This was a pre-Miranda case in which the court determined that the volun-
tariness of a confession was not vitiated by the defendant's lack of knowledge of the
victim's subsequent death. For the effect of pre-Miranda decisions as precedent for
post-Miranda cases, see note 15 supra.
24. United States v. Hall, 396 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 918 (1968) (knowledge of the punishment is not a prerequisite to a valid waiver
of constitutional rights). Accord, Zamora v. United States, 369 F.2d 855, 858 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 913 (1967). Contra, Schenk v. Ellsworth, 293 F. Supp.
26, 29 (D. Mont. 1968), in which defendant was aware that his wife was dead, but
did not know he was being charged with her murder. The court held that he should
have been told that he was suspected of murder before any statement was taken. Id.
25. 492 F.2d at 738. See notes 46-53 and accompanying text infra.
26. 492 F.2d at 739, citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The
Collins court relied upon the statement in Miranda that if the person being inter-
rogated
indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult
with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the
individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be inter-
rogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have
answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not
deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he
has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.
384 U.S. at 444-45.
27. 492 F.2d at 739.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 739-40.
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in a warning of the reasons for interrogation in order for a statement to be
voluntary.2 The majority expressly stated that the matter of whether or
not the defendant had this knowledge was just one factor to be considered
in determining the validity of a waiver.
33
The dissenters3 4 agreed with the majority's ad hoc approach to the
determination of voluntariness, but disagreed with its reversal of the grant
of habeas corpus.3 5 Like the majority, they disapproved of an expansion of
the Miranda holding by means of a per se rule dictating that all persons
under interrogation must be informed of the nature of the crime being in-
vestigated, 6 but they thought that the lack of such information should be
one of the factors considered in passing upon the voluntariness of a waiver.
3 7
The dissent disputed the majority's statement that there had been a finding
of fact that petitioner had been informed about the crime being investi-
gated.38 They reasoned that the case would have to be remanded for a
finding upon this issue,3 9 and for a finding regarding the sequence of events
occurring during the interrogation,40 before the voluntariness of the waiver
could be considered. 41 The dissent said that upholding the validity of the
waiver without such a finding would undercut Miranda's requirement of a
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver and would abridge petitioner's
constitutional rights.42
Since the voluntariness of any waiver of Miranda rights must be deter-
mined by a consideration of all "the particular facts and circumstances sur-
rounding th[e] case,"'43 and since petitioner's knowledge of the reason for
his interrogation would seem to have been a relevant fact, the dissent's
position appears to be compelling, because had petitioner indeed not been
informed of the nature of the crime until after he made a statement, the
factual premise of the majority's opinion would be faulty.
32. Id.
33. Id. The court stated:
It is possible that in some situations the fact that the suspect was not aware of
the offense under investigation would be of concern to the court in evaluating the
totality of the circumstances to determine the voluntariness of a statement. This
is quite different, however, from a holding that unless the information is included
in the pre-interrogation litany, a confession is per se inadmissible.
Id.
34. Judge Adams wrote the dissenting opinion in which Judges McLaughlin and
Van Dusen joined. Id. at 740 (dissenting opinion).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 741.
37. Id. at 742.
38. Id. at 740.
39. Id. at 743. The dissent also would have remanded for a finding of fact as to
whether petitioner had been aware of his ability to reassert his rights at any time. Id.
40. Id. See note 46 and accompanying text infra.
41. 492 F.2d at 743.
42. Id. at 741.
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While the court's result is questionable, the facts that Miranda did not
expressly require that a suspect be told of the reason for his interrogation,
4 '
and that the traditional test of voluntariness looks at the facts of each case,
make it seem that the court's approval of an ad hoc approach was well
founded. However, since, in the instant case, the possibility existed that
petitioner was never told why he was being detained, the court's opinion
creates a major difficulty because it did not discuss how the lack of such
information affected the voluntariness of this particular defendant's waiver.
As the dissent pointed out, it is not clear that the state trial court made
any finding of fact as to whether petitioner had received any information
concerning the reason for his detention prior to making a statement.45
There was conflicting evidence concerning the time at which petitioner
was informed of the reasons for his interrogation. There were three ver-
sions: 1) petitioner testified at the suppression hearing that he did not
receive this information until after he made the statement; 2) the arresting
officer testified at the suppression hearing that he had told petitioner after
the signing of the waiver form, but before the questioning; and 3) the ar-
resting officer testified at trial that petitioner had been informed before
he signed the waiver form. 46 In concluding that petitioner had known about
the crime before he made a statement, 47 the instant court relied upon the
trial court's statement, in rejecting petitioner's motion for a new trial, that:
"[c]ounsel also argues that [the statement] is inadmissible because
the officers did not advise Collins of the reasons for his detention on
44. 492 F.2d at 738. The argument that a knowing and voluntary waiver of
Miranda rights requires awareness of the crime under investigation may have its
inspiration in the similar requirement for sustaining guilty pleas: in order to enter a
valid guilty plea, a defendant must know the exact crime to which he is pleading
guilty. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721-22 (1948). It can be argued by
analogy that in order to waive effectively his privilege against self-incrimination, the
defendant must know the nature of the crime in which he may implicate himself.
However, the Collins court rejected this analogy and distinguished between the
instant case and a guilty plea:
Nowhere is there the slightest indication that there must be included a [Miranda]
warning about the nature of the crime which has led to the interrogation con-
ference, what the penalty is for the offense, what: the elements of the offense
consist of, and similar matters. That these might be requisites for the entry of a
valid guilty plea in open court is not relevant to the standards applicable to the
custodial interrogation stage of a prosecution. In a sense, all of these elements
might conceivably enter into an 'intelligent and understanding' rejection of an
offer for the assistance of counsel, but the simple answer is that Miranda does
not by its terms go so far.
492 F.2d at 738.
45. 492 F.2d at 741 (dissenting opinion).
46. Id. at 737.
47. Id. at 738. In so deciding, the Collins court chose between the detective's
conflicting accounts, wholly disregarding petitioner's testimony. Id. at 739 n.10. As
the dissent pointed out, there is no indication in the record that the state trial court
actually considered petitioner's contention that he had been uninformed of the reasons
for his interrogation. Id. at 740 n.1. Hence, there was no finding of fact that peti-
tioner's version was untrue. Absent such a finding, there seems to have been as much
reason to believe petitioner as the detective - indeed, petitioner did not relate two
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questioning until after he was advised of his rights, and until after he
signed the waiver. It is our opinion that the sequence is unimportant
as long as Collins knew his rights when the questioning began. That
this is so is, in our opinion, an established fact." . . . "We believe that
Collins was properly apprised of these matters and that he effectively
waived his privilege and that he did so knowingly and intelligently. '4
The Collins majority interpreted this language as "a finding that the officers
had in fact advised the petitioner of the reasons for his interrogation. '49
But as the dissent pointed out, these statements were not findings that
petitioner was aware of the murder when he signed the waiver form, but
only that he was aware of his Miranda rights.50 The majority also stated
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court apparently had interpreted the trial
court's language in the former manner because the state appellate court's
holding "assumed that there was error based on the time when notice
was given, not that it was actually lacking."51 However, this interpretation
provides no real support for the Third Circuit's conclusion because the
assumption made by the state supreme court also represents an erroneous
reading of the trial court's language.52 The majority further supported its
conclusion by citing the state trial court's finding at the suppression hearing
"that the oral statement was given voluntarily by the defendant and after
he had intelligently waived his rights. '5 3 However, this language was not
an unassailable finding of fact upon the issue of voluntariness because the
trial court did not state which test5 4 it had employed or the factual con-
siderations5 it had used in arriving at its conclusion. Thus, because of the
questionable validity .of the court's conclusion that petitioner had been told,
before he had answered a question, that he was being interrogated in connec-
48. Id. at 737-38. "These matters" to which the trial court referred were those
regarding petitioner's awareness of his Miranda rights. Id. at 738. Knowledge of his
rights to remain silent and to consult with counsel of his choosing does not seem
tantamount to knowledge that he was being questioned about a murder. See notes
49-52 and accompanying text infra.
49. Id. at 738.
50. Id. at 740-41 n.1 (dissenting opinion).
51. Id. at 738.
52. See Id. at 737-38. A careful reading of the trial court's language quoted
by the majority to support its position that petitioner was told the reason for his
interrogation reveals that the trial court never addressed the subject. Id. at 738.
Since the trial court's opinion was never published, one can only presume that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied upon the same language and was also mistaken.
53. Id. at 737 n.6.
54. In LaValle v. Delle Rose, 410 U.S. 690 (1973) (per curiam), the Supreme
Court of the United States held that the opinion of the lower court therein met the
requirements for granting habeas corpus writs as set forth in the United States Code
(28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1970)) because the court had applied the correct standard,
i.e., "totality of the circumstances," in determining the voluntariness of petitioner's
confession. Id. at 695.
55. The federal habeas corpus statute provides that, "if the factfinding procedure
employed by the State court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing," the
petitioner in a habeas corpus proceeding need not sustain the burden of proving that
such finding of fact was erroneous. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2) (1970). The underlying
factual considerations might include whether petitioner was aware of the reason for
the investigation before he made a statement.
[VOL. 20
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tion with a murder, it is submitted that the dissent was correct in suggest-
ing that in order to protect petitioner's rights adequately, the Collins court
should have remanded to the district court for a finding of when and if
petitioner had been so informed.
In addition to the question of the existence of the necessary finding
of fact, the Third Circuit's opinion presents a potential difficulty regarding
its determination of the time of actual waiver. 6 Since the court said the
waiver occurred when the first question was answered after petitioner signed
the waiver form, it is submitted that the signing itself should be considered
as part of the totality of circumstances determining the voluntariness of
the statement. The court, however, said that the signing of the form "had
no legally compulsive effect."'5 7 This statement could have two possible
interpretations. It could mean that although petitioner signed a form waiv-
ing his right to remain silent, he was not legally compelled to speak. Or
the court could have meant that it had examined the totality of the cir-
cumstances and concluded that the signing of a waiver form was not a
legally significant factor in determining the voluntariness of petitioner's
waiver. Under either interpretation the court's reasoning must fail. The
form itself was marked "WAIVER,"5' 8 and as the majority noted, the form
did "not contain the admonition which is seen in some forms advising that
the questioning may be stopped at any time and that the request for an
attorney may be made at any time during the interrogation."5 9 Without
that information, execution of such a form would seem to have, potentially,
a "psychologically compelling effect" since a reasonable person could believe
that he will not be permitted to reassert his rights because signing such a
form is an irrevocable waiver.60 Therefore, when the petitioner answered,
he may not have had sufficient knowledge of his rights - at least of his right
to stop answering - to make a voluntary and intelligent waiver.6' The
possibility that execution of the form actually misled the petitioner means
that the instant court should have completely considered and clearly re-
solved the form's effect upon its determination of voluntariness.
By assuming that petitioner in Collins was actually informed of the
reason for the investigation, rather than remanding for a finding of fact
56. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
57. 492 F.2d at 739.
58. See id. at 737 n.5.
59. Id. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
60. 492 F.2d at 743 (dissenting opinion). This point was also discussed in
Commonwealth v. Collins in which the state supreme court stated:
The crucial moment is the time the waiver is signed. Once an accused has signed
the waiver stating that he is willing to give a statement, it is no longer efficacious
that he then be told what he is being questioned about. The compulsive force
of the unintelligent waiver has already had its effect.
436 Pa. at 121, 259 A.2d at 163-64.
61. As defined by the Supreme Court, "[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). It is difficult to understand how petitioner could have
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upon the issue, the Third Circuit avoided the necessity of indicating clearly
how a suspect's ignorance of this information would affect the voluntariness
of a waiver. However, since the court did assume that Collins knew the
reason for which he was being detained, this opinion does provide a criminal
defendant with support for the position that a suspect must be so informed
before he answers a question and thereby waives his Miranda rights.
By finding that a waiver -occurs when a suspect answers a question,
this decision may allow law enforcement agents to take advantage of "the
psychologically compelling effect"6 2 of signing a waiver form. The inter-
rogator can intentionally withhold information concerning the crime under
investigation until the suspect has signed a waiver form, hoping to mislead
him into making an incriminating statement. Such a possibility underlines
the need to protect a suspect's rights by requiring the waiver form to inform
him that he may, at any time, stop the questioning and refuse to answer. It
is difficult to evaluate the future effect of Collins because the possibly in-
accurate factual basis for the holding renders at least questionable its
precedential value concerning the time at which a suspect must be informed
of the crime being investigated to enable him to execute a valid waiver of
his Miranda rights. A decision based upon more precise lower court factual
findings seems necessary to clarify the present state of uncertainty upon this
issue.
Robin Lincoln
ANTITRUST - PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS THAT DEFENDANTS' AT-
TEMPTS TO CONTROL COMPETITION IN HOSPITAL SERVICES WOULD
REDUCE THE VOLUME OF OUT-OF-STATE SUPPLIES PURCHASED BY AP-
PROXIMATELY 100 AREA HOSPITALS HELD SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH
A SUBSTANTIAL EFFECT UPON INTERSTATE COMMERCE AND THEREBY
CONFER FEDERAL JURISDICTION UNDER SECTIONS 1 AND 2 OF THE
SHERMAN ACT.
Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia (1973)
Plaintiff Doctors, Inc. (Doctors), a nonprofit general hospital located
in Philadelphia, brought suit against Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia
(Blue Cross) and Hospital Survey Committee, Inc.1 (HSC), alleging that
the two defendants had combined and conspired to control the hospital
62. 492 F.2d at 743 (dissenting opinion). See note 60 supra.
1. Hospital Survey Committee, Inc. (HSC), a private, nonprofit corporation,
served as an advisory agency with respect to the coordination and planning of hospital
and health services in the Greater Philadelphia area. Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross of
Greater Philadelphia, 490 F.2d 48, 49 (3d Cir. 1973).
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services market in the Greater Philadelphia area in violation of sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act.2 The defendants filed motions to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter s contending that the alleged illegal
restraints had been imposed solely upon intrastate trade or commerce and
that any effect upon interstate trade or commerce was too remote to confer
jurisdiction. 4 The district court agreed that it lacked subject matter juris-
diction and dismissed the complaint. 5 On appeal, the Third Circuit re-
versed, holding that Doctors' factual allegations regarding the effect of the
activities of Blue Cross and HSC upon the flow of out-of-state supplies
2. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . .. is declared to
be illegal ....
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States . .. shall be deemed guilty of a mis-
demeanor ....
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
The complaint alleged that Blue Cross, which dominates the third-party hos-
pital services payer market in Greater Philadelphia, sought to terminate Doctors'
status as a Blue Cross member hospital as part of a scheme to control the hospital
services market encompassing five Pennsylvania and three New Jersey counties.
Plaintiffs also averred that the scheme violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act
in that: (1) Blue Cross and HSC had used the market power of Blue Cross to desig-
nate which hospital services would be provided in Greater Philadelphia and which
hospitals would provide them; (2) Blue Cross and HSC, with others, had entered
into an illegal contract, combination, and conspiracy to eliminate competition in hos-
pital services in the market area; (3) in furtherance of this scheme, Blue Cross, with
the cooperation of HSC, had illegally refused to deal with Doctors; and (4) the two
defendants had induced a group boycott of Doctors. Finally it was alleged that
because of Blue Cross' dominance of the third-party hospital services payer market,
Doctors could not survive financially unless it remained a Blue Cross member hospital,
since only that status would permit Doctors to be reimbursed by Blue Cross for
services provided to Blue Cross subscribers. 490 F.2d at 49.
3. Defendants' motions were made pursuant to rule 12(b) (1) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1).
4. Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 360 F. Supp. 693, 695
(E.D. Pa. 1973).
Blue Cross advanced a second argument in support of its motion to dismiss,
that it, as an insurance company, was exempt from the Sherman Act because of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1970). 490 F.2d at 49-50 n.2. How-
ever, the court of appeals noted that this claim was not properly before it because the
facts necessary to support the claim had not, as yet, been pleaded, nor had the district
court considered the question. Id.
HSC also filed a motion under rule 12(b) (6) to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. This motion was filed
after the district court had issued an order staying all proceedings pending a decision
upon the rule 12(b) (1) motions. Thus, the district court had not, at the time of
appeal, consideied this alternate motion. The court of appeals, relying upon Andrews v.
Chemical Carriers, Inc., 457 F.2d 636 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972),
refused to consider the motionsince it raised issues of fact not resolved by the district
court prior to its stay of the proceedings. However, the court directed the district
court, to fully consider this motion. on remand. 490 F.2d at 54-55 & n.13.
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and equipment to Doctors and other area hospitals 6 established a sufficiently
substantial effect upon interstate commerce to confer federal jurisdiction
under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross of
Greater Philadelphia, 490 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1973).
Since the enactment of the Sherman Act, it has generally been recog-
nized that Congress intended to exercise its constitutional power to the
fullest extent in restraining trust and monopoly agreements. 7 The reach
of the Act has been described as coextensive with that of Congress' power
to regulate commerce. 8 Thus, as judicial construction has extended the
reach of the commerce clause of the United States Constitution9 to reflect
the courts' recognition of the need for increased federal intervention in
various aspects of the national economy, the interstate commerce foundation
of Sherman Act jurisdiction has been concomitantly expanded.' 0
Presently, Sherman Act jurisdiction exists if the complaint alleges
either (1) activities in the flow of interstate commerce, or (2) activities
which, though occurring at a local level, substantially affect interstate com-
merce." While the latter test would seem to be an outgrowth of the
Supreme Court's "affectation doctrine," established in its interpretation of
6. The complaint alleged the following facts in an attempt to establish jurisdic-
tion: (1) Doctors purchased services and supplies in interstate commerce in the
amount of approximately $2,000,000 (in 1972, $233,430 worth of these supplies came
from companies located outside Pennsylvania) ; (2) 9.6 percent of Doctors' patients
in 1972 came from outside Pennsylvania; (3) Blue Cross distributed over $200,000,000
in reimbursements to member hospitals in Pennsylvania and New Jersey; (4) Blue
Cross serves 2,380,000 subscribers living in Pennsylvania and New Jersey; (5) Blue
Cross invests funds held for reimbursements to member hospitals in firms doing busi-
ness in interstate commerce; and (6) the activities of Doctors are typical of those
hospitals supplying health services throughout the United States. 490 F.2d at 51 n.3.
For purposes of the motion to dismiss, these factual allegations were assumed to be
true. Id. at 51.
7. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944).
8. Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973), quoting REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL
COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 62 (1955).
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Compare the restrictive interpretation given
the interstate commerce clause in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918)
(production is not commerce), with the more recent doctrine that a "substantial
economic effect" upon interstate commerce is sufficient to establish congressional power
over local production. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124-25 (1942).
10. Note, The Commerce Requirement of the Robinson-Patnan Act, 22 HASTINGS
L. REV. 1245, 1254-55 (1971).
Compare an early, restrictive interpretation of the Sherman Act's commerce
requirement - that only direct restraints upon commerce are subject to the Sherman
Act, and only a restraint "in commerce" could be direct, United States v. E.C. Knight
Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895), with the broad "substantial effect" test applied in Burke
v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 322 (1967) (per curiam). For a discussion of the Burke
application to the instant case, see notes 29-36 and accompanying text infra. Cf. Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 95 S. Ct. 392, 398 (1974) (Sherman Act's "in restraint
of trade or commerce" is broader than Clayton Act's "in commerce" requirement).
11. 490 F.2d at 50, citing Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517, 522
(9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973) ; Las Vegas Merch. Plumb. Ass'n
v. United States, 210 F.2d 732, 739 n.3 (9th Cir. 1954) (emphasis added).
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Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce, 12 the Court has failed
to establish any definitive guide for determining when interstate is "substan-
tially affected" under the Sherman Act. Consequently, lower court decisions
demonstrate considerable difficulty and confusion in dealing with this issue.
1"
Confronted with this thorny question, the Doctors court noted that
the answer was one of degree, defying any precise test.14 Thus, the court
rejected the broad formulations often used by other courts, 15 and adopted
the approach of the Ninth Circuit in Rasmussen v. American Dairy Asso-
ciation,16 which recognized that the issue requires "a practical, case-by-case
economic judgment, not a conclusion derived from application of abstract
or mechanistic formulae.'
17
Before applying this test, the Doctors court distinguished Spears Free
Clinic & Hospital v. Cleere 8 and its progeny, 19 which seemed to stand
12. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), in which Mr. Justice
Jackson, speaking for the Court, stated:
[Elven if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded as
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts
a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of
whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as
"direct" or "indirect."
Id. at 125.
13. Compare United States v. Starlite Drive-In, Inc., 204 F.2d 419 (7th Cir.
1953), with United States v. Central States Theatre Corp., 187 F. Supp. 114 (D.
Neb. 1960). See Krotinger, "The Essentially" Local Doctrine and Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 15 W. RES. L. REv. 66, 72-73 (1963).
14. 490 F.2d at 51.
15. Id. See, e.g., Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323, 332 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 825 (1961) ("the effect . . . must be direct and substantial, and not merely
inconsequential, remote or fortuitous") ; Spears Free Clinic & Hosp. v. Cleere, 197
F.2d 125, 128 (10th Cir. 1952) (effect must be direct and substantial rather than in-
cidential and fortuitous).
16. 472 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973).
17. 490 F.2d at 51, quoting Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d'"17,
523 (9th Cir. 1972).
The instant court analyzed the jurisdictional issue in terms of the plaintiff's
averments concerning its purchase of out-of-state supplies, making no attempt to
determine the adequacy of the complaint's other interstate commerce allegations, since
jurisdiction would be established if any one of the allegations were to satisfy the
commerce requirement. 490 F.2d at 51.
18. 197 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1952).
19. Relying upon the analysis in Spears, the Eighth Circuit, in Elizabeth Hosp.,
Inc. v. Richardson, 269 F.2d 167 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959),
dismissed, for want of jurisdiction of the subject matter, a complaint alleging a con-
spiracy by a county medical society and its members to interfere with the referral of
out-of-state patients to the plaintiff hospital. Id. at 171.
Additionally, two lower courts have followed Spears and dismissed antitrust
complaints alleging restraints on the operation of a hospital. In Hospital Bldg. Co. v.
Trustees of Rex Hosp., 1973 Trade Cas. ff 74,428 (E.D.N.C. 1973), aff'd per curiam,
1974-1 Trade Cas. 1 74,903 (4th Cir. 1974), the court found interstate commerce
allegations similar to those in Doctors insufficient to confer jurisdiction, because
hospital and medical services were considered a local business that only incidentally
affected interstate commerce. Id. at 93,919. In Nankin Hosp. v. Michigan Hosp.
Serv., 361 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Mich. 1973), another case factually similar to Doctors,
the court concluded that the hospital was neither engaged in interstate commerce
nor able to demonstrate that its business had any effect upon interstate commerce.
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for the proposition that no allegation of a restraint upon the operation of
a hospital or the furnishing of hospital services could be sufficient to confer
Sherman Act jurisdiction, because of the local character of that business
and its only incidental involvement with interstate commerce. 20 In Spears,
the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a Sherman Act complaint which
alleged a conspiracy to prevent the operation of the plaintiff's chiropractic
hospital and to monopolize "the practice of the healing arts" in Colorado,
upon the ground that any effect upon interstate commerce was fortuitous,
incidental, and remote.21 While noting Spears' factual similarity to the
instant case, the Doctors court nevertheless rejected the reasoning of
Spears on two grounds.
Initially, the court noted that Spears placed primary reliance upon
cases which looked to the intent of the alleged conspiracy as dispositive
of the jurisdictional issue.22 In Spears, dismissal of the complaint was
affirmed because the alleged conspiracy had for its purpose the restraint
of purely local activities, 28 and "it is this exclusively local aim and not the
fortuitous and incidental effect upon interstate ...commerce which gives
character to the conspiracy .... "24 The Tenth Circuit's use of this juris-
dictional test was questionable because the Supreme Court had abandoned
jurisdiction is not that the acts complained of affect a business engaged in interstate
commerce, but that the conduct complained of affects the interstate commerce of
such business." Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323, 330 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
875 (1961).
. . However, it is questionable whether the Ninth Circuit still recognizes Page
as setting down the definitive test of jurisdiction. In Rasmussen, decided some 10
years later, that court noted that each case was one of degree, and that:
In essence, the test is whether "the facts of the particular situation . ..deter-
mine . . . that the relationship to interstate commerce is too tenuous in a practical
sense to warrant federal control."
472"'f.2d at 524, quoting Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy
1933-1946 (Part 1), 59 HARv. L. REV. 645, 673 (1946).
20. 490 F.2d at 51.
21. 197 F.2d at 126.
22. 490 F.2d at 52. Spears quoted at length from Levering & Garrigues Co. v.
Morrin, 289 U.S. 103 (1933), and United Leather Workers Int'l Union v. Herkert
& Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457 (1924). 197 F.2d at 127-28. In Levering, the
Supreme Court had upheld dismissal of a complaint for lack of jurisdiction saying:
Accepting the allegations of the bill at their face value, it results that the sole
aim of the conspiracy was to halt or suppress local building operations as a means
of compelling union labor . . . . Restraint of interstate commerce was not an
object of the conspiracy. Prevention of the local use was in no sense a means
adopted to effect such a restraint. It is this exclusively local aim, and not the
fortuitous and incidental effect upon interstate commerce which gives character to
the conspiracy.
289 U.S. at 107 (emphasis added). Earlier, in United Leather Workers, the Court
had required dismissal for lack of jurisdiction because a complaint alleging a strike to
prevent the employer's continued manufacturing did not state an antitrust cause of
action when the strikers "did nothing which in any way directly interfered with the
interstate transportation or sales of the complainants' product." 265 U.S. at 471.
Compare the jurisdictional approach of these cases with that of Burke v.
Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam). See note 29 infra.
23. 197 F.2d at 126 (emphasis added).
24. Id. at 127.
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this method of analyzing effects upon interstate commerce in 1942, in
Wickard v. Filburn,2 5 when it began to use an ad hoc economic deter-
mination of what constituted a substantial effect upon interstate commerce
which would make an activity subject to congressional commerce power
regulation.2 6 Therefore, the Doctors court rejected Spears because it had
relied upon an outmoded jurisdictional test.
27
Moreover, the court said that Spears was defective because its analysis
was not in accord with the Supreme Court's more liberal analysis in United
States v. Employing Plasterers Association28 and Burke v. Ford.29 The
instant court noted factual similarities between Burke and Employing
Plasterers that made their reasoning applicable to the instant case: First, in
all three cases the alleged conspiracy was to obtain control of a local com-
petitive market.30  Second, in each case it was contended that the effect
of the conspiracy was to restrain competition and to eliminate some com-
petitors. 31 Lastly, the complaints in all three cases alleged that the flow
of a significant amount of out-of-state goods would be affected by the
illegal acts. 32 Neither Burke nor Employing Plasterers discussed "direct"
effect or the specific relationship between the flow of goods affected and
the local market controlled, and in both cases the thrust of the Supreme
Court's analysis was whether "the logical and therefore probable effect"
3 3
of the defendants' alleged activities was to reduce in some degree interstate
traffic in certain goods.
3 4
25. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
26. Id. at 125. See note 12 supra.
27. 490 F.2d at 52.
28. 347 U.S. 186 (1954). Employing Plasterers was an action under section 1 of
the Sherman Act alleging a conspiracy on the part of a Chicago trade association of
plastering contractors, a local labor union, and that union's president to restrain com-
petition among plastering contractors in Chicago. It was alleged that the restraint
on plastering work in the Chicago area adversely affected the interstate flow of plas-
tering materials. Id. at 188. The Supreme Court found these allegations sufficient to
confer jurisdiction. Id. at 189.
29. 389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam). In Burke, Oklahoma liquor retailers
brought suit under section 1 of the Sherman Act to enjoin Oklahoma wholesalers
from dividing a statewide liquor market by territories and brands. Id. at 321. The
Supreme Court, in reversing the lower court's dismissal for failure to satisfy the
Act's interstate commerce jurisdictional prerequisite, found that the territorial divisions
involved would almost surely result in fewer sales to retailers and thus fewer pur-
chases from out-of-state distillers, and that the division of brands could make fewer
wholesale outlets available to an out-of-state distiller. This scheme was described as
having an "inevitable" effect upon interstate commerce that satisfied the Act's re-
quirements. Id. at 322.
30. 490 F.2d at 53. In Burke, the market was the Oklahoma retail liquor busi-
ness. 389 U.S. at 320-21. In Employing Plasterers, the market was the Chicago
plaster contracting trade. 347 U.S. at 187-88. And, in Doctors, the market was that
for hospital services in Greater Philadelphia. 490 F.2d at 49.
31. See 490 F.2d at 53.
32. Id. In Burke, the flow into Oklahoma of out-of-state liquor would have been
affected, 389 U.S. at 321-22; in Employing Plasterers, it was the flow of plastering
materials. 347 U.S. at 188. In Doctors, the flow of medical supplies used to provide
hospital services would be diminished. 490 F.2d at 51. See note 37 infra.
33. 490 F.2d at 53.
34. See 389 U.S. at 322.
23
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Therefore, the Doctors court said, the Supreme Court's change in
analytical emphasis, and the practical economic judgment test of Ras-
mussen,35 meant that the factual allegations of the complaint concerning
the effect that defendants' activities would have upon the flow of supplies
from other states to Doctors and other hospitals in the Greater Philadelphia
area were substantial and, therefore, satisfied the jurisdictional require-
ment of the Sherman Act.
30
While it found jurisdiction based upon these allegations, the Third
Circuit noted that the issue was one of degree, as almost any restraint upon
local commerce would be likely to affect interstate commerce in some way.
Therefore, the court pointed out that judicial vigilance would be necessary
in order to avoid making the interstate commerce prerequisite of the
Sherman Act superfluous.8 7 Nevertheless, it believed that a case-by-case
factual determination would be sufficient to ensure that courts would con-
tinue to require any alleged illegal activity to bear the probability of having
35. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
36. 490 F.2d at 53. The court noted "conceivable" distinctions between Burke,
Employing Plastering, and the instant case. Id. at 52-53. In Burke, the same goods,
liquor, were involved in interstate commerce and sold in the intrastate market sought
to be controlled, while in Doctors, the medical supplies only constituted part of the
"services" which the hospital "produced." However, in Employing Plasterers, the
Supreme Court attached no significance to the fact that the affected plastering
material which had been shipped interstate was only an ingredient of the plastering
work in the Chicago market that the defendants tried to control. 347 U.S. at 188.
The instant court also noted that in Employing Plasterers, out-of-state as
well as in-state plasterers were allegedly excluded from the Chicago market, while in
Doctors only intrastate businesses were allegedly affected. However, in Burke, as in
Doctors, all of the competitors whom defendants were allegedly restraining operated
only intrastate. 490 F.2d at 52. The Doctors court believed that these distinctions
were insignificant in light of both the Court's flexible approach in Burke and Employ-
ing Plasterers and the underlying similarities between the three cases. Indeed, all
three involved a conspiracy, aimed at an entire market, to limit overall competition,
and in each case, there was a likelihood that the flow of supplies allegedly affected
would decline if overall market activity declined. See id. at 53.
37. Id. at 53-54. The court said that cases which found no federal jurisdiction
such as Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes, Inc., 332 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1964), and
Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 875 (1961), were still
good law. 490 F.2d at 54. In Lieberthal, there had been alleged a conspiracy to
prevent the opening of a bowling alley. Since the conspiracy was aimed at only one
bowling establishment, and since the equipping of the alley with out-of-state supplies
would only be undertaken once, the Second Circuit found no substantial effect upon
interstate commerce. 332 F.2d at 272. The thrust of the analysis in both Lieberthal
and Page, however, was whether or not the flow of supplies was incidental to the
business being restrained, an analysis which, it seems, the Doctors court rejected.
It may have been important in Doctors, as the court noted, that the alleged scheme
of the defendants was directed to all hospitals in the local market; thus the flow of
interstate supplies to them would be affected as well. See text accompanying note 32
supra. However, the significance the court attached to this factor is unclear in view
of its subsequent statement, made while discussing Burke and Employing Plasterers,
that in those cases the Supreme Court had not been concerned "with the specific
magnitude of the impact on interstate commerce caused by the alleged conspiracy."
490 F.2d at 53 & n.11.
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a "substantial effect" upon interstate commerce before they would find
federal jurisdiction.38
It is submitted that the Doctors court's decision to employ an ad hoc
economic determination to resolve this difficult jurisdictional issue was well
considered. It would seem that, through Burke, the Supreme Court placed
a new judicial gloss upon the commerce requirement of the Sherman Act
when it analyzed the jurisdictional issue in terms of whether it could
logically be said that interstate commerce would be adversely affected by
the alleged illegal restraints8 9 The Third Circuit seems to have adopted
this analytical framework, thus recognizing that the Sherman Act was
intended to go to the limits of the congressional commerce power in regu-
lating activities deemed harmful to the national economy and adverse to
its fundamental precept of free competition. 40 The fact that a restraint
does not directly affect the interstate commerce aspect of a business should
not be a deterrent to a court's finding of Sherman Act jurisdiction. More
specifically, the use of out-of-state supplies and equipment in hospital and
health services is an integral part of that business which would be ad-
versely, although indirectly, affected by an anticompetitive scheme. As Mr.
Justice Jackson stated, "if it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch,
it does not matter how local the operation which applies the squeeze."
' 4 1
Thus, the primary significance of Doctors is the Third Circuit's rejec-
tion of the mechanistic "direct and substantial" test of Sherman Act juris-
diction. Future allegations of effects upon interstate commerce in antitrust
cases will be scrutinized in light of the facts pleaded, not the nature of the
plaintiff's business nor the regional character of the alleged restraint. While
the decision is unlikely to open the door to frivolous Sherman Act com-
plaints, provided courts continue to require and closely examine any al-
legedly substantial effects, there may be a significant increase in private
actions based on activities which occur solely intrastate. Nevertheless, in
view of society's need to maintain a freely competitive economic system,
any increased case load generated by the Doctors opinion seems entirely
justifiable.
Robert E. Goldstein
38. 490 F.2d at 54.
39. Note, supra note 10, at 1254. See 389 U.S. at 321-22.
40. See Krotinger, supra note 13, at 67.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CIVIL SUIT FOR VIOLATION OF FOURTH
AMENDMENT - POLICE OFFICERS MAY NOT ENTER THE HOME OF
AN INNOCENT CITIZEN IN SEARCH OF A SUSPECTED OFFENDER FOR
WHOM THEY HAVE A VALID ARREST WARRANT ABSENT INDE-
PENDENT PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THE SUSPECT IS ON THE
PREMISES ENTERED.
Fisher v. Volz (1974)
Plaintiff brought a civil suit for damages under the Civil Rights Act of
1871,1 for alleged police 2 violations of her fourth amendment3 rights in an
incident which occurred within 8 days of an armed bank robbery.4 Almost
1. The Civil Rights Act of 1871 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulations, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
2. Defendants were all members of the Newark, New Jersey, Police Department.
Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d 333, 335 (3d Cir. 1974).
3. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. 496 F.2d at 335. Four armed men had taken $69,000 from a bank and had
wounded a policeman during their escape. Id. There were three suits based upon
different incidents arising out of that same transaction, but two of the three are not
pertinent to the Third Circuit's principal holding, with which the instant note deals.
Therefore, the court's resolution of the issues raised by these events merits only
abbreviated discussion.
In the first of these incidents, the police predicated their entry and search
of the plaintiffs' unoccupied apartments upon the tip of an informant of questionable
reliability. Id. at 343-48. After forcing entry and failing to find the suspect, the
police left without locking or securing any of the apartments, or notifying any of the
rightful occupants of the entry. At trial there had been conflicting testimony about
whether there had been sufficient time to procure a search warrant; however, the
defendant admitted that he had never procured a search warrant in 26 years on the
force. Id. at 343-45. The Third Circuit sustained an award of punitive damages,
finding that the "jury might reasonably have concluded that the defendant was
unconcerned with th constitutional rights of the plaintiffs," or that failing to guard
the apartments evidenced a gross disregard for the plaintiffs' property and that the
defendant was not, therefore, being held liable upon the grounds of respondeat superior.
Id. at 347.
On appeal, the defendant asserted that he had been entitled to an instruction
that good faith in ordering entries into the plaintiffs' apartments constituted a defense
to the section 1983 action. Id. at 348. The court disallowed this as to him, but in
remanding the principal case, suggested that, in the light of the holding in Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), "good faith" and "probable cause" would be a defense
to a 1983 action. 496 F.2d at 348 & n.27. See notes 95-103 and accompanying text
infra.
The second incident involved allegations of police brutality for which the
plaintiff could recover only if the doctrine of respondeat superior could be used
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immediately after the robbery, several known or suspected participants
were identified, and warrants for their arrest were obtained by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Within 5 days, three had been arrested,
and the police and the FBI continued their hunt for the other suspects.
During the course of this search, the police and-the FBI entered plaintiff
Bass' apartment during her absence, by mistake, after they had confused
her with another person who was linked to a suspect by prior association
and through a phone number discovered by the FBI at the suspect's home. 5
The jury found for the defendant, and on appeal, the plaintiff con-
tended first that the jury should have been instructed 6 that probable cause
to believe the suspect was in the dwelling entered was an indispensible and
independent requirement notwithstanding the presence of exigent circum-
against the defendant. Id. at 348-49. While not deciding that vicarious liability is
never applicable under section 1983, the court held that it would not support an award
of punitive damages. Id. at 349.
5. 496 F.2d at 334-36. The FBI told the Newark Police Department (defendant
MacDonald) that a suspect could be found. at the address. However, the FBI Special
Agent-in-Charge testified that at the time of entry he had had no indication of the
presence of the suspects in the apartment. Id. at 337. The person, "B. Bass," thought
to be aiding the fugitive, was registered at the apartment house under another name.
Id. at 336 n.4. As a result, the plaintiff had been identified to the combined FBI-Police
squad which had come to search the "B. Bass" apartment as the only resident by
that name in the building. Having obtained' a key from the building superintendent,
the force of approximately 10 officers and agents knocked at plaintiff Bass' door,
and then entered and searched the empty apartment. Id. at 336. At trial, while the
plaintiff alleged no physical damage, she did testify that she had been embarrassed
and humiliated by the incident. Id. at 336 & n.5. MacDonald testified that he had
never obtained a search warrant in 24 years police service even though he had
entered "thousands" of apartments. Id. at 337.
6. The charge given was based upon Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385
(D.C. Cir. 1970), which involved, a' warrantless nighttime entry of the suspect's
home for the purposes of arresting him. See text accompanying notes 16-20 infra.
The trial court in Fisher instructed the jury as follows :
Therefore, in determining whether there were exigent circumstances and
whether the defendants were entitled to search the plaintiffs' homes in the absence
of search warrants you, the jury, may consider a number of factors that are
material. (1) [W]hether or not a grave offense is involved, particularly one
that is a crime of violence. (2) [W]hether or not the suspect was reasonably
believed to be armed. Was he in fact a dangerous suspect? (3) [[W]hether]
delay in arrest of an armed felon may well increase [the] danger to the com-
munity or to the officers at [the] time of arrest . . . . (4) . . . .Was there more
than a minimum of probable cause to believe that the suspect committed the
crime involved? (5) . . . .Was there strong reason to believe that the suspect
was in the premises being entered? (6) . . . . Was there a likelihood that the
suspect would escape if not swiftly apprehended .... .. (7) . . . . Was the
entry, although-not consented to, . . .made peaceably? (8) [T]he time of entry.
(9) [W]hat delay if any, would have been involved in the obtaining of a
warrant. (10) [W]hether or not the defendants announced the purpose and
authority of their planned entry before breaking into the plaintiffs' homes. (11)
[T]he availability or lack of availability of a magistrate or judge to whom the
defendants could have applied and the time or opportunity for such application.
496 F.2d at 337-38 n.8. Upon review, the appellate court found: that there had
been testimony to support factors 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, and 11 ; that there had been no evidence
upon 4 and 6; that 5 and 9 were disputed; and that 1) was inapplicable since no
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stances ;7 and, second, that liability should have been imposed as a matter
of law since the fourth amendment requires that police, even with an arrest
warrant, first procure a search warrant or obtain the occupant's consent
before entering a third party's dwelling.8 The Third Circuit reversed in
part and affirmed in part, hdlding, inter alia, that while probable cause must
be established as an indispensible, independent factor notwithstanding the
presence of exigent circumstances, the police, seeking a suspect pursuant to
an arrest warrant, are not invariably required to obtain a search warrant
before entering a third party's dwelling. Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d 333
(3d Cir. 1974).
There have been few cases which involved factual circumstances and
problems identical to those presented in Fisher. Instead, the constitutional
perceptions relevant to the law of arrests and the law of search and seizure
have grown out of criminal cases. 9 To a large extent, these perceptions
have necessarily been shaped by the demands of the criminal law and the
remedy of suppression of evidence. In a Fisher situation, although fourth
amendment rights are also involved, the application of criminal precedent
would seem to generate different and complex problems. Therefore, it is
extremely important to any analysis of Fisher to understand, as a central
notion, that the law of arrest and the law of search and seizure relate to
different aspects of the fourth amendment. Thus, the courts generally re-
quire certainty and judicial review1 ° to uphold a search, but appear to test
arrests against a reasonableness standard.' Confusion results because the
courts describe both of these different tests as probable cause. Although
these criteria would seem to intersect when the case involves an arrest
entry, that result has not obtained, as the courts have viewed this intrusion
as an arrest and not as a search for a person. Thus, the constitutional prece-
dent most relevant to Fisher is that which discusses arrest entries made
under exigent circumstances or with arrest warrants.' 2
7. 496 F.2d at 338.
8. Id. at 342.
9. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-76 (1971).
10. E.g., Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), where the Court said:
Save in certain cases as incident to arrest, there is no sanction in the decisions
of the courts, federal or state, for the search of a private dwelling house without
a warrant. Absence of any judicial approval is persuasive authority that it is
unlawful .... Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed
in a dwelling house furnishes no justification for a search of that place without
a warrant. And such searches are held unlawful notwithstanding facts un-
questionably showing probable cause.
Id. at 33. Accord Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958) ; Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477-78
(1971).
11. Cf. text accompanying notes 13-26 infra.
12. At common law the legality of an arrest entry turned upon the legality of
the arrest. United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 8 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974) ; Wilgus, Arrest Without A Warrant, 22 MIcH. L.
REV. 541, 558, 800-06 (1924). The principal qualification of this rule was that the
arresting officer have reasonable and just cause to believe the person sought was in
the dwelling searched. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 204, 206 (1965). Cf.
436 [VOL. 20
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In Warden v. Hayden,'3 the principal case involving a constitutional
challenge to a warrantless entry under "exigent circumstances," the Su-
preme Court of the United States judged the: validity of the entry in terms
of its- overall reasonableness.' 4 Thus, the Hayden Court suggested that
information placing the suspect upon the premises entered was only a factor
to be considered in evaluating the overall reas6nableness of the search and
its consequent constitutionality.' 5  The most significant refinement of
Hayden's reasonableness standard was made in Dorman v. United States'
6
which involved the seizure of evidence during a fruitless search for a suspect
subsequent to a warrantless entry of his home. 17 ;In Dorman, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia enumerated a number of factors that
the court and jury were to consider in evaluating the overall reasonableness
of the entry.' 8 While strong reason to believe the suspect was on the
premises entered was one of these;19 courts folfowing Dorman have ap-
parently made no requirement that all the factors had to exist or that any
one of them was indispensible.
20
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire,21 a case involving the admissibility of
evidence seized during warrantless searches of the defendant's automobiles,
United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259, 263 n.3 (6th Cir. 1967). See generally
Morrison v. United States, 262 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Accarino v. United
States, 179 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ; District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13
(D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd, 399 U.S. 1 (1950); Annot., 5 A.L.R. 263 (1920). So, too,
where a warrantless arrest entry was permissible, a warrantless search solely for
the purposes of arrest was valid. See United States v. Hall, 348 F.2d 837, 841
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 947 (1965). Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 511 n.1 (1971) (White, J., dissenting). Where entry, ostensibly for
the purpose of a valid arrest, is in reality only a pretext for a broad search, evidence
seized is inadmissible. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499-500 (1958). See also
United States v. Joines, 246 F.2d 278 (3d Cir. 1957), vacated and remanded, 357 U.S.
573 (1958).
13. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
14. Id. at 298-99. This appears to be the interpretation of Hayden by the
majority of the lower courts. E.g., Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 391-92
(D.C. Cir. 1970). Conversely, it is possible to read Hayden for the proposition that
the operant "exigent circumstances" only served to excuse the general requirement
of obtaining a warrant as long as there was reasonable certainty the suspect was
upon the premises entered. 387 U.S. at 298-99. Fisher seems to be following this
second approach and rejecting the Dorman interpretation. See 496 F.2d at 339-40. It
is difficult to know which interpretation of Hayden is correct since this part of the
Court's opinion was dealt with in a cursory, almost offhanded manner. In any event
this part of the Court's analysis appears to be only tenuously related to the main
analytical thrust and holding in that case.
15. 387 U.S. at 298-99.
16. 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
17. Id. at 386-88.
18. Id. at 392-94. For a list of these factors see note 6 supra.
19. 435 F.2d at 393.
20. E.g., Vance v. North Carolina, 432 F.2d 984, 990-91 (4th Cir. 1970). See
notes 85-86 and accnmpanying text infra.
21. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Coolidge involved an arrest entry made with invalid
arrest warrants. However, the main issue before the Court was whether police could,
without warrants, seize and search the defendant's automobiles, parked outside his
home, when no danger existed that they would be taken away, or the evidence therein
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the Court dealt with several of the constitutional problems which appeared
in Fisher. Coolidge was arrested, at night, inside his home, upon the basis
of invalid arrest warrants. 22 In dicta, the Court opined that a warrantless
arrest entry was per se unreasonable in the absence of exigent circum-
stances.23 However, the Court was careful to point out that the law of
arrest entries had developed to ascertain the legality of police conduct in
terms of the scope of the search subsequent to the entry and the arrest,
rather than in terms of the more fundamental question of when police may
validly enter premises without prior judicial approval.2 4 Yet the Coolidge
Court also noted, although it found it unnecessary to resolve the issue,
2 5 that
several courts had concluded that an arrest warrant would suffice to fulfill
the requirement of judicial approval for the entry, in the absence of exigent
circumstances.
2 6
Together Coolidge, Hayden, and Dorman suggest, at least, that when
people are the objects of a search, police need not have the same degree of
objective certainty required for entry into a suspect's premises to search
for things .2  A more difficult question is whether an arrest warrant carries
with it the authorization to enter a third party's dwelling. The few civil
cases dealing with this issue evidence two consistent judicial concerns:
whether the decision will properly protect fourth amendment rights, con-
22. Id. at 447, 478.
23. Id. at 477-78. This view was supported by only a plurality of the Justices,
and the conclusion reached was not necessary for resolution of the central issues in
the case. Id. at 492 (Harlan, J., concurring) ; see also note 21 supra.
24. 403 U.S. at 474-76.
25. Id. at 481.
26. Id. at 480-81. Apparently the Supreme Court has not examined the issue
of whether police with arrest warrants may constitutionally enter a third-party's
premises. Coolidge is readily distinguishable as to this point. However, in Coolidge
the majority's history of the law of arrest, id. at 473-87, did not appear to be limited
to Coolidge's particular facts; thus, if Coolidge is read broadly, it seems to have a
unique relevancy to Fisher.
27. A similar point was raised in Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 205 (4th
Cir. 1966). See note 34 and accompanying text infra. Statutory law and the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure reflect this approach in that parameters have been
prescribed for the issuance and execution of arrest warrants which differ from those
prescribed for search warrants. Apparently, there has never been much effort made
to examine or reconcile the possibly incongruous scope of authority each warrant
provides. See Rotenberg & Tanzer, Searching for the Person To Be Seized, 35
OHIO ST. L.J. 56, 57 n.6, 58 n.7 (1974), wherein the federal statutes, the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the cases are summarized and compared.
Rotenberg & Tanzer, supra, suggested that a problem exists where entry
is made into the suspect's home solely upon the basis of the arrest warrant because
such an intrusion violates the privacy interests of third parties. Id. at 70. There is,
however, some compelling logic suggesting that an arrest warrant alone is sufficient
therefor. See United States v. Joines, 246 F.2d 278 (3d Cir. 1957), cert. granted,
vacated and remanded, 357 U.S. 573, aff'd, 258 F.2d 471, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880
(1958) ; Paper v. United States, 53 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1931). Indeed, if a search
warrant were obtained, even if the search were limited to one for the named suspect,
it is conceivable that the search would be more extensive and, consequently, more
disruptive of third parties' interests than one predicated upon an arrest warrant alone.
Cf. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 776 (1969) (White, J., dissenting).
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sistent with the nature and the degree of the alleged illegal conduct, and
whether the effects of the decision will allow legitimate police activity to
proceed unhampered.28 For example, in Lankford v. Gelston,2 9 a section
1983 action, the Fourth Circuit enjoined police raids based only upon the
tips of anonymous informants.30 Stressing that the raids were indicative of
a general pattern of police conduct,3 ' the court observed that failure to
issue an injunction might suggest that the courts would not - or could not
- remedy police violations of innocent parties' rights in a situation where
a criminal defendant would have a variety of avenues of redress.3 2 How-
ever, the court's order proscribing only entries based upon the tips of
anonymous informants3 3 left unanswered the plaintiffs' contention that, in
the absence of exigent circumstances, an arrest entry must be accompanied
by both an arrest warrant and a search warrant.
3 4
In the criminal cases facing the problem of entries of a third-party's
premises based solely upon arrest warrants, there has been an uncritical
acceptance of the notion that the arrest warrant combines with other infor-
mation the ,officers possess to justify the search.35 For example, in United
States v. McKinney,30 the Sixth Circuit, answering the defendant's conten-
tion that a search warrant was required,3 7 held that, provided the author-
ities reasonably believed the suspect could be found upon the premises, the
issuance of an arrest warrant was itself an exigent circumstance which
28. Compare Rodriguez v. Jones, 473 F.2d 599 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
953 (1973); Monette v. Toney, 119 Miss. 846, 81 So. 593 (1919), with Lankford v.
Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966); Wheeler v. Goodman, 330 F. Supp. 1356
(W.D.N.C. 1971). All these cases suggest that the various factors to be considered
include: the closeness of the relationship between the suspect and the third-party
occupant; the reasonableness of the police conduct in effectuating entry; whether the
entry was an isolated one, or part of a series; general police practices within the
community; and, possibly, concern over police-community relationships.
29. 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
30. Id. at 206.
31. Id. at 201.
32. Id. at 202-04. See also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
33. 364 F.2d at 206.
34. Id. at 205. The Lankford plaintiffs argued that absent judicial approval,
police capacity to determine probable cause should not be any different when the
object of the search is a person rather than a thing. Id. The court found the
injunction, as framed, sufficient to protect the plaintiffs' rights and, therefore, did
not address this contention. Id. at 206.
35. The language of Dorman is illustrative:
While there is no strict logic in the matter it seems to be accepted, at least
by implication, that the obtaining of an arrest warrant is material in supporting
a search of premises as not "unreasonable" even though the magistrate has not
passed upon the need for invasion of privacy of the premises.
435 F.2d at 396 n.25.
36. 379 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1967). Entry was based upon the tip of an informant
who previously had been mistaken about the suspect's presence in the apartment
entered, and the tip of anonymous informant. Id. at 262-63. The defendant was
convicted of aiding a fugitive, and sought to suppress the evidence of the fugitive's
presence in her apartment. Id. at 262.
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combined with the inherent mobility of the suspect to justify the entry.38
Also, in United States v. Brown,39 the district court had dismissed the
Government's case because the officers had not had probable cause to
believe that Brown was in the apartment, and because they had lacked a
search warrant. 40 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
reversed, and, although it did not rely explicitly upon Dorman, it found
that probable cause was essentially a concept of reasonableness and that
under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 41 there was no general
requirement for a search warrant in addition to an arrest warrant, even if
sufficient time had existed to obtain one.
42
In Fisher, the Third Circuit for the first time examined the factors
which would justify an arrest entry of a third party's dwelling by police
possessing a valid arrest warrant.43 Recognizing that the outcome would
involve a balancing of the interest of the police in executing their duty
against the rights of citizens, Judge Rosenn, writing for the majority,
44
defined the controlling parameters. 4  The court first found that police
testimony had established a majority of the Dorman factors46 but held
that these alone, absent probable cause to believe the suspect was in the
place to be searched, would not be constitutionally sufficient to justify
entry.47 The court stated that "the chief evil" to which the fourth amend-
ment is directed is the unreasonable physical invasion of the home, 48 and
that although crime is a waxing problem, this protective purpose requires
that, as a general rule, the decision to enter a person's home should be
made by a judicial officer and not by the police. 49 However, recognizing
that exceptions exist, the court relied upon Chambers v. Maroney,50 a case
38. Id. at 263. See Rotenberg & Tanzer, supra note 27, at 68-69. But see
notes 55, 76-79, and accompanying text infra.
39. 467 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Brown involved an early morning raid of an
apartment whose occupant was thought to be the suspect's lover. The building had
been under surveillance, and the raid had been conducted several hours after officers
observed two men enter the building and lights in the general area of the apartment
go on shortly thereafter. Id. at 421-22. See notes 56-59 and accompanying text infra.
40. 467 F.2d at 420.
41. See note 57 infra. For a more complete compilation of these rules and relevant
cases, see Rotenberg & Tanzer, supra note 27, at 57-58 nn.6, 7.
42. 467 F.2d at 423-24.
43. The Third Circuit had dealt with a parallel situation where the suspect's
dwelling had been entered. See United States v. Joines, 246 F.2d 278 (3d Cir. 1957),
vacated and remanded, 357 U.S. 573, aff'd 258 F.2d 471, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880
(1958). See note 12 supra.
44. Judges Van Dusen, Aldisert, and Rosenn heard the case. Judge Aldisert
dissented upon the ground that timely objection to the trial court's instruction had
not been made. 496 F.2d at 350 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 335.
46. See note 6 supra.
47. 496 F.2d at 338.
48. Id. at 338-39.
49. Id. at 339, quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
50. 399 U.S. 42 (1970). Chambers involved an arrest and the seizure and
subsequent search of the defendant's vehicle at the police station. The Court held
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involving the warrantless search of an automobile, to support its statement
that, nonetheless, in every case, probable cause is a minimum requirement
for a constitutionally reasonable search.51 The court also cited its own
opinion in United States v. Rubin,5 2 a warrantless search and seizure case,
for the proposition that the Third Circuit had established that "probable
cause is an indispensible element for a warrantless search of a dwelling
even in the presence of exigent circumstances.' ,,53
The court then observed that other circuit courts considering similar
facts had uniformly held that such an entry is constitutional only when police
have probable cause to believe that the suspect is within the premises to be
searched. 54 To support this conclusion, the court relied upon what it
asserted to be the implications of earlier decisions: First, that Lankford
impliedly created an independent probable cause limitation upon entries with
arrest warrants; and second, that McKinney settled an issue, unanswered in
Lankford, by providing that the police may execute a valid arrest warrant
upon the premises of a third party without a search warrant if they reasonably
believe the subject will be found there.5 5 The court then turned to Brown5 6
for two propositions: First "[t]hat the arrest warrant issued under rule
4(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 7 provides authority to
justified as incident to an arrest. Id. at 48-52. See note 68 and accompanying text
infra.
51. 496 F.2d at 339. The Fisher court relied upon the statement in Chambers
that:
the Court has insisted upon probable cause as a ininimuns requirement for a
reasonable search permitted by the Constitution .... Only in exigent circumstances
will the judgment of the police as to probable cause serve as a sufficient
authorization for a search.
Id., quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (emphasis supplied by
the court). To further support this proposition, the court also quoted McDonald
v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299
(1967).
McDonald involved an entry and seizure without an arrest warrant when
there had been no apparent reason why police who had observed the defendant for a
considerable period of time could not have obtained a warrant. The Court suppressed
the evidence seized, finding the warrantless entry unjustified because police had ample
time to procure a warrant. 335 U.S. at 452-54. Compare Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971), discussed in notes 21-26 and accompanying text supra.
52. 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 883 (1973). In Rubin
officers had known that contraband drugs were located in a house. The principal
issue in the case was whether reasonable grounds to believe or knowledge that
evidence would be destroyed was the proper basis for deciding that there existed an
emergency situation which justified a warrantless entry. 474 F.2d at 268. See notes
10-12 and accompanying text supra; notes 67 & 68 and accompanying text infra.
53. 496 F.2d at 339.
54. Id. at 340.
55. Id. The Third Circuit thought the McKinney court meant reasonable belief
to be "synonymous with 'probable cause.' " Id. But see notes 76-82 and accompanying
text inra. See also notes 29-34, 36-38 and accompanying text supra.
56. See notes 39-42 and accompanying text supra.
57. Rule 4(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides guidelines
pertaining to the execution or service of the arrest warrant, details who may serve the
warrant, delineates the jurisdictional limits of its execution, and prescribes the
manner of service and method of return. FED. R. CRiM. P. 4(c). Rule 4(b) (1) pro- 33
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enter any premises for the purposes of enforcing the warrant, if the officer
has probable cause to believe that the subject is located therein,"5 3 and,
second, that Brown limited the District of Columbia Circuit's earlier de-
cision in Dorman by imposing an independent probable cause requirement. 59
Finally, the Fisher court concluded that "permitting reliance by the officer
solely on exigent circumstances offers too many opportunities for abuse,
provides little comfort to a citizen peacefully in his home, and affords
insufficient protection against invasions of his privacy.
060
In rejecting the plaintiff's contention that the fourth amendment in-
variably requires a search warrant even if police have a valid arrest war-
rant and probable cause to believe that the suspect is in the dwelling,' the
Fisher court stated that its holding that police need not procure search
warrants for arrest entries 62 would not, as the plaintiff alleged, allow the
abuses inherent in general warrants 5 because of two factors: First, the
arrest warrant names a specific person ;64 second, the standard of probable
cause for the police entry with or without the search warrant would be
the same if the question was subsequently brought before the court.65
Thus, the court concluded that its decision did not "expand the underlying
situations in which entry is permissible; it only leaves the initial deter-
mination of the propriety of the entry to the police." 66
vides that an arrest warrant need only name the person to be arrested, not the place
of service. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(b) (1). Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (search war-
rants). See generally Dorman v. United States, 485 F.2d 345, 402 n.6 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
58. 496 F.2d at 340-41, quoting United States v. Brown, 467 F.2d 419, 424
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (emphasis supplied by the court).
59. 496 F.2d at 341.
60. Id. One of the factors implicit in the earlier cases was a concern over police-
community relationships. See text accompanying note 28 supra. For a detailed study
of this factor in Newark, New Jersey, see REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 30-38 (1968).
61. 496 F.2d at 342.
62. Id. at 338.
63. Id. at 343. Historically, general warrants gave Crown officers authority
to search where they pleased or to act as a roving commission in quest of offenders
unknown at the time the warrant was issued. For a fuller discussion, see Stanford
v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 482-86 (1965), and authorities cited therein.
64. 496 F.2d at 343. The court made no mention of the fact that Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 4(b) (1), authorizes a "John Doe" warrant. In Rodriguez v.
Jones, a case factually similar to Fisher, a warrant was issued upon this basis.
473 F.2d 599, 601 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973).
65. 496 F.2d at 343.
66. Id. (emphasis supplied by the court).
While, with respect to the Bass search, the court suggested, without resolving
the issue, that a jury might justifiably have found probable cause based upon the
telephone number and the prior associations, it did not mention the fact that the
FBI had told the defendant officer that the suspect could be found in the plaintiff's
apartment. Id. at 337. Compare Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568 (1971);
United States v. Miles, 468 F.2d 482, 488 (3d Cir. 1972). Both cases suggested that
an officer might justifiably and reasonably rely upon information from another law
enforcement agency. Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339,
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While the interests which the Fisher court sought to protect are the
same as those which concerned earlier courts, the result it reached is not
supported by the previous cases' analysis. The Rubin court did say that
probable cause and exigent circumstances must exist to justify a warrantless
search,67 but since the search in Rubin had not been for the purpose of
arrest, that case appears distinguishable. Chambers is also factually distinct
since it involved an automobile search. In relying upon it, the Third Circuit
seems to have ignored the Chambers Court's ,observation that "the search
of an auto on probable cause proceeds on a theory wholly different from
that justifying a search incident to an arrest .... Automobiles because of
their mobility, may be searched without a warrant upon facts not justifying
a warrantless search of a residence or office."' 8
Admittedly, upon their facts, Hayden and Dorman do provide support
for the meaning the Third Circuit gave them, since in each case there had
been sufficient independent information either to place the suspect in the
premises entered, or to associate him with them.19 The difficulty with the
Fisher court's reliance upon these cases is that both seem to deal with
the entry only in terms of its overall reasonableness ;7o furthermore, Dor-
man's formulation did not require that any factor reach a level that could
be called "independent probable cause."
'71
The Fisher court viewed Brown as a limitation upon the District of
Columbia Circuit's earlier decision in Dorman.72  The Third Circuit
reached this conclusion by noting that while Brown did not explicitly use
an exigent circumstances analysis, the factors considered by the Brown
67. 474 F.2d at 268.
68. 399 U.S. at 50, quoting Dyke v. Taylor Impl. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 221 (1968).
The Supreme Court's point in Chambers seems to have been that the review of the
automobile search undertakes an analysis which employs standards different from
those used in scrutinizing other searches. 399 U.S. at 49-51. Note that again the
term probable cause is used; but this only disguises the notion that, depending upon
the reason for the police entry, the thing sought, and the nature of the place entered,
quite different constitutional parameters are applied. Cf. text accompanying notes 10 &
11 supra. Thus, arrest entries, searches, and automobile searches differ theoretically,
not merely terminologically as the Third Circuit suggested. Fisher's conjunctive
use of Rubin and Chambers seems to have been designed to answer the defendant's
probable argument that "the inherent mobility of the suspect" justified a standard
looser than and different from that regulating a search for an object. Compare
Fisher, 496 F.2d at 339, with United States v. Hall, 348 F.2d 837, 841 (2d Cir.),
(Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 947 (1965).
69. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 297 (1967); Dorman v. United States,
435 F.2d 385, 387 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
70. See text accompanying notes 13-20 supra.
71. See text accompanying note 20 supra. Compare the fifth factor in the district
court's charge in Fisher, quoted in note 6 supra.
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948), another case relied upon in
Fisher, is distinguishable because there police had had ample time to procure warrants
but had not done so. Id. at 454. The Fisher opinion seems erroneously to indicate that
McDonald was a case involving exigent circumstances. 496 F.2d at 339. The portion
of McDonald quoted in Fisher was dictum. See 335 U.S. at 454. If, in McDonald,
there had been either an arrest warrant or exigent circumstances, the entry might well
have been justified.
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court tended to indicate that this approach was the analytical basis of
the decision.73 What seems more likely is that the Brown court did not
view that case as an exigent circumstances problem, but merely listed the
various circumstances of the entry to show that it had been reasonable,
equating "reasonableness" with probable cause.7 4  If Brown bore any
relevancy to Dorman, it was only to negate Dorman's twofold dicta: 1) that
nighttime entries require greater probable cause than daytime entries; and
2) that in doubtful cases, especially at night, a search warrant should be
procured in addition to an arrest warrant.75
Finally, the Fisher court's analysis of McKinney and Lankford appears
to have taken those cases too far. The Third Circuit interpreted McKinney
as "a probable cause" case76 by relying upon the McKinney court's use of
McCray v. Illinois,77 where the Supreme Court had upheld an arrest, based
upon the tip of a reliable informant, as having been made with probable
cause.78 Thus, the Third Circuit implied that the McKinney entry had
been justified by information concerning the suspect's presence that was of
sufficient value to meet the "independent probable cause" test announced
in Fisher, and that without this quality of information the McKinney court
would have invalidated the entry.79 This analysis ignored two points: 1)
the McKinney informants had either proven unreliable, or had been anony-
mous and hence of undetermined reliability ;so 2) the McKinney court never
resolved the McCray question of whether the informant's tip was probable
cause, but upheld the entry upon the "totality" of information available,
including the arrest warrant."' This analysis, and the McKinney court's
seeming reliance upon a tort standard,8 2 suggest that that court viewed
the presence of the warrant as catalytic and, therefore, tested the entry
against a standard of "overall reasonableness" rather than requiring separate
and independent information sufficient to establish probable cause to believe
the suspect was in the dwelling entered.
73. 496 F.2d at 341 n.12.
74. See 467 F.2d at 424.
75. Compare United States v. Brown, 467 F.2d 419, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1972), with
Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 393, 395-96 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
76. 496 F.2d at 340.
77. 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
78. Id. at 304.
79. 496 F.2d at 340.
80. 379 F.2d at 260-61, 264.
81. Id. at 263, 264.
82. 379 F.2d at 263 n.3. The Sixth Circuit cited section 204 of the SECOND
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS and indicated that it was consistent with the constitutional
requirements. Id. Analyzing separately the officer's reasonable belief in the necessity
of making an entry or an arrest, courts, in other cases, have indicated that the tort
standard, which, if proved, provides the police with a defense, is a lesser one than
the constitutional requirement, which determines the validity of the search. Rodriguez
v. Jones, 473 F.2d 599, 604-05 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973) ; Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339, 1347-48 (2d Cir. 1972). This then
seems to suggest that MeKinney held the tort standard constitutionally adequate only
because of the other concurrent factors. Cf. 379 F.2d at 264.
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The Lankford court had sought to curtail police conduct which was
patently illegal conduct predicated upon information and sources upon
which it was unreasonable to rely. Fisher relied upon Lankford for the
same implications it found in McKinney :83 Lankford's proscription of
entries made with an arrest warrant but without probable cause meant
that the Lankford court would invalidate any entry made without "inde-
pendent probable cause." However, Lankford had not addressed this
question in rejecting the use of an anonymous tip as justification for a
police entry.8 4 Indeed, in Vance v. North Carolina,85 decided 4 years after
Lankford, the Fourth Circuit upheld an arrest entry and search upon the
basis of its overall reasonableness despite the fact that the court explicitly
found the information placing the suspect upon the premises entered in-
sufficient to establish probable cause.86
Thus, it is not clear from the decisions cited by the Third Circuit that
independent probable cause to believe the suspect to be upon the premises
entered, is required as an indispensable element to support the validity of
an entry based solely upon an arrest warrant. Simply, the problem the
court faced in relying upon these cases was that the law of arrest entries, 87
as developed from criminal cases, was inadequate to provide a standard to
vindicate the fourth amendment rights of innocent third parties. Fisher
dealt with this discontinuity by linking its analysis to these earlier prece-
dents upon a verbal level rather than analyzing them theoretically. None-
theless, the concerns expressed by the Lankford court ss and epitomized by
the Third Circuit's statement that "permitting reliance by the officer solely
on exigent circumstances offers too many opportunities for abuse . . .
establish the possibility that the court's conclusion, while not compelled
by the decisions it cited for support, was sound in its result. The difficult
residual problem is one of how far the court's result may be taken -
especially in a criminal case.
Contrary to the Fisher court's interpretation, the arrest entry cases
relied upon did suggest that searches would be constitutionally valid where
the court could find that police action in making the entry had been reason-
able in terms of the method of entry, and that the police had believed in
the necessity of the entry, although "independent probable" cause in the
Fisher sense had not existed. However, Fisher's reading of those cases
would seem to suggest, first, a shift away from Coolidge toward a test
focusing upon the basis underlying the initial entry, 90 and second, a sig-
83. See 496 F.2d at 340.
84. Cf. 364 F.2d at 206; notes 29-34 and accompanying text supra.
85. 432 F.2d 984 (4th Cir. 1970).
86. Id. at 990-91.
87. See text accompanying notes 9-12 supra.
88. See text accompanying notes 31 & 32 supra.
89. 496 F.2d at 341.
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nificant explanation and qualification of the Hayden-Dorman line of
cases. 91 Yet Fisher warned that its holding applied only to innocent
citizens.9 2 This caveat, while limiting the scope of the court's holding,
raises other difficult problems. It could be an indication that the court's
analysis and its conclusion were meant to be limited to Fisher's particular
facts, to wit, where no suspect had been found. If so, this necessarily means
that different tests and, consequently, different rights apply depending upon
what police find after they enter. 93 In any event, it is not very clear how
Fisher would apply to a criminal case where its issues are most likely to
be raised. A more important and problematic consideration is whether the
decision effectively protects the citizen's fourth amendment rights in its effort
to avoid hamstringing legitimate and necessary activities of the police. 94
Here also, the pragmatic implications are not clear. In civil actions, while
Fisher does suggest that it will be easier for future plaintiffs to establish
a prima facie section 1983 case, 95 it is not clear from the opinion what one
must establish in order to be availed the valid defense created by the
Supreme Court's opinions in Monroe v. Pope96 and Pierson v. Ray,97
which established "good faith and probable cause" as a defense to a section
1983 action. It is in this regard that the most complex portents of the case
arise; two interpretations are possible.
Read literally, the Fisher holding invalidates an entry where the police
cannot establish an independent probable cause basis for their belief that
the suspect was present prior to their entry. However, to hold the police
to such a rigid standard means that they will often fail to act "for fear of
guessing wrong,"98 especially in areas like Newark where potential police
91. See text accompanying notes 13-20 supra.
92. 496 F.2d at 341.
93. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-76 (1971).
94. The court's opinion sought to balance these interests. 496 F.2d at 335.
95. Prior to Fisher it would appear that the plaintiff had to show that the
conduct of the police was unreasonable. Certainly, it is likely this was the reason the 11
Dorman factors were given as a jury instruction in Fisher. See note 6 supra. After
Fisher the plaintiff need only demonstrate that the information available to the police
did not independently establish probable cause that the suspect was in the premises
entered.
96. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
97. 386 U.S. 547 (1967). In Pierson the Court held that a good faith-probable
cause defense was available in a section 1983 action against police officers who
allegedly had arrested black civil rights marchers under a Mississippi statute later
declared unconstitutional. Id. at 557. The courts have not clarified whether "good
faith and probable cause" describes a two-phased or single-phased standard. If Pierson
intended a two-pronged standard, the Fisher court could have avoided a constitutional
adjudication by focusing upon the "good faith" element and requiring instructions
that the jury consider the defendant officer's composite conduct during the course
of his career. E.g., 496 F.2d at 337, 343-45; Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197,
201, 202 (4th Cir. 1966) ; Wheeler v. Goodman, 330 F. Supp. 1356, 1368-69 (W.D.N.C.
1971).
98. Rodriguez v. Jones, 473 F.2d 599, 605 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953
(1973), quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339, 1349 (2d
Cir. 1972) (Lumbard, J., concurring).
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defendants would expect juries to be formed largely of members of minority
communities having a history of the worst possible relations with the
police. 9  If this be so, abeyance of police action is likely to have a greater
and more detrimental effect upon the community, especially in minority
neighborhoods, than the illegal police conduct Fisher was trying to pre-
vent. 100
An alternate interpretation is suggested by Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents,1° 1 wherein the Second Circuit read Pierson to mean that
an effective defense exists if officers have a "good faith and 'reasonable
belief' in the validity of the arrest or search."' 1 2 Following Bivens it can
be argued that in a Fisher situation, the defense may use information con-
cerning only the suspect's presence to show "good faith and reasonable
belief" in the validity of the entry. Unfortunately, this approach seems to
create an obvious conceptual difficulty for the framing of an instruction
which would allow jurors to understand the notion that the plaintiff could
establish a case by showing that the police lacked independent probable
cause to enter his home, but, at the same time, the police could have a
Bivens defense. 10 3 A second problem with this narrow application of
Bivens is that pragmatically it means the police officer on the "front line"
would either have to apply the dry, objective analysis of the courtroom
before making any entry, or risk the consequences of an action for damages.
To expect this of anyone is incredible; rather, the practical and certain
result would be an abeyance of police activities in constitutional gray areas.
Bivens may be more constructively interpreted to mean that all the
operative circumstances should be considered in assessing the necessity and
reasonableness of police conduct. However, the facts in Fisher and the
cases upon which it relied suggest that in those situations where police
are most likely to engage in raids violative of a third party's fourth amend-
ment rights, 04 a maximum number of Dorman factors, indicating the rea-
99. Cf. e.g., note 60 supra.
100. See generally HEWITT AND NEWMANN, POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATION: AN
ANTHOLOGY AND BIBLIOGRAPHY (1970); REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COM-
MISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 157-158, 161 (1968) ; THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A
FREE SOCIETY: A REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 35-38 (1967).
101. 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972).
102. Id. at 1347. In Fisher, the Third Circuit did not commit itself to following
Bivens; however, that decision was cited in a footnote in which the court dealt with
the issue of a good faith and probable cause defense that it anticipated would arise
upon remand. 496 F.2d at 348 n.27.
103. E.g., Rodriguez v. Jones, 473 F.2d 599, 605-06 n.3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 953 (1973).
104. All of the cases have involved a common factual pattern. Usually the crime
for which the suspect was sought has been one of violence. E.g., Brown, 467 F.2d at
420 (murder); McKinney, 379 F.2d at 260 (bank robbery); Wheeler v. Goodman,
330 F. Supp. 1356, 1368 (W.D.N.C. 1971) (robbery-murder). In some cases, the
suspects have been sought for the death or wounding of police officers. E.g., Rodriquez
v. Jones, 473 F.2d 599, 600 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973) ; Lankford,
364 F.2d at 198. Often the suspects sought and the occupants of the homes entered
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sonableness of the police conduct, will also be found. Thus, it seems that
as misconduct becomes more likely it also becomes more defensible. If one
of the objectives of a section 1983 action is the deterrence of police mis-
conduct, it is submitted that this result will not be achieved where the
conduct is less than outrageous. In short, if the Fisher court intended to
follow this analysis of Bivens, the result will be only to deter conduct
approaching bad faith, or reckless or willful misconduct.
10 5
While the Fisher court did not clarify the nature of the defense avail-
able to the police in suits arising from arrest entries into third-party
premises, its holding may yield two, possibly intended, results. First, it
allows the lower courts greater supervision over police conduct after an
arrest warrant has been issued. 106 Second, by making the plaintiff's burden
easier, the opinion would appear potentially to have a significant deterrent
effect, but in terms far broader than that achieved by the Lankford court
in a comparable situation.
0 7
Ultimately, the decision does not effectively reach its hypothesized
balance; rather, it appears that its application will favor one result and,
a fortiori, one set of interests over the other. However, resolution of the
problem of achieving an equitable balance may be beyond the powers of the
courts alone. The solution would seem to lie in legislation which would
provide administrative, monetary redress for aggrieved innocent third
parties.10 8 Resort to the courts is patchwork and focuses upon the indi-
vidual officer,10 9 who, as a matter of policy, should not be liable for prac-
Brown, 467 F.2d at 421; Lankford, 364 F.2d at 199; Wheeler, supra, at 1369. Almost
invariably the officer's presence was based, at least in part, upon an informant's tip.
E.g., Rodriquez, supra, 473 F.2d at 601; Brown, 476 F.2d at 421; Lankford, 364 F.2d
at 199; McKinney, 379 F.2d at 260; United States v. Alexander, 346 F.2d 561, 562
(6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 993 (1966); Wheeler, supra, at 1369; Palmer
v. United States, 192 A.2d 801, 803 (D.C. Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 907
(1964). See also Love v. United States, 170 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
336 U.S. 912 (1949); England v. State, 488 P.2d 1347 (Crim. App. Okla. 1971);
Monette v. Toney, 119 Miss. 846, 81 So. 593 (1919).
105. Cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) ; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
555-57 (1967).
106. For a less flexible standard applied by a court which required police to obtain
search warrants whenever exigent circumstances did not exist, see Wheeler v. Good-
man, 330 F. Supp. 1356, 1361-62 (W.D.N.C. 1971). But see Hill v. Rowland, 474
F.2d 1374 (4th Cir. 1973)'.
107. Lankford's holding limited its effect to entries which were based upon the
tips of anonymous informants. 364 F.2d at 205-06.
108. Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411-27 (1971)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) ; see generally ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, THE URBAN POLICE FUNCTION Part V (Tent. draft 1972); THE PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE (1967).
109. Cf., e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-92 (1961) (municipal corporation
is not a "person within the meaning of section 1983"). Accord, United States ex rel.
Gittlemacker v. Pennsylvania, 281 F. Supp. 175 (E.D. Pa. 1968), aff'd, 413 F.2d 84
(3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1046 (1970). But see United States ex tel.
Washington v. Chester County Police Dep't, 294 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. Pa. 1969)
(while municipal corporation is not a person within meaning of section 1983, Civil
Rights Act section 1981 may provide right of relief against municipal corporation).
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tices which, for a number of reasons, such as departmental acquiescence,
he may reasonably believe legitimate or acceptable.
J. Charles Sheak
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS - INMATES OF FEDERAL
PENITENTIARY Do NOT HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CON-
FRONT AND CROSS-EXAMINE ADVERSE WITNESSES AT GOOD TIME
FORFEITURE HEARING, WHERE THE RIGHT TO PRESENT WITNESSES
AFFORDS AN ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT A DEFENSE, BUT
PRESENCE UPON DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF ASSOCIATE WARDEN WHO
HAD SUBSTANTIAL CONTACT WITH INMATE CONDUCT FROM WHICH
CHARGES AROSE CONSTITUTED DENIAL OF THE DUE PROCESS RIGHT
TO AN IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL.
Meyers v. Alldredge (1974)
Eleven inmates of the Federal Penitentiary at Lewisburg filed a com-
plaint in federal district court,' charging that the administrators of that
institution had violated the inmates' constitutional rights by their actions
during and after a prisoner work stoppage.2 Nine of the plaintiffs were
members ,of a committee elected by the prisoners to present grievances to
the administration.3 The work stoppage had lasted 13 days, largely because
the committee refused to' prepare grievarices until formally recognized by
the warden, and it continued to delay after this recognition was granted. 4
When the stoppage ended, all members of the committee were brought
before the prison Adjustment Committee and charged with "Conduct Preju-
dicial to the Good Order, Security, and Safety of the Community and
Security of Inmate Population,"5 for failing to present grievances. 6 The
Adjustment Committee,7 chaired by Associate Warden Cansler, followed
There is a possibility that a municipal corporation could be joined as a pendent party in
a section 1983 action. Cf. H.M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 947-50, 1071-81, 1158-62, 1170-72 (2d ed. P. Bator, P. Mishkin,
D. Shapiro, H. Wechsler 1973).
1. Meyers v. Alldredge, 348 F. Supp. 807 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
2. Meyers v. Alldredge, 492 F.2d 296, 298 (3d Cir. 1974).
3. The nine plaintiffs were Irwin (Chairman) Meyers, Phillips, Jones, Johnson,
Mason, Tucker, Buyse, and Alger. 492 F.2d at 299. Plaintiffs Moore and McAllister
refused to return to work when the stoppage had ended. 492 F.2d at 301.
4. 492 F.2d at 299-301.
5. Id. at 301.
6. Id. In addition, inmates Irwin, Phillips, Alger, Jones, and Mason had been
before the Committee upon charges of "Attempting to Incite a Work Stoppage"
because of speeches they allegedly had made at the beginning of the strike. Id.
7. The Adjustment Committee is a low-level disciplinary board composed of
at least three members of the prison administration which deals with moderately
serious disciplinary offenses and is empowered to file bad conduct reports, transfer
the prisoner to another prison, or place the prisoner in segregated confinement.
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the prescribed procedures for its duty,8 upheld the charges and referred
five plaintiffs to the Good Time Forfeiture Board (GTF Board). 9 That
board, following its prescribed procedures, 10 and also chaired by Mr.
Cansler, found the men guilty, placed them in indefinite segregation, and
recommended forfeiture of their earned good time credits."
The inmates' complaint sought injunctive and declaratory relief, and
alleged that (1) the disciplinary procedures afforded plaintiffs failed to
comply with the requirements of procedural due process ;12 (2) the actions
of the administration were so unfair and the charges so untrue as to con-
stitute a violation of substantive due process; and (3) the punishments
imposed were so disproportionate to the offenses charged as to be cruel
and unusual.' 3 The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that there
nad been no denial of due process before the Adjustment Committee 14 and
refusing to mandate more safeguards at the GTF Board level. 1" The Third
Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings, holding that due
process considerations attach at both disciplinary levels, and while, there-
fore, the presence of Associate Warden Cansler upon both disciplinary
boards violated the prisoners' right to an impartial tribunal, the other
safeguards sought by the plaintiffs were not constitutionally required. The
court further held that the inmates had had adequate notice that their delay
in submitting grievances would bring disciplinary action, and that the
penalties ordered did not constitute cruel and unusual punishments. Meyers
v. Alldredge, 492 F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1974).
While the court summarily dismissed the plaintiffs' claim of cruel and
unusal punishment, its holding presented two distinct analytical issues:
1) the requirements of procedural due process in prison disciplinary hear-
ings, and 2) the application of the vagueness doctrine to prison regulations.
8. The Meyers court described the procedures as those outlined in the Bureau
of Prisons Policy Statement on Inmate Discipline, No. 7400.5A, which directs the
Adjustment Committee "to call [an] inmate before it, advise himn orally of the
charges against him and ask for his statement." 492 F.2d at 303 & n.19. The inmates
are not allowed the assistance of counsel or the opportunity to confront and cross-
examine witnesses. Id.
9. Id. at 302. The GTF Board is a higher level disciplinary body which deter-
mines, in more serious cases, whether already earned good time credits should be
forfeited. Id. at 303. A good time credit represents a reduction in the prisoner's
term of 5 to 10 days for each month the prisoner is not involved in any disciplinary
problem. Id. at n.20, citing 18 U.S.C. § 4161 (1970).
10. At the GTF Board hearing, the inmate is given a written copy of the
charges, permitted to retain substitute counsel from the prison staff, allowed to
present witnesses in his behalf, and informed of his right to appeal. 492 F.2d at 303.
11. Id. at 302.
12. For a list of the plaintiffs' specific allegations see text accompanying note
35 infra.
13. 492 F.2d at 298-99.
14. 348 F. Supp. at 823.
15. Id. at 824.
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1. Requirements of Procedural Due Process
Meyers did not present the issue of which civil rights a prisoner re-
tained while incarcerated, 16 but rather thatof what procedures or safeguards
were necessary to protect those rights. In the absence of precedent from the
Supreme Court of the United States upon prisoners' due process rights at
disciplinary hearings, 17 courts which have considered this issue'8 have
borrowed analyses from the precedents in administrative proceedings gen-
erally, and penocorrectional proceedings in particular. The seminal case for
this type of analysis was Goldberg v. Kelly, 19 in which the Supreme Court
set out the balancing test which must be used to decide what process is due
at an administrative hearing.2 0 The Court, applying the threshold rationale
that a hearing was required when an individual faced a "grievous loss,"2 1
ruled that delineation of the procedures which would satisfy the due process
requirement required initially an identification of both the governmental
and individual interests involved, and then a balancing of the two.
22
The Supreme Court applied this weighing of interests test specifically
to the penocorrectional area in Morrissey v. Brewer2 3 and Gagnon v.
Scarpelli.24 The Morrissey Court, in dealing with parole revocation, weighed
the parolee's loss against the state's interest in a speedy return to prison,
and concluded that the minimum requirements of due process were:
16. In a case decided after Meyers, the Supreme Court addressed this issue and
held that federal prisoners are protected by the fiith amendment and state prisoners
by the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).
17. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of this issue in a case
decided after Meyers, see note 109 and accompanying text infra.
18. See U.S. ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973); Sostre
v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972) ; Nolan
v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970) ; Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621
(E.D. Va. 1971); Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971),
modified, 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974) ; Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) ; Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970).
19. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
20. The Court addressed the issue of whether termination of public assistance
benefits without a prior evidentiary hearing violated due process. Id. at 255.
21. This concept of "grievous loss" replaced the traditional distinction between
challenged governmental action which deprived the citizen of a right and that which
denied a privilege. The right-privilege distinction, which mandated the application
of constitutional due process protection only against governmental deprivation of a
right, was gradually eroded, and the present "grievous loss" criterion emerged as the
touchstone for the application of this constitutional protection. Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REV.
1439 (1968). See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
22. 397 U.S. at 263, citing Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886
(1961). The Goldberg Court stated that when the opportunity to be heard is required,
it "must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard."
397 U.S. at 268-69. The Court proceeded to outline the minimum procedural re-
quirements for the welfare recipients' pretermination hearings: timely and adequate
notice; the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses and to retain
an attorney, if desired; and a decision grounded solely upon rules and the evidence
adduced at the hearing. Id. at 267-71.
23. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) dis-
closure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be
heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence;
(d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless
the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing con-
frontation)_; (e) a "neutral and detached" hearing body . . .; and(f)
a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and
reasons for revoking parole.25
The Morrissey Court did not reach the issue of whether assistance of coun-
sel, retained or appointed, is constitutionally necessary at such hearings.26
However, in Gagnon, the Court refused to require appointed counsel at
probation revocation proceedings2 7 except in certain limited circumstances, 2
reasoning that the resultant delay and change in the nature of the proceed-
ings outweighed the advantages to the probationer of the presence of
counsel.
29
In dealing with the penocorrectional area, the Third Circuit previously
had held that due process was required in prison disciplinary proceedings
and that certain minimal safeguards were required.3 0 A case decided in
1973, Braxton v. Carlson,s1 raised the issue of precisely what minimum
safeguards would be adequate in proceedings before an Adjustment Com-
mittee. In that case, plaintiffs claimed a denial of due process because they
had been denied, inter alia, the safeguards of counsel, advance written notice
of charges, and cross-examination. 82 The Braxton court relied heavily upon
the rehabilitative aspect of these lower-level hearings and held that such
25. 408 U.S. at 489. The Court had initially concluded that revocation of parole
was a "grievous loss." Id. at 482.
26. Id. at 489.
27. 411 U.S. at 779.
28. The Court enumerated these circumstances as:
where, after being informed of his right to request counsel, the probationer or
parolee makes such a request, based on a timely and colorable claim (i) that
he has not committed the alleged violation of the conditions upon which he is
at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of public record or is
uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation
and make revocation inappropriate, and that the reasons are complex or otherwise
difficult to develop or present.
411 U.S. at 790. The Gagnon Court only reached the issue of the right to have
counsel appointed and left open the question whether there is a right to have a
retained counsel present. Id. at 783 n.6. The Meyers plaintiffs, upon the other hand,
did not specify whether they were seeking the right to appointed or retained counsel.
492 F.2d at 309. It is submitted that the Gagnon holding is not necessarily inconsistent
with recognition of a due process right to have retained counsel present.
29. Id. at 787-88.
30. Biagiarelli v. Sielaff, 483 F.2d 508 (3d Cir. 1973), (administrative segrega-
tion) ; U.S. ex rel. Tyrrel v. Speaker, 471 F.2d 1197 (3d Cir. 1973) (punitive
segregation) ; Gray v. Creamer, 465 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1972) (transfer to solitary
confinement). These cases generally held that a hearing was required before the
indicated action could be taken, but did not set out the procedural safeguards necessary
at such a hearing. 492 F.2d at 304 n.22.
31. 483 F.2d 933 (3d Cir. 1973).
32. Id. at 936.
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safeguards were not constitutionally required.a The court adopted the
Second Circuit's position that due process is afforded in prison disciplinary
hearings when the "facts are rationally determined in a proceeding where
the prisoner (1) is notified of the accusation and informed of the evidence
against him, and (2) is afforded a reasonable opportunity to explain his
actions."
3 4
These cases, dealing with the safeguards required in the penocorrec-
tional context, formed the doctrinal background for the Meyers court's
analysis of the procedural due process issue. The Meyers plaintiffs initially
argued that the deprivation of procedural due process occurred because,
even though, they received the full safeguards prescribed by regulation,
they were denied (1) an impartial tribunal, (2) adequate notice of the
charges, (3) the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and (4)
the right to counsel.3 5
To deal with these issues, the court separated the allegations by the
level of the disciplinary proceedings. It rejected application of these pro-
cedures at the Adjustment Committee level, and reemphasized its position
articulated in Braxton, that although such procedures may aid factfinding,
the rehabilitative function of the committee hearing outweighed any gains
that might derive from imposing these requirements. 6
Before considering the need for these procedures at the GTF Board
level, the court disposed of the unresolved question of whether due process
applied to GTF Board proceedings at all, by reasoning that since for-
feiture of good time was a "grievous loss," due process applied.37 Having
resolved this issue, the court considered plaintiffs' specific allegations to
determine whether or not the prescribed procedures were constitutionally
adequate. First, the appellants claimed that Associate Warden Cansler's
presence upon both the Adjustment Committee and GTF Board denied
them an impartial tribunal.38 After reviewing federal precedent requiring
33. Id. at 941. The court stated:
the focus of the Adjustment Committee function is rehabilitative rather than
punitive. We believe, therefore, that the transformation of this informal hearing
into a formal adversary proceeding . . . could be self-defeating.
Id.
34. Id. at 940, citing Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972), wherein the Second Circuit held that if substantial
deprivations such as punitive segregation and the resultant loss of opportunity to earn
good time credits are to be visited upon a prisoner, such action must be premised upon
rationally determined facts. 442 F.2d at 198.
35. 492 F.2d at 302.
36. Id. at 304, citing Braxton v. Carlson, 493 F.2d 933 (3d Cir. 1973).
37. 492 F.2d at 304-05, citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). The
Meyers court stated:
[R]evocation of already accrued good time credits thus drastically affects the
time when an inmate may enjoy liberty since it postpones the time of release.
Since \we have held that due process applies to the disciplinary imposition of
segregation by the Adjustment Committee, it is, a fortiori, applicable to the GTF
Board.
492 F.2d at 305 (footnotes omitted).
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a "neutral and detached" decisionmaker, 89 the Third Circuit agreed with
the inmates and found that Mr. Cansler's presence upon both disciplinary
committees was "improper as a result of substantial personal involvement
in the activities .. which led to such misconduct charges." 40 The court,
aware of a definitional problem as to what constituted "neutral and de-
tached," emphasized Mr. Cansler's direct personal involvement with the
prisoners' committee, 41 and enunciated the rule that "direct personal or
otherwise substantial involvement, such as major participation in a judg-
mental or decisionmaking role, in the circumstances underlying the
charge" 42 would disqualify an official from sitting as a member of an
impartial tribunal.
This definition and Braxton, which ruled that a tribunal was not im-
partial because an associate warden's initiation of measures to control a
mutiny did not present the degree of involvement necessary to bar him
from serving upon the disciplinary board, 43 provide sharp factual distinctions
that aid in determining that type of personal involvement which, along with
presence on a tribunal, would constitute a violation of due process.
The plaintiffs next alleged that because they had not received advance
written or oral notice of the charges against them, but were only informed
at the beginning of -the Adjustment Committee hearings, they had been
denied due process of law. 44 Once again, the court followed Braxton and
held that due process only required "adequate notice,"' 45 and that prior oral
notice was adequate because written notice would add little to the prisoner's
ability to present his defense. 40 However, the Meyers court went further
and held that due to the "emergency conditions which prevailed, '47 even
the absence of advance oral notice was not a denial of due process.48 Thus,
where charges arise during and as a result of any concerted inmate activity
39. E.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485-89 (1972).
40. 492 F.2d at 305. The Third Circuit said that plaintiffs Irwin, Phillips, Alger,
Jones, and Mason 'were entitled to new hearings. However, apparently fearing more
severe sanctions in reprisal, it ruled that the plaintiffs had to request such hearings
or the present forfeitures would remain in effect. Id. at 307.
41. Id. at 305-06. The court found Mr. Cansler personally involved because:
He dealt directly with the committee throughout the last two days of the work
stoppage until he finally disbanded the committee .... In sum, Associate Warden




43. 483 F.2d at 941. The Braxton court dismissed any idea of personal involve-
ment by saying:
[Associate Warden Rauch] had no personal involvement with any of the appellants
because of their alleged infractions. He was neither a witness nor an investigator.
Id.
44. 492 F.2d at 307.
45. 483 F.2d at 942. Q
46. 492 F.2d at 307, citing Braxton v. Carlson, 483 F.2d 933, 941-42 (3d Cir.
1973).
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or inactivity which poses a serious threat to prison security, the court said,
notice at the beginning of the disciplinary hearing was adequate.4
In delineating these notice requirements, the court was attempting to
balance the time factors involved in the state's and prisoners' interests.
However, it is submitted that a holding which favors the state's interest
in speedy disposition suffers two analytical difficulties. First, although the
Adjustment Committee is part of the rehabilitative process as Braxton
recognized,5 0 its possession of the punitive power 51 dictates that a prisoner
be given time to prepare his defense. Thus, Meyers appears more egregious
than Braxton because in the latter, time was provided, and only written
notice, a safeguard against inaccuracy or fraud, was withheld.12 Second.
the premise that emergency conditions justified the lack of prior notice is
questionable because the Adjustment Committee hearings took place after
the work stoppage had ended. 53 The court's decision, grounded in these
two questionable premises, deprived prisoners of time to prepare for the
hearings, a critical element in the opportunity to present an adequate
defense.
This opportunity was the basis for the court's holding upon the third
alleged deprivation of due process, the denial of an opportunity to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses at the GTF Board hearings."4 While
noting the controversy over applying this safeguard to disciplinary hear-
ings,5 5 the court limited its ruling to the specific factual setting before it
and said there was no denial of due process50 because "[the] limited right
49. Id.
50. 483 F.2d at 941-42.
51. The Committee's punitive power is evidenced by its ability to order segrega-
tion, which deprives the inmate of an opportunity to earn good time credits. See notes
7 & 9 supra.
52. The Meyer court noted that a new Bureau of Prisons directive provided
for written notification to the inmate of charges against him. The court did not decide
whether obedience to this policy would be constitutionally required. 492 F.2d at 307
n.33a. However, the Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974),
required advance written notice of charges before state good time credits could be
revoked. Id. at 564.
An unresolved problem is the detail required in such notification. Although
a bill of particulars is not constitutionally required in federal criminal procedure, a
prisoner could argue by analogy to the provision for requesting a bill of particulars
provided by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that advance notice should
be more than a statement of the disciplinary rule violated. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(f).
At present, however, the only standard for judging the sufficiency of notice
is its purpose - whether it gives "charged party a chance to marshal the facts in
his defense ... 418 U.S. at 564.
53. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
54. 492 F.2d at 308.
55. Id. For a listing of courts and commentators which have dealt with the issue,
see 'id. at nn.35 & 36.
56. Id. The court reasoned that the facts of Meyers indicated that due process
had been satisfied because the "circumstances surrounding the failure to present griev-
ances were largely, if not exclusively, within the knowledge of the committee mem-
bers, and the plaintiffs were afforded the opportunity to present the committee mem-
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to present and examine witnesses afforded plaintiffs the opportunity to
provide sufficient testimony to enable the factfinder to make a rational
determination of the facts."'5 7 The court said, however, that if the ability
to present a defense was meaningless without cross-examination, such a
procedure might be required. 58
In deciding that due process had not been denied, the court appears
to have been attempting to strike a balance between the problems attendant
upon adversary disciplinary hearings59 and the individual's interest in
adequate protection when facing a loss of good time credit. Given the
the present facts, that balance appears to have been well struck. Taking a
broader view, however, it is the very process of determining the facts of a
situation which must be controlled through safeguards.0 0 Near the end of
its opinion, the instant court noted that district courts cannot sit as fact-
finders in prison disciplinary cases, and that their role is limited to ascer-
taining only whether there is any evidence to support a charge.61 This
limited judicial review seems to make the factual determination at the dis-
ciplinary proceeding critical to an effective appeal to the federal courts,
and therefore, the prisoner should be afforded every opportunity, including
cross-examination, to present his side of the case.62
57. Id. at 309.
58. Id. at 309 n.38.
59. These problems include both maintaining staff morale and authority, and pro-
tecting other inmates. See Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1088 (M.D. Fla.),
vacated, 492 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973) ; Nolan v. Scafati, 306 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D. Mass.
1969), vacated, 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970). See also Note, Decency and Fairness:
An Emerging Judicial Role in Prison Reform, 57 VA. L. REV. 841, 874 (1971), advo-
cating "compromise" procedures similar to those adopted in the instant case.
60. The critical nature of factfinding has been pointed out by courts and com-
mentators. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558-59 (1974). Cf. Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 785 (1973). As a study of Rhode Island's prison disciplinary
system pointed out:
The *real function of the Board is dispositional in nature. Even in contested
cases, with the presumption of credibility so heavily weighted against the inmate,
the Board's fact-finding role is subordinated to its dispositional function ....
However, where the disposition is keyed directly to the charged misconduct,
as is ostensibly the case at the [Adult Correctional Institution], the fact-finding
is critical.
Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, Judicial Intervention in Prison Discipline, 63
J. CRIm. L.C. & P.S. 200, 213 (1972).
61. 492 F.2d at 312.
62. Meyers did not contain a frank discussion of the bias inherent in decision-
making by the GTF Board similar to the admission by prison officials in Braxton
that they normally believe the charges in the original misconduct report filed
by a correctional officer, even when the accused prisoner denies them. They
stated that one of the reasons for allowing the accused to give his side of the
story was therapeutic. Nonetheless, the officials said one purpose of the Adjust-
ment Committee hearing was to determine the truth of the allegations.
483 F.2d at 940. This bias casts serious doubt upon whether cross-examination is a
sufficient safeguard for the factfinding process. For other courts' discussions of the
need to allow cross-examination of witnesses, see Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280
(1st Cir. 1973); Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1088 (M.D. Fla.), vacated,
492 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973); Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 782-83
(N.D. Cal. 1971), modified, 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974).
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The court's determination that problems of correctional policy out-
weigh the individual's interest should be seriously questioned. The only
state interests which justify this cautious refusal to allow cross-examination
are those of preserving the morale of the prison staff and maintaining an
appearance of absolute authority.63 It is submitted that the denial of the
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses at a hearing such as the GTF
Board cannot be justified when weighed against these interests. The mini-
mal procedures outlined in Morrissey provide for this right unless good
cause is found to deny it,64 and this approach should also be followed in
prison discipline cases. The use of cross-examination is crucial to fact-
finding ;6.5 hence, the opportunity should be denied by the Board only when
prison interests outweigh the prisoner's right, but these interests should
not be used to deny completely the right to cross-examine. 6
6
The fear that allowing cross-examination will mean a loss of authority
is somewhat ameliorated by the results of a study of the Rhode Island prison
system which showed that the staff members of the prison became more
aware of the prisoners' rights when forced to do so by the courts. 67 The
experience of some prison systems which allow cross-examination, 68 plus
this awareness that the inmates do have rights, offer evidence that morale
may not be as serious a problem as expected, and that absolute authority is
not necessary for an effective system of prison discipline.
The final procedural argument was that denying plaintiffs counsel at
the GTF Board hearings rendered those hearings unconstitutional. 9
63. The Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), refused to
order cross-examination and confrontation and left this matter to the discretion of
the prison officials in each state. The Court relied upon both the necessity for protection
of other inmates and guards, and the requirement of summary disposition of the cases.
Id. at 568-69. The Court's use of the summary disposition rationale is more under-
standable in Wolff than in Meyers, since in the former, the state system under
consideration had only one level of discipline, not two as in the federal system. Id.
at 518 n.8. Therefore, the state board had to perform the functions of both the
Adjustment Committee and the GTF Board. As such is required, a flexibility of
procedure is necessary to allow swift action.
64. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
65. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 585-86 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 586-87 (Marshall, J., dissenting). To safeguard against unreasonable
and arbitrary use of this discretion, the Board should be asked to state, for the record,
its reasons for denying the opportunity for cross-examination. Cf. id. at 566; Gagnon
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 791 (1973).
67. The study concluded:
[Tihere was a growing recognition by administrative and custodial staff that
inmates did have rights, rights that would be contested and enforced. Acceptance
of this fundamental notion is a necessary predicate to any effective prison reform.
Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, supra note 60, at 222. See also Kadish, The
Advocate and the Expert-Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45 MINN. L.
REv. 803, 837-41 (1961).
68. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 588--89 (1974) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting).
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Reasoning that the need for legal skills was not great in hearings where
there were no formal evidentiary rules, the court rejected this argument
and concluded that "the interjection of counsel in prison disciplinary hear-
ings would severely conflict with and undermine the prison administration's
interest in summary disposition of disciplinary matters."7 0 Thus, the in-
mate's interest in counsel yielded to a stronger state interest.
The court's use of the summary disposition rationale appears to have
been faulty.71 There is no legitimate interest in summary disposition of the
GTF Board review because necessary protective action is usually taken by
the Adjustment Committee.7 2 The Third Circuit appeared to overlook the
aid counsel could provide in the critical task of marshaling facts.73 While
the court found that the opportunity to have a counsel substitute was a
sufficient safeguard, an investigation into the effectiveness of such staff
substitutes showed they were often inadequate.7 4  Further, although the
court found a denial of due process upon only the narrow ground of the
lack of an impartial tribunal and refused to mandate other procedural safe-
guards, its mode of analysis - an application of the Goldberg-M'drrissey
balancing test - was sound because due process is not a fixed concept
but a flexible response to the particular situation. 75 Any criticism of Meyers
results not from the balancing process itself but from the weight given to
the various interests at stake in a prison discipline hearing.76
70. Id.
71. The Court in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), denied the right
to counsel, relying upon the Gagnon rationale that the resultant delay and change
in the nature of the proceedings precluded adopting this requirement. Id. at 570.
However, as the dissent noted, the Wolff Court overlooked the holding in Gagnon
that counsel was required in limited circumstances, and allowed counsel substitute
(see note 74 and accompanying text infra) under those conditions in which counsel
should have been required. Id. at 590-91 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See note 28 and
accompanying text supra for the enumeration of the conditions under which Gagnon
stated that counsel was required.
72. See notes 7 & 9 and accompanying text supra.
73. See notes 64-66 and accompanying text supra.
74. Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, supra note 60, at 208-09. Staff mem-
bers serving as representatives for prisoners were reluctant advocates and prisoners
were often dissatisfied with this lack of full support. Id. at 208. This finding seems
to undermine not only the Meyers but also the rationale of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974). See note 71 supra. It is submitted that the Gagnon "particular
circumstances" approach should be followed in disciplinary proceedings. See note 28
supra. When the prisoner meets these requirements, counsel should be provided. Such
an approach appears to balance adequately the needs of both the prison and the inmate.
75. See note 22 and accompanying text supra. See also Hannah v. Larche, 363
U.S. 420, 440, 442 (1960).
76. Some courts and commentators have said that the prisoner's interests were
dominant, and that extensive safeguards should be required. See Sands v. Wain-
wright, 357 F. Supp. 1062 (M.D. Fla.), vacated, 491 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973) ; Clutch-
ette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971), modified, 497 F.2d 809 (9th
Cir. 1974); Milleman, Prison Disciplinary Hearings and Procedural Due Process -
The Requirement of a Full Administrative Hearing, 31 MD. L. REV. 27 (1971).
[VOL. 20458
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2. Vagueness in Prison Regulations
Having decided the due process issue, the Meyers court turned to what
it termed the substantive due process claim, 77 that the regulation under
which the prisoners were charged was unconstitutionally vague because it
afforded no notice that failure to present grievances would be punished. 78
The issue of specificity in prison regulations has prompted courts to
borrow the standard applied in cases challenging criminal statutes as being
void for vagueness. 79 That standard was articulated in Grayned v. City of
Rockford,8O wherein the Supreme Court set out three requirements for
upholding a statute: the statute must provide (1) fair warning to a person
of ordinary intelligence that his actions are prohibited, (2) explicit standards
for application to avoid arbitrary enforcement, and (3) no infringement of
sensitive areas of first amendment freedoms. 8'
The vagueness issue had not previously been raised in the Third
Circuit in the context of prison regulations, but there was precedent for
applying the Grayned standards to regulations. In Levy v. Parker,8 2 the
Third Circuit had held that Articles 133 and 134 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice,83 which punished "conduct unbecoming an officer"8 4 and
"disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the
armed forces,"8 5 were unconstitutionally vague.86  The inmates in the
present case relied heavily upon the oourt's decision in Levy. Initially,
the Meyers court distinguished Levy by stating that the prison regulation
involved was more specific,8 7 and by noting that a fundamental difference
between normal society and prison society required a less strict standard
of specificity in prison regulations than in criminal laws generally.8 8 As
77. 492 F.2d at 298-99, 309. The court's concern was with ensuring adequate
notice and avoiding arbitrary enforcement, issues which are ordinarily considered
procedural due process concerns. Note, Vagueness Doctrine in the Federal Courts:
A Focus on the Military, Prison and Campus Contexts, 26 STAN. L. REV. 855, 856
n.8 (1974).
78. 492 F.2d at 309. For the wording of the regulation see note 5 and accompany-
ing text snpra.
79. E.g., Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
80. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
81. Id. at 108-09.
82. 478 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), noted in 19 VILL.
L. REV. 291 (1973).
83. 10 U.S.C. §§ 933-34 (1970).
84. Id. § 933.
85. Id. § 934.
86. 478 F.2d at 796. Captain Levy had allegedly violated the Articles by making
public statements that black soldiers should refuse to go to Vietnam. Id. at 776.
87. The Meyers Court stated:
While Article 134 speaks only generally of good order and discipline, without
qualifying such terms, the prison regulation speaks also specifically of safety and
security, thus making clear to inmates and limiting the nature of the good order
to which the regulation applies.
492 F.2d at 310.
88. Id. The court failed to discuss any similarity between prison and military
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to prison discipline rules in particular, the Third Circuit adopted the
position -of the district court in Landman v. Royster,s 9 that objections to
applying the vagueness standard to prisons "may all be met simply by
relaxing the standard somewhat in deference to the state's legitimate needs,
rather than by abandoning it."90 The Meyers court then concluded that in
view of this lower standard, "plaintiffs had sufficient notice that bad faith
failure to prepare grievances would result in disciplinary measures." 91
The instant case's standard for the application of the vagueness doc-
trine to prison regulations presaged subsequent Supreme Court decisions
regarding this doctrine. In Smith v. Goguen,9 2 the Court reiterated the
Grayned standards and noted two categories for determining whether a
statute was vague as applied: it could be vague in the sense of an imprecise
but comprehensible standard, or vague in the sense that no standard of
conduct was specified at all. 93 The Smith Court held that the statute there
under question was of the latter type and, therefore, had been unconstitu-
tionally applied because the lack of a standard for enforcement would have
allowed conviction based upon the jury's personal preferences. 94 In another
case applying the vagueness doctrine, the Supreme Court reversed the Third
Circuit in Parker v. Levy, 95 where the Court noted the differences between
military and civilian life which, it concluded, required a less strict appli-
cation of the vagueness doctrine to military regulations,90 and held that
Article 134 was not vague as applied to Levy's actions; indeed, the con-
struction given to this Article by military oourts had brought it within the
imprecise but comprehensible category referred to in Smith.. 7
The Meyers court's analysis was very similar to the Supreme Court's
analysis in Parker. Both cases discussed a crucial factor in applying the
vagueness doctrine to such subsocieties as the military and prison popu-
lations: the inability to enact precise standards or regulations.9" Indeed,
this problem was part of the "fundamental" difference between civilian and
in the military than in civilian society and that the more apt analogy would have been
between prison and the military.
89. 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
90. 492 F.2d at 311, quoting Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 656 (E.D.
Va. 1971).
91. 492 F.2d at 312. Plaintiffs originally had been placed in segregation for
failure to present grievances; then were released specifically to prepare them. Id.
They were also warned of the importance of presenting grievances. Id. at 310 n.39.
92. 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
93. Id. at 578, citing Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971).
94. 415 U.S. at 578-79. The Court was dealing with the language of a Massa-
chusetts flag misuse statute which punished anyone who "treats contemptuously the
flag of the United States . Id. at 568-69, quoting MASs. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch.
264, § 5 (1971).
95. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
96. Id. at 754-57.
97. Id. at 754-56.
98. The factors involved in an application of the vagueness doctrine are out-
lined in Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA.
L. REV. 67 (1960). These factors are reviewed and applied to the prison context in
Note, supra note 77.
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prison life noted by the Meyers court. 99 The inability to foresee both the
types of behavior and the situations which would lead to a breach of security
and safety seemed to weigh heavily in both decisions to require a less strict
standard.100 Such a parallel establishes Meyers as a strong precedent for
other cases challenging prison regulations on vagueness grounds. It is
submitted that the regulation in Meyers should be considered as setting up
an imprecise standard rather than no standard at: all. Such imprecision is
tolerable, however, given the unique problems involved in maintaining
prison order and safety. 10 1 The need to be flexible and the inability to
anticipate every instance of dangerous behavior in a given situation are
important considerations in prison administration. Nevertheless, the system
must also be fair and not arbitrary. 10 2 The Meyers court recognized this
fact and warned that its decision "does not confer upon prison officials a
license to punish inmates pursuant to broad sweeping regulations,"' 0 3 and
that due process may require more precise regulations in specific circum-
stances.
1 04
In its resolution of the vagueness issue Meyers sets a reasonable bal-
ance between the needs of the system and those of the individual. The
Landman approach to the application of the vagueness doctrine allows both
flexibility in discipline, and a standard of review which guards against
arbitrary punishment. However, the court may have used a rather demand-
ing awareness requirement in determining whether this regulation was void
as applied to these plaintiffs. The court's standard of "should have re-
alized"10 5 presumes an awareness of the context of one's actions which
99. 492 F.2d at 310.
100. The Third Circuit stated:
The instant case offers a convenient example of the type of misconduct - i.e.,
failure to present grievances during a work stoppage where such failure prolongs
the stoppage - which form of misconduct could not reasonably be anticipated
by the prison administration but which the inmates should clearly have recognized
as constituting dangerous and unacceptable prison conduct.
Id.
101. See notes 98 & 99 and accompanying text supra, and Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 561-62 (1974). The Supreme Court recognized in Smith that 'n
certain areas, such as police control of disorderly conduct, developing standards of
conduct which are both precise and enforceable is not possible. 415 U.S. at 581.
It can be argued that prison security is just such an area.
102. One commentator has argued that while relatively loosely drawn standards
may be necessary to provide flexibility in maintaining discipline, the abuse of such
statutes to oppress prisoners can become a source of ferment, thereby undermining
prison security. Note, supra note 77, at 876 n.111.
103. 492 F.2d at 311.
104. Id. The Meyers court clarified this caveat by stating:
[D]ue process may well require clearly drawn regulations specifying those types
of proscribed conduct which can be reasonably anticipated. This is particularly
important with respect to conduct which might otherwise seem innocent to
an inmate.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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borders upon careful and selective perception, 00 and goes beyond the more
usual one of sufficient to give notice to the average person.'0 7 It forces
an individual to guess which parts of a factual situation will be stressed
at some future time to determine if he had notice. However, given the
factual environment of Meyers, the application of this regulation appears
to be narrow and fair.
In conclusion, it must first be noted that the effect of Meyers appears
to have been muted by the Supreme Court's decision in Wolff v. Mc-
Donnell,10 8 wherein the Court established four due process requirements
in a state prison disciplinary hearing: (1) advance written notice of the
claimed violations; (2) a written statement of the factfindings and reasons
for any action taken by the disciplinary board; (3) the inmate should be
permitted to call witnesses in his defense when doing so will not be haz-
ardous to prison safety; and (4) counsel substitute, either a staff member
or a fellow prisoner, if the inmate is unable to present evidence himself.' 0 9
It could be argued that Meyers is distinct in that the state system involved
in Wolff provided for only one level of disciplinary proceeding, and, neces-
sarily, this -one level had to be able to deal in both a summary and reviewing
capacity. The type of review panel such as the federal system's GTF
Board in Meyers does not act in a summary capacity, and therefore, a
legitimate state interest in speedy disposition is lacking. This fact neces-
sarily affects the results of the Goldberg-Morrissey balancing test °10 since
the weight of the state's interest is lessened. When the balance is thus
shifted, it would be error - because the requirements -of due process vary
according to the weight of the interests involved - to apply procedures
which are not derived from a review of the relative importance of the
new interests: therefore, Wolff should not be accepted as the last word in
all prison disciplinary cases.
The Meyers case does provide a standard for determining the im-
partiality vel non of a tribunal, yet it appears to invite further challenge
upon due process grounds to proceedings before these boards, especially
challenge which would focus upon the cross-examination question. The
crucial issue in such a case would be whether the inmate had had an ade-
quate opportunity to present his defense before these boards, particularly
106. Committee members believed that no disciplinary action would result because
of promises from the warden of no reprisal and his permission to work around the
clock upon preparing grievances. The court pointed out that both of these promises
were qualified by the quid pro quo of good faith upon the part of the committee.
Id. at 311. It seems that the court's "clearly should have realized" standard suffers
a vagueness disability itself because it does not reveal what facts or how many of the
total circumstances a prisoner must realize.
107. See note 81 and accompanying text supra.
108. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
109. Id. For an example of an application of Wolff beyond its immediate facts,
see Workman v. Mitchell, 502 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1974).
110. See Note, Due Process Safeguards in Prison. Disciplinary Proceedings: The
Application of the Goldberg Balancing Test, 49 N.D.L. REv. 675 (1973), enumerating
court holdings in this area.
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the GTF Board."' The test for when cross-examination must be permitted
may provide a compromise formulation for states wishing to allow a middle
ground between the extremes of Wolff and those decisions requiring cross-
examination."
2
The acceptance of the Landman approach to the application of the
vagueness doctrine is a sound decision which allows flexibility while pro-
viding a check upon arbitrary punishment, and appears to be an important
step in prison reform. Both Meyers and Wolff evidenced desires to defer
to the expertise of prison authorities in discipline matters. The role of
the courts cannot be simply to grant such broad discretion; rather, it should
be to safeguard basic rights against infringement. 1 3 Fortunately, neither
case is written as a definitive statement about this developing area of the
law. 1 14 The process of reevaluating the balances struck in Meyers should
continue.
Jerome C. Murray
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FCC REGULATION OF BROADCAST CON-
TENT - ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE WINNING STATE LOTTERY NUMBER
DURING NEWSCASTS Is NEWS PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT
AND CANNOT BE RESTRAINED BY THE FCC.
New Jersey State Lottery Commission v. United States (1974)
Jersey Cape Broadcasting Corp.' planned to announce the winning
number in the weekly New Jersey State Lottery during three consecutive
regular newscasts on the day of the drawing. By means of a declaratory
111. See note 58 and accompanying text supra. Another open question is the
sufficiency of notice. See note 52 and accompanying text supra. However, Wolff
was applied to the federal prison system in an opinion which did not distinguish that
case upon the basis of the different disciplinary systems involved. See Workman v.
Mitchell, 502 F.2d 1201, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 1974). It is submitted that such an
analysis does not reflect the approach of basing due process decisions upon the varying
interests involved. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
112. See note 62 supra.
113. See note 114 infra: 418 U.S. at 555-56.
114. The Wolff majority noted that its decision was not "graven in stone." 418
U.S. at 572. The Meyers court stated:
The judiciary cannot avoid its ultimate responsibility for interpreting the consti-
tional requirements of due process. Certainly that responsibility cannot be dele-
gated to prison authorities. . . . These cases represent a stage in the development
of a extremely important phase of constitutional law. It is appropriate that
the development proceed with full deliberation.
492 F.2d at 309, quoting United States ex ret. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 719
(7th Cir. 1973).
1. Jersey Cape Broadcasting Corp. was a licensee of stations WCMC-AM-FM-
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ruling 2, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) determined that
such newscasts would violate FCC regulations 3 and section 1304 of the
United States Criminal Code which prohibits the broadcast of information
concerning lotteries.4 Petitioner, the New Jersey State Lottery Commission
(Lottery Commission), sought reconsideration of this ruling,5 but its
petition was denied by the FCC.0 Subsequently, the Lottery Commission
filed a petition for review of the FCC action with the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit.7 The court granted the petition and re-
versed the FCC, holding that a winning lottery number was news on the
day of the drawing and was therefore information protected by the anti-
censorship provision of the Federal Communications Act of 19348 and the
first amendment from prior broadcasting restraint. New Jersey State
L'dttery Commission v. United States, 491 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1974), re-
manded to det'ermine mootness, 95 S. Ct. 941 (1975).
Traditionally, Congress has expressed disapproval of lotteries by
statutorily denying the use of federally regulated facilities to transmit any
2. Id. The FCC clarified its initial ruling specifically to include newscasts.
36 Fed. Reg. 14347 (1971).
3. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.122(AM), 73.292 (FM), 73.656 (TV) (1972).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1970). The statute's proscription applies to
[Whomever] broadcasts by means of any radio station for which a license
is required by any law of the United States, or [whomever], operating any such
station, knowingly permits the broadcasting of, any advertisement of or in-
formation concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme, offering
prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any list of the
prizes drawn or awarded by means of any such lottery, gift enterprise, or
scheme ....
Id.
The FCC has the power to revoke the license of any broadcast station for
violation of section 1304. Communications Act of 1934 § 312(a) (6), 47 U.S.C.
§ 312(a) (6) (1970).
Much of the language of section 1304 first appeared in Act of Mar. 4, 1909,
ch. 321, §§ 213, 237, 35 Stat. 1129, 1136, which prohibited the mailing and foreign
importation of lottery materials. It was then adopted in its present form, in the
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 316, 48 Stat. 1088, repealed, Act of June 25,
1948, ch. 645, § 21, 62 Stat. 866, and reenacted in the Criminal Code, Act of June 25,
1948, ch. 645, § 1304, 62 Stat. 763 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1970)).
5. The petition for reconsideration was filed pursuant to the Communications
Act of 1934 § 405, 47 U.S.C. § 405 (1970), and FCC rules, 47 C.F.R. § 1.106(b)
(1973).
6. Jersey Cape Broadcasting Corp., 36 F.C.C.2d 93 (1972).
7. The petition for review was made pursuant to the Communications Act of
1934 § 402(a), 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1970), and 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) (1970).
The states of New Hampshire and Pennsylvania intervened in the action while the
Maryland Public Broadcasting Corp. filed a brief as amicus curiae. New Jersey
State Lottery Comm'n v. United States, 491 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1974), remanded to
determine mootness, 95 S. Ct. 941 (1975).
8. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970). That section provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the
Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals
transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promul-
gated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free
speech by means of radio communication.
[VOL. 20
56
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1975], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanov .edu/vlr/vol20/iss2/7
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
information concerning them. 9 The courts have :interpreted these statutes
as applying to both illegal and legal lotteries, including state lotteries. 10
Since the broadcast medium is a federally regulated industry under the
Communications Act of 1934,11 it is not surprising that Congress enacted
section 130412 to prevent the broadcast of "any advertisement of or in-
formation concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme."' 3
However, Congress also demonstrated its awareness of the serious consti-
tutional issue raised by such prior restraints on broadcast information -
the extent to which such information is speech protected by the first amend-
ment - by enacting section 326 of the Communications Act, 14 which in-
corporates a first amendment limitation on the FCC's power to regulate
the content of broadcast information. Other areas of prior restraint imposed
by the FCC have been unsuccessfully challenged as violative of section
9. For example, Congress has repeatedly prevented the transmission of lottery
information through the mails. See Act of Mar. 2, 1827, ch. 61, § 6, 4 Stat. 238-39;
Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 149, 17 Stat. 302; Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, §§ 213,
237, 35 Stat. 1129, 1136. Presently, the mailing of lottery information and participation
in lottery schemes by postal employees is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1303
(1970).
In 1967, Congress prohibited the sale of state lottery tickets by federally
insured banks, savings and loan associations, and member banks of the Federal
Reserve System. 18 U.S.C. § 1306 (1970). This section provides sanctions for
violations of section 5136A of the Revised statutes, 12 U.S.C. § 25a (1970) (national
banks) ; section 9A of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 339 (1970) (state
member banks) ; section 20 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1829(a)
(1970) (state non-member insured banks) ; and section 410 of the National Housing
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1730c (1970) (savings and loan associations).
10. See S. REP. No. 727, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967) ; 15 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 203
(1877). In In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110 (1892), the Court upheld a statute pro-
hibiting mailing of a newspaper containing an advertisement for the Louisiana State
Lottery. Id. at 135. The proscription against any record, paper, or writing designed
for use in a wagering pool, 18 U.S.C. § 1953 (1970), has been construed to apply
to the New Hampshire Sweepstakes, a state lottery. United States v. Fabrizio,
385 U.S. 263 (1966).
Congressional disapproval of lotteries developed in the mid 1800's when there
were numerous lotteries throughout the country, both state and privately operated.
Spofford, Lotteries in American History, 1892 REP. AM. HIST. Ass'N 173 (1892).
The evils of lotteries were described by the author as follows:
The investor in such schemes always stands to lose and the management to
gain in the direct ratio of their chances, which are preponderantly in favor of
the lottery. The plain results of indulgence in this tempting but surely losing
species of gaming were seen in thousands of instances. Unreal expectations,
visionary hopes, distaste for the slow gains of useful labor, consuming anxieties,
spending beyond means, debt, speculation, concealment, bankruptcy - such were
some of the oft-repeated experiences of the victims of the lottery habit.
Id. at 194.
11. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970). The FCC was granted power to enforce
the Communications Act of 1934. Id. § 151.
12. Section 1304 was originally enacted as part of the Communications Act of
1934. See note 4 supra.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1970).
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326,15 yet the restraint on broadcasting lottery information under section
1304 has been relatively free from attack.' 6
Only the Second Circuit, in New Ydrk State Broadcasters Association
v. United States,'7 had considered the validity of section 1304, concluding
that it was facially unconstitutional in prohibiting speech protected by the
first amendment.' 8 In so doing, however, the court recognized both the
necessity of prohibiting information tending toward actual conduct of a
lottery through the broadcast medium,' 9 and the limitation placed by
Congress upon this policy in section 326. The New York State Broad-
casters Association court thus interpreted section 1304 to resolve potential
15. The FCC exercises prior restraint in several areas: the fairness doctrine
which requires broadcasting stations to present information in a fair and equal manner,
Communications Act of 1934, § 315(a) (4), 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)(4) (1970); the
equal time provision for political candidates, Communications Act of 1934, § 315(a),
47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972); and the regulation of
commercial advertising under the public interest standard of the Communications Act
of 1934, §§ 307(a), 309(a), 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), 309(a) (1970). See generally
Johnson & Westen, A Twentieth Century Soapbox: The Right to Purchase Radio
and Television Time, 57 VA. L. REV. 574 (1971) ; Marks, Broadcasting and Censorship:
First Amendment Theory After Red Lion, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 974 (1970);
Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio
and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REV. 671 (1967) ; Note, Freedom of Expres-
sion in a Commercial Context, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1191 (1965) ; Note, Regulation of
Program Content by the FCC, 77 HARV. L. REV. 701 (1964).
The fairness doctrine was upheld as not violative of the first amendment and
section 326 in the landmark decision of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367 (1969). The Third Circuit recognized the validity of the equal time
provision in Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc., 186 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 909 (1951). Finally, the FCC's right to regulate a broad-
caster's commercial activities was accepted in Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
16. The early cases concerning section 1304 were concerned only with what
constitutes a lottery under the statute. See, e.g., FCC v. American Broadcasting Co.,
347 U.S. 284 (1954) (radio and television giveaway shows are not lotteries);
Caples Co. v. United States, 243 F.2d 232 (D.C. Cir. 1959). The issue of whether
the New Jersey State Lottery was a "lottery" for the purposes of section 1304 was
never raised in the instant case.
17. 414 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1061 (1971), modifying
Broadcasting of Information Concerning Lotteries, 14 F.C.C.2d 707 (1968).
18. 414 F.2d at 997. The court stated:
The real point here is that we are not primarily in the realm of ideas at all
but are chiefly concerned with speech closely allied with the putting into effect
of prohibited conduct. This is not to say that the statute under attack does not
raise first amendment issues. Thus, petitioners contend that section 1304 is
unconstitutional on its face, arguing that its broad terms improperly inhibit "lawful
communication unconnected with the operating of a lottery." It is obvious that
a literal reading of the statute would support petitioners' challenge, since by
its terms it punishes the broadcasting of "any information concerning any
lottery."
Id. (language of statute deleted by court).
19. Id. The court noted:
The section obviously prohibits a licensed broadcaster from conducting a lottery
on the air. But that prohibition alone would be almost meaningless; by its very
nature, a lottery could be promoted by broadcasting information about it with
essentially the same effect as conducting it.
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conflict between these provisions, by stating that "the phrase 'information
concerning any lottery' refers only to information that directly promotes
a particular existing lottery. ' 20 Therefore, a news item that only incidentally
promoted a lottery would be acceptable, since the first amendment's pro-
tection of "news" would override the minimal effect of promoting a lottery,
21
thereby eliminating the constitutional objection to the statute.
In its initial request for a declaratory ruling,22 Jersey Cape Broadcast-
ing Corp. cited New York State Broadcasters Association in support of
its contention that the broadcast of the winning lottery 'number would not
violate section 1304, since it was news having only the incidental effect
of promoting a lottery.23 The FCC disagreed and determined that while
the winning number may be of news value to some persons, its broadcast
would nevertheless directly promote the lottery, "the widespread dissemina-
tion of such information being reasonably necessary or helpful to the
conduct of the lottery. '24 In its petition for reconsideration, the Lottery
Commission challenged the FCC's position by asserting that the winning
number had "significant news value" due to the widespread interest in the
state lottery and, therefore, could not be banned. According to the FCC,
the news value of the information was not sufficient to minimize its effect
of directly promoting a lottery; it therefore could not be broadcast under
20. Id. (emphasis added).
21. Id. The court offered a few examples of what types of broadcast information
would directly promote a lottery: lists of winners, pleas to buy tickets, information
of where and when to buy tickets, and any paid announcements. Items that would not
directly promote a lottery included debate on the issue of the state lottery, news of
how lottery proceeds were being distributed, interviews with winners, and editorial
comment on the lottery if not used as a sham to broadcast prohibited information. Id.
at 998-99. The court also exempted certain advertisements that met the test of
being "on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of highest
public interest and concern." Id. at 998, quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
Since the petitioners had requested rulings on specific items they had wished
to broadcast, the court remanded the case to the FCC for a determination of what
information would be banned. The FCC found that the following would directly
promote a lottery: unpaid announcements of places where lottery tickets could be
purchased; announcements of where, when, and how winning tickets would be drawn,
and of amounts of prizes; advertisements of the lottery; live broadcasts of the
drawing of winning tickets; and long lists of prizes and winners. The following
would not directly promote a lottery according to the FCC: news reports of illegal
lotteries; explanations of how revenues from the state lottery would be distributed;
speeches by public officials on the operation and purpose of the lottery; interviews
with winners; documentary programs favoring or opposing the lottery; and editorial
comment. Supplementary Declaratory Ruling, 21 F.C.C.2d 846 (1970).
22. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
23. See 30 F.C.C.2d at 794.
24. Id. at 795. The Lottery Commission later contended that if the broadcasting
of the winning lottery number were illegal, then the report of World Series scores
and the result of the Super Bowl would be equally illegal since both are necessary
for illegal betting pools. The FCC countered this argument by noting that there was a
legitimate public interest in these scores outside their connection with illegal gambling.
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section 1304 even as interpreted by New York State Broadcasters Asso-
ciation.
25
The court in the instant case specifically rejected the FCC's premise
that information that was of value to a limited number of persons was any
less "news" than an item of more universal concern.2 6 As news, 27 the
announcement of the winning lottery number was protected by the first
amendment.28 Since this particular broadcast was prohibited by section
1304 according to the FCC's "directly promote" test, and Congress' intent,
as manifested in section 326, was to forbid FCC interference with free
speech, the court found it necessary to formulate a different interpretation
of that provision so as to permit the broadcast. Stating that "[t]he FCC
interpretation of [section] 1304 gives that provision of the Communications
Act of 1934 undue weight while giving too little weight to the Congres-
sional expression in the same statute set out in [section] 326, ' '29 the court
viewed section 1304 as inapplicable to news broadcasts, thus implying that
even news that directly promoted a lottery was within the exemption.
Consequently, the court suggested that section 1304 was intended to pro-
hibit only lottery promotions for which the broadcaster received com-
pensation.3
0
The interpretation of section 1304 derived by the instant court was
one of a variety of alternative constructions through which the result of
permitting the broadcast could have been reached. For example, the court
could have accepted the FCC view and have justified the result by holding
that the broadcast of the winning number did not "directly promote" a
lottery. It seems apparent that this conclusion would have been incon-
sistent with the New York State Broadcasters Association case, since
broadcasting a winning number appears analogous to broadcasting a list
of winners which was therein held impermissible under the "directly pro-
mote" test.8 1 As a second interpretation, section 1304 could have been
construed as not restricting the broadcast of information concerning legal
state lotteries. However, this assertion would have been contrary to con-
gressional intent due to the historical construction of similar anti-lottery
statutes as applying to all lotteries,' 2 and the recent enactment of a statute
directed at state lotteries.33 It therefore appears that the instant court
25. 36 F.C.C.2d at 96. The FCC continued and said that "[t]he public demand
may be 'truly staggering' but it cannot change the law to permit the broadcast of
information directly promoting a lottery." Id. at 97.
26. 491 F.2d at 222-23.
27. The instant court appeared to define news as "items of possible immediate
public concern." Id., quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 415 F.2d 892, 895
(3d Cir. 1969), aff'd, 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
28. 491 F.2d at 222-23.
29. Id. at 224.
30. Id. The court, however, suggested that even some non-commercial announce-
ments may not be news and therefore would still be prohibited by section 1304. Id.
31. See note 21 supra.
32. See note 10 supra.
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selected the most reasonable interpretation, available in order to reach the
result of permitting the broadcast.
Although the court's 'view represented the most reasonable interpre-
tation of section 1304 by which to permit the broadcast in issue, it does
not necessarily follow that this more restricted reading of section 1304
represents congressional intent more exactly ,than the "directly promote"
test. As the court stated, Congress sought to curtail, broadcasts of, or
relating to an activity it disapproved, 'i.e., lotteries, but it also expressed, in
section 326, its cognizance of the protection offered to certain information
by the first amendment.3 4 Thus, the answer to the question of which in-
terpretation more closely follows congressional intent ultimately rests upon
the validity of the instant court's conclusions that the winning lottery
number is "news", and' as such, is protected by the first amendment al-
though it contains information which may directly promote a legal practice
viewed by Congress as against public policy.
The instant court's definition of "news"3 5 conforms to the accepted
use of the term, at least as used in the law of privacy.3 6 The winning lottery
number is unquestionably an item of "immediate public concern," regardless
of the total number of persons interested in the information, contrary to the
FCC's contention.3 7
However, the second issue remains: to, what extent may Congress
prevent the dissemination of news which may directly promote a legitimate
activity that Congress disfavors? Clearly, in the context of printed jour-
nalism, the first amendment quite literally precludes such restrictions be-
cause the interest of the. public in the publication of "news" overrides any
governmental interest in censorship.38 This basic principle, when applied
to broadcasting, however, is complicated by the fact that Congress can
lawfully regulate the broadcast industry to ensure that the public interest
is being served.3 9 Nevertheless, this additional interest of Congress in the
content of broadcast information does not justify censorship over "news"
34. 491 F.2d at 224.
35. See note 27 supra.
36. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 550-57 (1970).
The publication of highly personal information may give rise to an action in tort
for invasion of privacy. A defense to such an action is that the information is
newsworthy and therefore is in the public domain. Id. at 550. Quaere, of course,
whether the two areas are necessarily in pari materia for purposes of defining "news."
37. See note 26 supra. Prof. Emerson has stated:
In fact, no matter how [newsworthiness] is construed, a classification that bases
the right to First Amendment protection on some estimate of how much general
interest there is in the communication is surely in conflict with the whole idea
of the First Amendment.
T. EMERSON, supra note 36, at 554.
38. See M. KONVITZ, FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES OF A FREE PEOPLE 187-93 (1957).
39. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215-16 (1943).
The primary justification for the imposition of federal regulation of broadcasting
has been that there is a limited number of broadcast frequencies so that some control
is necessary to ensure the promotion of the public interest in view of the competing
interests for a limited number of facilities. See T. EMERSON, supra note 36, at 660-67.
See note 15 and the sources cited therein supra. 61
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directly promoting a legal activity which, while lawful, is nevertheless
deemed to be harmful to the public interest; the stake of the public in
"news," "the people's right to know," 40 is superior to the theoretical public
interest - as formulated by Congress - in preventing the allegedly dele-
terious effects resulting from such broadcasts. 41 Therefore, the instant
court's restrictive reading of section 1304 conforms to the congressional
intent expressed in section 326 that first amendment theory guide the
interpretation of the Communications Act.
Since the instant court's view of section 1304 is more restricted than
the "directly promote" construction, more information concerning state
lotteries can be broadcast, provided such information qualifies as news.
42
It is submitted, in light of this consequence, that the result in the instant
case is far more satisfactory, as a matter of policy, than that reached under
the "directly promote" test. If the state has made the determination that
a lottery would serve public needs, 43 then that finding should be an overrid-
ing factor in a Congressional evaluation of public policy towards state
40. M. KONVITZ, supra note 38, at 192.
41. The instant court noted that the only restraints on broadcasting news in-
formation are libel law and the law of obscenity. 491 F.2d at 223. See Kalven,
Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J. LAW & EcoN. 15 (1967),
wherein the author stated:
Communications apart from broadasting are, of course, not altogether immune
to regulation. To some extent, therefore, the regulation of broadcast programs
is predicated on these general premises for regulation of speech and press.
Insofar as this is true there is no distinctive problem of broadcasting as the
First Amendment posed, since presumably no one wishes to argue that broadcasting
should be regulated less than the press. In theory this common ground of prohibited
speech would include the direct advocacy of serious criminal action, contempt of
court, libel, invasions of privacy and above all obscenity.
Id. at 32-33 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
Another commentator has noted:
Thus radio and television, like newspapers, are subject to the general laws
which bind all persons, institutions, and businesses, such as the antitrust laws,
labor laws, and laws governing libel, slander, fraud, and other socially disruptive
conduct and speech. Concededly there are first amendment limitations on the
application of such laws, but the limitations are not unique to radio and television.
Robinson, supra note 15, at 162. It is obvious that information concerning legal state
lotteries does not fall into any of these categories. However, as the instant court
noted, a broadcast of similar information for which a licensee receives compensation
can be banned. 491 F.2d at 223 (citations omitted).
42. As an example, consider the following: "[T]he winning lottery ticket was
drawn at the Cherry Hill Shopping Mall by Miss America, surrounded by the
Governor and other state and local officials. The top prize winner was John Doe."
36 F.C.C.2d at 99, quoting Brief for the petitioner. The FCC stated that this item
could not be broadcast. 36 F.C.C.2d at 99. Under the instant court's interpretation
of section 1304, it seems likely that it could be broadcast because it would qualify
as news. See note 27 supra.
43. The proceeds of the New Jersey State Lottery are intended to be used for
state institutions and state aid to education. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:9-2 (Supp. 1973).
The Pennsylvania State Lottery is designed to relieve the tax burden of senior citizens
and curb illegal gambling. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3761-2 (Supp. 1974).
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lotteries. 44  In addition, legislation that attempts to discourage state lot-
teries by prohibiting broadcasts is inconsistent with congressional policy
toward horse racing, another form of legalized gambling,45 although both
appear to have identical attendant evils. The conclusion is compelled, then,
that decisions, such as that in the instant case, which minimize the effect of
legislation that curtails state lotteries by denying them access to federally
regulated facilities should be welcomed.
Jeffrey L. Pettit
44. See S. REP. No. 727, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1967). It should be noted that
Congress recently amended section 1304 to be inapplicable "to an advertisement, list
of prizes, or information concerning a lottery conducted by a State . . .broadcast
by a radio or television station licensed to a location in that State or an adjacent
State which conducts such a lottery. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-538, § 1 (a) (1),
88 Stat. 1916, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6905-06 (93d Cong., 2d Sess., Jan. 30,1975). Since, in the instant case, the broadcasts were to be by a New Jersey
corporation concerning information of the New Jersey State Lottery, section 1304
is now inapplicable. However, as New Hamphire pointed out in its brief to the
Supreme Court, Vermont broadcasters would still not be permitted to transmit any
information concerning the New Hampshire State Lottery because Vermont has no
lottery of its own. United States v. New Jersey State Lottery Comm'n, 95 S. Ct. 941,
943 (1975). Consequently, the Supreme Court, after granting certiorari, 417 U.S. 907
(1974), remanded the case to the Third Circuit to determine whether the controversy
was now moot in light of New Hamphire's contention. 95. S. Ct. at 942. Mr. Justice
Douglas dissented, stating:
It is to me shocking that a radio station or a newspaper can be regulated by a
court or by a Commission, to the extent of being prevented from publishing any
item of "news" of the day. So to hold would be a prior restraint of a simple
and unadulterated form, barred by constitutional principles. Can anyone doubt
that the winner of a lottery is prime news by our press standards?
Id. at 943.
45. Congress has not enacted any statute to prevent the broadcast of horse
racing information, including betting information, but has left the matter to the
discretion of the FCC under the FCC's power to grant and renew licenses for the"public interest, convenience and necessity." Communications Act of 1934, §§ 307(a).
309(a), 47 U.S.C. §§ 30 7 (a), 309(a) (1970). See Amendment of Part 3 of the
Commission's Rules to Regulate the Broadcast of Horse Racing Information, 36F.C.C. 1571 (1964). Following this view, the FCC has designated certain types ofinformation that it would especially examine to ensure that its broadcast was not aiding
illegal gambling. Id. at 1574-75. The FCC later refused to permit the broadcast of
such information about races covered by wagers placed with New York's Off Track
Betting Corporation (OTB), as well as advertisements of the OTB. Broadcasting
of Information Concerning Horse Races, 32 F.C.C.2d 705 (1971). However, the
FCC modified this ruling to permit advertising by OTB, stating:
While we remained convinced that virtually any inducement to bet may cater
generally to the gambling spirit, we conclude now that our ruling paid insufficient
attention to New York's legislative determination that legal off-track betting
would serve public needs.
Broadcasting of Information Concerning Horse Races, 41 F.C.C.2d 172, 175 (1973).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SEARCH AND SEIZURE - WARRANTLESS
SEARCH BY FIRE MARSHAL INTO CAUSE OF FIRE AT DEFENDANT'S
HOME AND SUBSEQUENT WARRANTLESS POLICE ENTRY TO SEIZE
EVIDENCE OF ARSON DISCOVERED BY FIRE MARSHAL DURING SEARCH
Do NOT VIOLATE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT.
Steigler v. Anderson (1974)
Defendant was convicted in a state court of three counts of first degree
murder and one count of assault with intent to commit murder, in con-
nection with a fire which destroyed his home.' Evidence of arson, which
was used to secure the convictions, had been discovered by firemen while
they were fighting the blaze, and by the deputy fire marshal in the course
of a warrantless investigatory search conducted immediately thereafter to
determine the cause of the fire.2 The evidence was photographed at the
scene and seized by Delaware State Police, who had been summoned by
the fire marshal.3 At trial, the defendant objected to the admission of the
photographs and the seized material upon the grounds that the evidence had
been obtained in violation of his fourth amendment rights,4 because the
fire marshal had not obtained a warrant prior to conducting a search of
the defendant's home, and the state police had not obtained a warrant to
subsequently enter the home, photograph, and seize the evidence. The trial
court admitted the evidence over these objections, and the Supreme Court
of Delaware affirmed. 5
Having exhausted his state remedies, defendant petitioned the United
States District Court for the District of Delaware for a writ of habeas
1. Steigler v. Anderson, 496 F.2d 793, 794 (3d Cir. 1974). Defendant's daughter,
father-in-law, and mother-in-law died in the fire. Id.
2. Id. at 795. Numerous glass containers, some broken and others filled with
gasoline, were found throughout the house. Sections of the rug upon which several
of the containers had been placed were soaked with gasoline. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Supreme Court of the United States established that
the fundamental fourth amendment standard for judging searches and seizures is
whether the search or seizure in question was "reasonable." E.g., Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). The problem of translating this abstract standard
into workable guidelines in a particular situation has often beguiled and divided the
Court. Compare United States v. Rabinowitz, 399 U.S. 56 (1952) with Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). However, with regard to searches of private
property, the Court has consistently followed one governing principle - except in
certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper
consent is per se unreasonable unless it has been authorized by a valid search war-
rant. Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 529. See note 14 infra.
5. Steigler v. State, 277 A.2d 662 (Del. 1971), vacated and remanded, 408 U.S.
939 (1972) (in a brief order, the Supreme Court vacated the defendant's death
penalty). The* Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed upon the ground that the de-
fendant had impliedly consented to the search. 277 A.2d at 666-67.
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corpus. The district court denied the petition,6 and the Third Circuit
affirmed, holding: 1) that the fire marshal's warrantless search to determine
the cause of the fire, conducted during and immediately following the sup-
pression of the blaze, was justified by exigent circumstances; and 2) that
the warrantless police seizure of the evidence was permissible since such
evidence had previously been lawfully discovered by an official clothed
with police powers. 7 Steigler v. Anderson, 496 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1974).
6. Steigler v. Anderson, 360 F. Supp. 1286 (D. Del. 1973). The district court
rejected defendant's contention that the seizure of the evidence was in violation of
his fourth amendment rights, holding that the entry into the home by the fire marshal
and the subsequent entry by the police were justified by the existence of an emer-
gency situation. Id. at 1293-94. The district court further held that the fire marshal's
actions were justified as he had legally entered the defendant's home to fight the fire,
and therefore discovered the evidence of arson in plain view, while legitimately on the
premises. The subsequent police entry and seizure of the evidence were held to have
been justified upon the grounds that the ongoing necessity to secure the premises
and the fact that the evidence in question was highly volatile created an emergency
situation which necessitated a prompt warrantless police entry to remove the evidence
in order to keep the fire from spreading, and to prevent the evidence from being
destroyed. Id. at 1293-95.
7. The court also rejected the defendant's alternative grounds for seeking the
writ. First, the Delaware State Police had interviewed the defendant on four separate
occasions, before charging him with arson and murder. On none of these occasions was
the defendant informed of his constitutional rights as established by the Supreme Court
in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966), and therefore, defendant con-
tended that the admission into evidence of statements obtained from him by the police
during these interviews violated his rights under the fifth amendment. 496 F.2d at 795.
In addressing this argument, the Third Circuit noted that Miranda warnings
need be given only when a defendant is subjected to a "custodial interrogation." Id.
at 798. The court set forth the criteria for establishing a custodial interrogation,
noting: 1) that the prevalent test for determining if a custodial interrogation has
occurred is whether the "government has in some meaningful way imposed restraint
on [a person's] freedom of action" while questioning him; 2) that the existence of
such restraint was to be determined by looking to the manner and circumstances in
which the particular interview was conducted by the police; 3) that the location
where the interview occurred was a factor to be considered in determining if such
restraint existed, but that the mere fact that the defendant was interviewed at the
police station was not in itself conclusive evidence that the restraint implicit in a cus-
todial interrogation existed; 4) that to determine whether such restraint existed
with regard to the defendant, the court must look to such factors as, a) the manner,
tone, and approach of the authorities in their questioning, b) the extent of the
questions and c) the extent to which the investigation was "focused" on the de-
fendant; and 5) that if a consideration of the above factors indicated to the court
that the police would not have heeded a request by the defendant to depart, or would
not have allowed the defendant to depart, sufficient restraint existed to establish a
custodial interrogation. Id. at 798-800.
The district court found that with regard to the interviews conducted with
the defendant:
(1) There was a complete absence of restraint of petitioner's liberty; for instance,
on October 24th, Bramble spoke with him briefly at his (petitioner's) office;
(2) The interrogations were routine and courteous in character;
(3) There is no evidence that the investigation had 'focused' on petitioner . ...
(4) Petitioner was a young and intelligent man, a college graduate and not to be
easily cowed or intimidated by police presence;
(5) The times of the interrogations seemed to be reasonable, subject to petitioner's
convenience and not unduly prolonged.
Steigler v. Anderson, 300 F. Supp. 1286, 1291 (D. Del. 1973).
Upon the basis of these findings the Third Circuit concluded that there was
not sufficient restraint of defendant's freedom during the police interviews to establish
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The Supreme Court of the United Stafs has long recognized that the
fourth amendment mandates that prior judicial, authorization, in the form
of a warrant, be obtained before searches of private premises may be legally
undertaken by either federal, 8 or state" police officials. In Camara 'V.
Municipal Court,'0 and a companion case, See v. Seattle," the Court re-
jected its previous civil-criminal distinction with regard to fourth amend-
ment protections, 12 and extended the warrant requirement to include civil,
administrative searches conducted 'by government officials.' 3
While the warrant requirement' is firmly 'established, 'the Supreme
Court has recognized certain limited situations where warrantless searches
are legally permissible. In each of these decisions, in which a warrantless
search was upheld, the Court found the existence of specific "exigent cir-
cumstances" which rendered warrantless official action imperative.14
a custodial interrogation; and, that as such, no Miranda warnings were required, and
that, therefore, the statements were admissible. 496 F.2d at 798-800.
As his final contention, defendant argued that his convictions were based
upon perjured police testimony. The Third Circuit summarily dismissed this argu-
ment, agreeing with the district court's finding that the defendant had failed to estab-
lish that any perjury had been committed. Id. at 800.
8. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
9. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
10. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
11. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
12. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
13. In Camara, the issue presented to the Court was whether a city housing in-
spector required a warrant to make a routine area inspection of defendant's apartment
for violations of the city housing code. 387 U.S. at 525. In See, the Court addressed
the issue of whether a warrant was required for a routine inspection by the fire de-
partment of a defendant's commercial warehouse for possible fire code violations.
387 U.S. at 542. Holding that such noncriminal administrative searches required a
warrant in both these cases, the Court reasoned that, while such area inspections of
premises for violations of municipal codes were a reasonable exercise of the govern-
ment's police power, they, nevertheless, constituted sufficient governmental intrusions
into a person's privacy to fall within the scope of the fourth amendment's pro-
tections. The rationale adopted by the Court in these two decisions was succinctly
stated in Camara:
It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are
fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected
of criminal behavior. . . . [E]ven the most law abiding citizen has a very tan-
gible interest in limiting the circumstances under which the sanctity of his home
may be broken by official authority ....
387 U.S. at 530-31 (footnote omitted). It should be noted that, although the Court in
Camara and See did extend the warrant requirement to administrative inspections,
the Court further held that the "probable cause" required for the issuance of a war-
rant for administrative inspections was far less stringent than the probable cause
required for a warrant for a criminal search - e.g., that, probable cause to inspect
premises in the enforcement of municipal fire, health, or housing codes, could, depend-
ing upon the program being enforced, be based upon the passage of time, the nature
of the building, or the condition of the entire area. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. at 538; See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. at 545.
14. E.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (warrantless search incident
to arrest) ; Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (warrantless search of house
justified by "hot pursuit") ; Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) (warrantless
search of motor vehicle held for forfeiture proceedings) ; Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925) (warrantless search of motor vehicle upon highway).
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. There are numerous cases- which iidicate thd types ,of situations that
may constitute "exigent circumstances", sufficieiit- to-justify -warrantless
criminal s earches. However,:.4.ide..f.rom the .Court's ,statement in Camara
that its holding was not: intended to preclude warrantless civil inspections
when -emergency situations necessitated such, action, 15 -the Court has had
little occasion to provide guidelines 'for 'determining the legality of civil
searches.' 6 Several circuit 'courts, however,. hae confronted the issue, and
two recent opinions, based upon the emergency exception of Camara, have
upheld searches without a warrant-insituations 'similar.t6 the instant 'case.
: In United States v., Gargotto,17 the Sixth. Circuit held that, where ' an
arson investigator had beencalled to the scene of a fire .to investigate its
origin, and the possibility of arson, .and where the investigation was initi-
ated while firemen were still on the premises containing ."hot spots," the
statutory authority conferred upon the investigator, and. the exigency in-
volved in the immediate determination of the fire's origin, were sufficient
bases for justifying the warrantless entry and investigation by the officer. 18
In United States v. Green,19 the Fifth Circuit held, in a fact situation almost
identical to Steigler, -that where a deputy.fire -marshal, under his statutory
powers, 20 conducted a search ,of an apartment' immediately after the sup-
pression of a fire while firemen were :still on the scene, and discovered
evidence of a crime, such evidence was .admissible at trial although the
search had been conducted without a warrant.21 The Green court noted that
15. The Camara Court stated:
Since our holding emphasizes the controlling standard of reasonableness,
nothing we say today is intended to foreclose prompt inspections, even without a
warrant, that the law has traditionally upheld in emergency situations. See North
American Cold Storage v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S' 306 (seizure of unwholesome
food); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (compulsory smallpox vacci-
nation) ....
387 U.S. at 539. It should be noted that none of the cases cited by the Court were
concerned with searches under the fourth amendment, sihce at the time of those de-
cisions the fourth amendment was neither applicable to civil searches, nor to the states.
See text accompanying notes 10-12 supra. See also note 9 and accompanying text snpra.
16. The only two decisions since Camara in :which the Court has directly
addressed the question of warrantless administrative searches are Colonnade Catering
Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), and United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S.
311 (1972). In neither of these cases did the Court rely upon the emergency excep-
tion of Camara to uphold the warrantless intrusions. In Biswell, the Court established
that certain types of commercial enterprises engaged in businesses closely regulated
and licensed by the federal government, (sale of liquor in Colonnade and sale of
firearms in Biswell) could be subjected to warrantless administrative inspections,
where such inspections were conducted pursuant to federal regulatory statutes de-
signed to insure their lawful operation. 406 U.S. at 313-16.
17. 476 F.2d 1009 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 1990 (1975).
18. Id. at 1012.
19. 474 F.2d 1386 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 829 (.1973).
20. The state statute provides, in pertinent, part:
o The state fire marshal shall investigate the cause, origin and circumstances
of every fire occurring in this state wherein property has been daniaged or de-
stroyed where there is probable cause to believe that the'fire was the result of
carelessness or design.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 633.03 (1972).
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Camara had expressly excepted emergency situations from the general
warrant requirement for civil inspections, and concluded that
"[a]scertaining the cause of the fire was necessary to assure that it
was in fact totally extinguished and would not reoccur." In short,
[the fire marshal's] entry was entirely reasonable and his search of
the apartment necessitated by the exigencies of the circumstances.
Clearly, this is not the type of investigation dealt with in Camara and
See and, therefore, it is not subject to the rule of those cases.
22
The second issue confronting the Steigler court was whether the state
police, who had been summoned to the scene by the fire marshal for the
purpose of removing the discovered evidence, were required to obtain a
warrant before they could enter the dwelling to photograph and seize that
evidence. Again, the Supreme Court has not had occasion to address
this specific issue, although several of the Court's decisions in the general
area of search and seizure can be loosely analogized to the present case.2 '
Several circuit court opinions, however, including Green and Gargotto,
have addressed situations closely analogous to that presented in Steigler,
and have held that evidence legally obtained by one law enforcement agency
may be made available to other such agencies without a warrant.2 4
For example, the Green court concluded that once the initial discovery
of the evidence was legally made, and that evidence was subject to seizure
by the fire marshal, no further judicial authorization was needed for officials
of a second law enforcement agency to enter the premises to take custody
of the evidence.2 5 The basis for this decision, was the determination that
the defendant's right of privacy, in the discovered material, had been suffi-
ciently abrogated by the fire marshal's initial legal intrusion, so that the
calling in of officers from another agency to remove such evidence without
a warrant did not violate the defendant's fourth amendment rights.26
In the instant case, prior to its addressing defendant's contentions
about the oonstitutional propriety of the police's and fire marshal's actions,
22. Id. The court quoted the unreported district court opinion.
23. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218 (1973). These cases held that no further invasion of a defendant's
privacy occurred, when police, upon arrest of a defendant, conducted a full body
search of the defendant, even though the police had no fear that the defendant was
armed, and, the crime for which the defendant was arrested had no tangible evidence
connected with it. The Court said that the arrest had abrogated the defendant's right
to privacy so that no further invasion occurred when the police conducted a full body
search, and therefore, evidence of a different crime, found by the police, was legally
obtained. Gustafson v. Florida, supra at 266; United States v. Robinson, supra at 236.
24. E.g., Gullett v. United States, 387 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 1044 (1968). The Gullett Court noted that the fact that the evidence in that
case had been obtained by state officers and turned over to federal prosecutors was
immaterial, so long as the search and seizure conducted by the state officials was con-
stitutionally sound. Id. at 308 n.1. Cf. United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113 (2d
Cir. 1972). -In Birrell, the court noted in dicta that if city police, on their own initia-
tive, turn over validly seized evidence to federal officials, such action is arguably,
constitutionally permissible. Id. at 117.
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the Steigler court made several observations regarding the general record
before it. The court initially noted that the firemen had an unquestionable
right to make a warrantless entry onto premises in order to extinguish a fire,
because the legitimate exercise of firefighting functions could not reasonably
be viewed as a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 27 The
court further stated that even if the firemen's conduct did constitute a
search under the fourth amendment, the emergency exception to the war-
rant requirement was clearly applicable.28 The court, therefore, concluded
that any evidence of arson observed by the firemen in plain view, during
the course of the execution of their firefighting functions, was legitimately
subject to warrantless seizure.
29
Turning to the issue of whether the fire marshal's subsequent warrant-
less investigation was undertaken in violation of the fourth amendment,
the court noted that, in determining the question of the warrant require-
ment for such investigations, federal standards must control,30 regardless
of the authority conferred upon the fire marshal by a state statute.31 Apply-
27. 496 F.2d at 795, citing Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). Wyman
held that the visit to a home by a New York State social service caseworker, for the
purpose of determining if an applicant for welfare assistance qualified under the New
York public assistance program, did not constitute a search in the fourth amendment
sense. 400 U.S. at 326.
28. 496 F.2d at 795-96.
29. Id. at 796. The Supreme Court has recognized that objects falling within
the "plain view" of an officer who has a right to be in a position to observe them are
subject to seizure and may be introduced into evidence, provided that there exists
probable cause to seize such objects as evidence of crime, or as contraband. Harris
v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the requirements for a
valid warrantless seizure of evidence in plain view were set forth. The first require-
ment is that the officer's initial intrusion into the area which gave him the view be
justified. Id. at 465. Such intrusions as will provide for application of the plain
view doctrine occur in situations where: 1) the police officers have a warrant to
search a given area for specified objects, and in the course of the search come
across some other articles of an incriminating character; 2) where the initial in-
trusion which brings the officers within plain view of the objects is not supported
by a warrant but by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement,
see note 14 supra 3) where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused at all, but, nonetheless, inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra at 465-66.
The second requirement for a plain view seizure is that the discovery of the
evidence must be "inadvertent." Thus "plain view" cannot be used to justify the
seizure of evidence when the police "know in advance the location of the evidence
and intend to seize it." In such a case a warrant must be obtained. Id. at 469-70.
Although plain view cases generally arise in situations involving police
searches, the plain view doctrine has also been applied to administrative searches.
See United States v. Green, 474 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1973).
30. 496 F.2d at 796, citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960).
31. The statutory description of the Delaware fire marshal's duties provides in
pertinent part:
(a) The State Fire Marshal, or his Deputy or Deputies, shall enforce all laws
and ordinances of the State and the several counties, cities, and political sub-
divisions thereof having to do with . ...
(5) The suppression of arson ....
The State Fire Marshal, or his Deputy or Deputies, may at any time investi-
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ing such federal standards3 2 to the facts of Steigler, the court had little
difficulty in concluding that the fire marshal's warrantless investigation
of the Steigler home was justifiable, and had been necessitated by exigent
circumstances.3 3 The court summarily dismissed the defendant's contention
that Camara and See were controlling in the instant case, noting that
Camara had explicitly excepted emergency situations from its coverage.
s4
The court stated that, unlike the situations in Camara and See, the situation
in Steigler presented a "compelling urgency" for the fire marshal to inspect
at a "particular time and on a particular day."'3 5 The court relied upon
the rationale expressed in Green with regard to the specific exigencies
which necessitated an immediate investigation by the fire marshal.3 6 Quot-
ing Green, the Steigler court concluded:
"Until someone expert in the cause of fires arrives, inspects the scene,
and determines that the fire has been completely extinguished, the fire-
men cannot reasonably depart. The imposition of a warrant require-
ment in such circumstances would immobilize the entire apparatus of
fire protection. The absurdity of requiring the fire investigator to
secure a warrant in order to search for the cause of the fire is self
evident."
87
Having thus upheld the fire marshal's warrantless search, the court
addressed the defendant's second argument that the evidence was inad-
missible because the state police were required to obtain a warrant to
enter the Steigler home to photograph and remove the evidence.3 8 Citing
Green and Gargotto on this point, and with regard to the purpose of the
warrant requirement as set forth by the Supreme Court in Katz v. United
States,3 9 the court dismissed this contention. The Steigler court recognized
that Katz had firmly established that the purpose of the warrant require-
ment was to insure judicial authorization prior to intrusion into areas in
State, and may at all reasonable hours enter any building or premises within his
jurisdiction for the purpose of making an inspection or investigation which,
under the provisions of this chapter he may deem necessary to be made.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 6607(a)(5) (1975).
32. E.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); United States v.
Gargotto, 476 F.2d 1009 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Green, 474 F.2d 1385
(5th Cir. 1973). See notes 13-22 and accompanying text supra.
33. 496 F.2d at 797.
34. Id. See note 15 supra.
35. 496 F.2d at 797.
36. Id. The Steigler Court stated:
The ordinary fireman is not an expert in the cause of fires ....
A fire might have been caused by any of a myriad of conditions that would
not be terminated by simply putting out the flame .... Where the existence of a
gravely dangerous condition has already manifested itself in one fire, it would
be the height of folly for the firemen to enter, suppress the flames, and leave the
premises without assurance they would not be required to return, perhaps within
minutes, to do it all again.
Id., quoting United States v. Green, 474 F.2d 1385, 1388-89 (5th Cir. 1973).
37. 496 F.2d at 797, quoting United States v. Green, 474 F.2d 1385, 1388-89
(5th Cir. 1973) (footnotes omitted).
38. 496 F.2d at 797.
39. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. 40 The court also
noted that the fire marshal, in conducting his investigation, had been
clothed with law enforcement powers similar to those of the police,41 and
that the evidence had already been discovered in a reasonable and legitimate
exercise of these powers. 42 Combining these two factors, the court con-
cluded that the discovery of the evidence by the fire marshal had abated
any justifiable expectation of privacy the defendant had possessed in those
items, and therefore, no further invasion of defendant's privacy had re-
sulted when officers of a second law enforcement agency had been sum-
moned to remove such previously discovered items.
43
The Third Circuit's decision in Steigler, allowing warrantless entry
for a fire marshal's investigation, is sufficiently limited so as not to
unduly disrupt the protections afforded by the fourth amendment. The
Steigler court limited its holding to cases where a search is initiated
during and immediately following the suppression of a fire, 44 and spe-
cifically noted that it was not addressing, and thus would not rule upon
the validity of, a warrantless search initiated several hours or days after
the fire.45 In view of this specific limitation, the court's analysis of the
several factors creating the compelling urgency for a search at that par-
ticular time, 48 afforded ample support for the conclusion that dispensing
with the warrant requirement was justified. It would seem that the Cainara
Court contemplated just such a set of circumstances when it excepted
emergency situations from that case's general rule.47
The Steigler court relied heavily upon Green and Gargotto for its deter-
mination of the scope of the fire marshal's law enforcement authority in con-
lucting searches.48 In light of the favorable treathnent accorded these cases,
it is submitted that the Third Circuit, although the instant decision dealt
only with evidence of arson, would not construe the fire marshal's authority
to be limited to the seizure of evidence relating only to those crimes which
were the subject of his investigation. Since the court viewed the fire
marshal as a law enforcement officer, invested with police powers while
conducting his search,49 the Steigler holding could easily be extended to
40. 496 F.2d at 797.
41. See note 31 supra.
42. 496 F.2d at 797-98.
43. 496 F.2d at 798. Accord, United States v. Gargotto, 476 F.2d 1009 (6th
Cir. 1973) ; United States v. Green, 474 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1973). Cf. United States
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
43. 496 F.2d at 798.
44. Id. at 796.
45. Id. at 797.
46. Id. See note 36 supra.
47. 387 U.S. at 539. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
48. 496 F.2d at 795-98.
49. Id. at 797-98. It is important to note that the Florida statute relied upon in
Green gave a much more explicit description of the broad law enforcement powers
afforded the fire marshal than does the Delaware statute. The Florida statute provides
in pertinent part:
Agents of the state fire marshal shall have the same authority to serve sum-
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allow a'fire marshal to authorize a warrantless police seizure of evidence
discovered during, but in no, way related to the purpose of, his search.
Such an extension would be supported by numerous Supreme Court de-
cisions which have upheld the seizure by law enforcement agents ,of evidence
of a different crime from that which they were investigating. 0
Having thus determined that there was no constitutional infirmity
in the fire marshal's search, the Steigler court again relied upon the ration-
ale of Green and Gargotto in upholding the propriety of the state police's ac-
tion.r' It is, however, important to note, that in both Green and Gargotto
the evidence which had been iturned over to the second agency had not only
been previously discovered by-the fir inkvrstigator, 'but had also been pre-
viously seized by him. 52 :Although the Steigler court never explicitly
stated that the fire marshal could have seized the evidence himself, it seems
that the court considered the power to seize evidence as an implicit part of
the fire marshal's law enforcement function. 3
Its discussion of the constitutional validity, of the state police action
raised an interesting issue 'which the Steigler court noted was not actually
before it, and which was thus relegated to a footnote - the proper scope
of the police's function and'authority once they had entered the premises
to seize the discovered evidence at the'request of the fire marshal."4 Thus,
future decisions must resolve the question of 'whether the police, when
summoned to remove such discovered evidence, are limited to removing
only the evidence previously discovered, or whether, upon such entry, they
are to be considered legitimately upon the premises in their own right so
that they may also seize other, previously undiscovered, items falling within
their plain view. It is submitted that the lttter c.onclusion is the more likely.
Since the warrantless entry of the police into the Steigler home, to seize
the discovered evidence, was held to be a justified warrantless intrusion,
it seems logical that this same police entry would also be considered a
justified "initial intrusion" for the purposes of applying the plain view
doctrine.55
sheriff or his deputies, in the respective counties where such investigations, hear-
ings, or inspections may be held ....
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 633.14 (1972), quoted in 474 F.2d at 1389 n.3. Compare note 31
supra.
50. E.g., Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973). See note 23 supra.
51. 496 F.2d at 797-98.
52. United States v. Gargotto, 476 F.2d at 1014; United States v. Green, 474
F.2d at 1390.
53. 496 F.2d at 797-98. See note 63 and accompanying text infra.
54. The court noted "[allthough it is not entirely clear from the record, the
police may have seized three items which had not been previously noticed by the
firemen or [the fire marshal]." 496 F.2d at 796 n.6. However, the court did not
have to address the question whether these items were impermissibly seized since the
defendant did not contest the district court's finding that, even if the police had im-
permissibly seized the previously undiscovered items, their admission into evidence
was harmless error. Id.
55. See note 29 supra.
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It is submitted that the conclusion reached by the Third Circuit with
regard to the emergency justification for the fire marshal's warrantless
investigation is correct. In prescribing a limited time period for the initi-
ation of a warrantless fire investigation, the ourt has effectuated a suffi-
cient preservation of the individual's right to privacy, while affording the
state a necessary avenue to protect the public by providing for efficient
fire prevention.
Problems arise, however, with regard to the portion of the court's
holding relating to when police may be summoned to enter a dwelling to
seize evidence already discovered by a civil investigator. The court's hold-
ing, that upon the fire marshal's discovering the evidence, he could legiti-
mately call in the police to make a warrantless seizure of it, is subject to
two possible interpretations - a narrow reading which would be con-
sistent with the established case law and the reasonableness standard of
the fourth amendment, or a broad reading which would seem to be an
unprecedented departure from the fourth amendment's warrant requirement:
The Steigler court never explicitly stated that the fire marshal had any
authority to seize the evidence he discovered. Thus, a literal reading of
the court's holding would seem to establish a broad rule that the discovery
of the evidence by the fire marshal was a. sufficient invasion of the de-
fendant's privacy in those discovered items to allow the. fire marshal to
summon the police to enter the dwelling and make a warrantless seizure
of such evidence.56 Such a reading would result in' a radical departure from
the established case law. Prior cases have recognized that a government
agency may call a second government agency to take custody of or seize
previously discovered evidence, but in each of these cases it has been
explicitly established that the first government agency had not only made
a legitimate discovery of the evidence, but also had the authority to make
a seizure of that evidence. 57 Administrative agencies are not general
police units, and they are limited in the scope of their law enforcement
function by their authorizing statutes.5 8 Therefore, the statutory authority
vested in a given agency, would determine whether that agency, although
empowered to conduct inspections, also had the power of seizure and if so,
to what types of items that power extended. If a government inspector
56. The relevant portion of the court's holding reads:
But having determined that the fire marshal's warrantless discovery of evidence
of arson was justified and valid under the fourth amendment, we think no greater
invasion of privacy resulted when officers from another law enforcement agency
(Bramble and the other policemen) subsequently entered and removed the evidence.
496 F.2d at 798 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
57. E.g., United States v. Gargotto, 476 F.2d 1009, 1013 (6th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Green, 474 F.2d 1385, 1390 (5th Cir. 1973) ; Gullett v. United States,
387 F.2d 307, 308 n.1 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1044 (1968). Cf. United
States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 117 (2d Cir. 1972).
58. E.g., Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1935); Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407
(1908); Commonwealth v. Orsini, 368 Pa. 259, 81 A.2d 891 (1951). Cf. Field v.
Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693-94 (1891). See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
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with no power of seizure, or with a strictly limited seizure power, on
private premises in his governmental capacity, were to seize items when
he had no authority to do so, this seizure would seem to be unreasonable
under the fourth amendment. 59 Likewise, it seems inapposite to say that
such a government agent, although he had no authority to seize such items
himself, should, merely because he discovered those items, thereby authorize
police to make a warrantless entry onto a private premises so that they
might seize the items. It is submitted that a civil agent in such a situation
should be considered no. differently from a police informant, who may
supply the police with information establishing probable cause to obtain
a warrant for a search of that premises and a seizure of those items. 60 It
has been firmly established that no matter how much probable cause for
searching a premise information known to the police may provide, they are
required to obtain a warrant prior to conducting the search.6'
While a literal reading of the court's holding would thus seem to
establish an impermissibly broad authority for warrantless police entries,
a much narrower rule may be derived from a careful reading of the opinion.
Taken upon its face, the court's holding would seem to establish that the
fire marshal's discovery of the evidence was enough to totally abrogate
the defendant's expectation of privacy in those items. 6 2 However, in a
footnote to this holding, the Steigler court recognized that the fire marshal
was vested with police powers. 3 Thus, although it never so stated, the
court may have recognized that the. fire marshal's police powers had given
him implied statutory authority to seize the evidence. This interpretation
59. See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963), where the Court in dicta
stated that a defendant's fourth amendment rights would be violated when a search
or seizure is conducted by a government agent acting in excess of his statutory
authority. Id. at 649-51. Cf. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), where
the Court, in dealing with the scope of an administrative inspector's authority, stated:
Each licensee is annually furnished 'with a revised compilation of ordinances that
describe his obligations and define the inspector's authority. The dealer is not
left to wonder about the. purposes of the inspector or the limits of his task.
Id. at 316 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
60. See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108 (1964).
61, E.g., Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970); Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20 (1925), where the Court held that, "belief, however well founded, that an
article sought is concealed in a dwelling house furnishes no justification for a search
of that place without a warrant." Id. at 330. Cf. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S.
410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
62. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
63. The court noted that .under the Delaware: Fire Marshal statute, "the State
Fire Marshall [sic], or his Deputy . . . shall enforce all laws and ordinances of
the State . . .having to do with . . . [tihe suppression of arson." 496 F.2d at 798
n.15, quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 6607(a) (5) (1975). Also, a related pro-
vision of the Delaware Code provides in pertinent part, that the fire official in charge
of the fire has the duty to preserve evidence of the fire's cause. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
16, § 6704(4) (1975). Although not cited by the court, this statute would seem to
support the proposition that the fire marshal had authority to seize the evidence of
arson, and the court's initial conclusion that the firemen had authority to seize the
evidence they discovered while fighting the fire. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
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is reinforced by the court's reliance upon cases in which it had been ex-
plicitly recognized that the government agency which had discovered the
evidence had also been vested with the authority to seize it.6 4 If the court's
holding is narrowly construed, it may be establishing a limited rule - that
when one government agency, acting within the scope of its duties, makes
a valid discovery of evidentiary items, and is vested with authority to seize
those items, that first agency may summon the police to assist it, by having
the police make a warrantless seizure of the items in lieu of the agency
doing so itself. Such a narrow rule would seem to be a reasonable seizure
within the bounds of the established case law.65
It is submitted that given the facts of Steigler, the result reached by
the court, upholding the warrantless police seizure of the previously dis-
covered items, is correct. In the instant case it appears that the fire marshal
himself had the authority to seize. the discovered evidence. 66 Therefore,
by calling in the police he was merely requesting police assistance in the
performance of one of his authorized duties. However, it is submitted that
in future decisions the Steigler court's holding, with regard to the validity
of a warrantless police entry into private premises to seize evidence dis-
covered by another agency, should be narrowly read, so as to uphold such
warrantless entries by police only when the agency, which has summoned
the police to assist it, possesses statutory authority that would enable it
to have seized that evidence itself.
Albert R. Romano
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FIFTH AMENDMENT - TAXPAYERS MAY
NOT ASSERT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION To RESIST A
SUMMONS TO PRODUCE ACCOUNTANT'S WORK PAPERS TRANSFERRED
TO ATTORNEY AFTER BRIEF PERIOD OF ACTUAL POSSESSION BY TAX-
PAYERS.
United States v. Fisher (1974)
In an action to enforce an Internal Revenue Service summons,1 served
upon their attorney and seeking their accountant's work papers, the tax-
payer-petitioners intervened and argued that "because of their rightful and
64. The court cited United States v. Green, 474 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1973);
Cf. United States v. Birrell, 470 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1972). 496 F.2d 798 n.16. Both
of these cases explicitly recognized that the agency making the search had the authority
to seize the evidence which it discovered. United States v. Green, supra at 1390;
United States v. Birrell, supra at 116. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
65. E.g., cases in note 57 supra.
66. See statutes in notes 31 and 63 supra. See also text accompanying note 62
supra.
1. The summons was issued pursuant to section 7602 of the Internal Revenue
Code (Code). INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7602. That section provides:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return
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indefinite possession" of the documents, compelled production would vio-
late their fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.2 The ac-
countant had transferred the work papers to the taxpayers who held them
in their possession for 12 or 13 days,3 and subsequently transferred them
to their attorney to aid his representation of them during an investigation
of their tax liability.4 The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania granted enforcement, finding that the summons
was valid and that the privilege against self-incrimination was not available
where the accountant had a superior right to possession of the documents. 5
The Third Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed, holding that the sum-
mons was valid6 and that where an accountant's work papers were in the
revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary
of any person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such lia-
bility, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized-
(1) To examine any books, papers, records or other data which may be
relevant or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or
any officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody,
or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person
liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary
or his delegate may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary or his delegate
at a time and place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers,
records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant
or material to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be
relevant or material to such inquiry.
Id.
2. United States v. Fisher, 352 F. Supp. 731, 732 (E.D. Pa. 1972). The docu-
ments sought were compilations of income and expenses which had been gathered by
the accountant in the course of ascertaining the taxpayer's tax liability from their
cancelled checks and deposit receipts. Id. at 733-34. Originally a summons had been
served upon the accountant, after he had given the records to taxpayer Goldsmith;
by the time he contacted Goldsmith to tell him that he would like the records returned,
they had already been transferred to attorney Fisher. Id. at 732.
3. United States v. Fisher, 500 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420
U.S. 906 (1975) (No. 74-18). The exact duration of possession was not determined
because the accountant was unable to remember the specific date upon which he had
turned the records over to the taxpayer. Id. at 685 n.1.
4. 352 F. Supp. at 732. Taxpayers Sally and Morris Goldsmith contacted attor-
ney Fisher after a Special Agent of the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue
Service had made an appointment with Mr. Goldsmith to discuss his tax liability for
the years 1969 and 1970. Id.
5. Id. at 733-34. The district court rejected the taxpayer's fifth amendment
argument and held that where ownership of the papers is in the accountant, he has a
superior right to possession. Id. at 734. The court also noted that "the transfer of
the papers seems to indicate that this was an attempt to thwart the government's in-
vestigation." Id. However, in light of the so-called "pre-existing document" rule
which proscribes reliance upon the attorney-client privilege (see note 70 infra), it
would appear equally probable that the transfer was intended only to enable the
attorney to represent the taxpayers.
6. 500 F.2d at 688. The Goldsmiths had argued that the summons was invalid
because its sole object was to obtain evidence for use in a criminal prosecution as
demonstrated by the fact that the person assigned to investigate their case was a
Special Agent of the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service, rather
than an Internal Revenue Agent of the Field Audit Division. Id. For a discussion of
the distinction between a Special Agent and a Revenue Agent, see Barnett, Procedures
in Tax Fraud Investigations, 47 TAXES 807, 809-10 (1969). The court was unanimous
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actual possession of the taxpayers for only a limited time and were subse-
quently turned over to their attorney, the taxpayers could not assert the
privilege against self-incrimination. United States v. Fisher, 500 F.2d 683
(3d Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 906 (1975) (No. 74-18).
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination 7 is rooted
in a dread of "a recurrence of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber even
if not in their stark brutality,"" and has been characterized as "one of the
great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized." 9 The policies
behind the privilege were set forth in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission.'°
It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations:
our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for
an accusa.torial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal jus-
tice . . . our sense of fair play which dictates a "fair state-individual
balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone
until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the
government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire
load" . . . our respect for ... the right of each individual "to a private
enclave where he may lead a private life . . .,,
The privilege was extended to prohibit the compelled production of
books and documents in Boyd v. United States,12 where the Supreme Court
of the United States struck down a statute requiring claimants in forfeiture
proceedings either to produce documents or to accept the allegations of a
upon this issue, saying that this showing alone was not sufficient to invalidate the
summons, and affirming the district court's finding that the summons was issued in
good faith prior to any recommendation of criminal prosecution. 500 F.2d at 688.
See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531-36 (1971). See generally Bur-
roughs, The Use of the Administrative Summons in Federal Tax Investigations, 9
VILL. L. REV. 371 (1964); Lyon, Government Power and Citizen Rights in a Tax
Investigation, 25 TAX LAW..79 (1971).
7. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part:
"[N]or shall any person.., be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8. Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956). See generally C. McCoR-
MICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 114-18 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972)
[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]; 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2250-51 (McNaughton
rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]; Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomor-
row: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 677-96 (1968).
9. Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956), quoting E. GRISWOLD,
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955).
10. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
11. Id. at 55 (citations omitted). The "cruel trilemma" has been explained
as follows:
He can produce the sought after document, thereby implicitly stating that the
document produced is the one requested, and provide evidence against himself.
He can perjure himself in two ways: he can refuse production on the ground
that he does not have the requested item, or he can produce something other than
the document requested - for example, a forged nonincriminating version of the
document. Or he can simply refuse production and subject himself to a con-
tempt sanction.
United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181, 1193 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See generally
8 WIGMORE, supra note 8, at § 2251; McCORMICK, supra note 8, at § 118.
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district attorney. 13  The Court held that the compulsory production of
"private papers" was tantamount to forcing an individual to be a witness
against himself and was therefore proscribed by the fifth amendment.' 4
While bringing written materials within the ambit of the privilege
against self-incrimination, the Boyd decision did not delineate the factual
setting which would cause that privilege to operate. 15 In subsequent cases,
the Court denied the use of the privilege to corporations and unincor-
porated organizations, characterizing it as personal and available only to
natural persons.'0 However, because this standard did not specify the
personal interests required to invoke the privilege, lower courts have
reached conflicting results, in attempting to apply it.
17
13. Id. at 638. The case involved a forfeiture proceeding for 35 cases of plate
glass which allegedly had been imported without payment of duties. The document
sought was an invoice that claimant Boyd had in his possession. Id. at 618-20.
14. Id. at 634-35. While the Court rejected the argument that the fourth amend-
ment rights of the claimant had been violated, it observed an intimate relationship
between the fourth and fifth amendments, based upon the notion that the unreasonable
searches and seizures prohibited by the fourth amendment are usually made to compel
the accused to produce evidence against himself. Id. at 633. But see 500 F.2d at 690.
Justice Miller, in a concurring opinion, expressed what appears yet to be the viable
view, finding that the effect of the statute was to compel a person to be a witness
against himself, but finding no violation of the fourth amendment, reasoning that when
a party produces documents against himself there is no search or seizure. 116 U.S.
at 639-41 (Miller, J., concurring). See 500 F.2d at 690 n.10, 692-93 (Gibbons, J.,
concurring). See also Comment, The Search and Seizure of Private Papers: Fourth
and Fifth Amendment Considerations, 6 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 274 (1973); Comment,
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments - Dimensions of an "Intimate Relationship,"
13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 857 (1966).
15. In Boyd, ownership and possession were in the same person, and the privilege
applied even though the invoice sought by the government was prepared by a third
person. 116 U.S. at 618-19.
16. In Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), it was held that an officer of a cor-
poration could not refuse to produce its books upon the grounds that the corporation
would be incriminated. Id. at 73-75. The Court differentiated between the rights of
a corporation and those of an individual upon the basis that a corporation held its
privileges of existence subject to its articles of incorporation, and the state, having
granted these limited powers, could demand production to ensure that the franchise
was not abused. Id. at 74-75. In Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911), the
Court, held that corporate officials were not permitted to withhold corporate books
or documents which would incriminate them personally. Id. at 384-85. The Court
noted that physical possession of the documents was not in itself enough to invoke the
protections against self-incrimination, but that "[t]he question still remains with re-
spect to the nature of the documents and the capacity in which they are held." Id. at
380. In United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944), the Court held that the privilege
was unavailable to an unincorporated labor association. Id. at 699-705. See generally
8 WIGMORE, supra note 8, at §§ 2259(a), (b); MCCORMICK, supra note 8, at § 129.
17. The lower court cases typically involve an Internal Revenue Service sum-
mons issued to a third party, other than the taxpayer investigated, or to a nonowner-
possessor of documents. One line of cases requires one to have a proprietary interest
in the records before he may assert the privilege against self-incrimination; these
courts read Hale, Wilson, and White as standing for the proposition that since the
privilege is a personal one, it can protect only the owner. See note 16 supra. See, e.g.,
United States v. Widelski, 452 F.2d 1, 4 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918
(1972) (privilege not available to taxpayers when accountant's copies of taxpayers'
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The Supreme Court attempted to resolve the question of what factual
circumstances permit a natural person to invoke the privilege in Couch
v. United States,'8 where a taxpayer argued that compliance with a sum-
mons ordering production of her business records, which were in the
possession of her accountant, would violate her fifth amendment right.19
While rejecting the taxpayer's argument that ownership was the basis of
the privilege against self-incrimination, 20 the Court emphasized that the fifth
amendment was intended to proscribe "personal compulsion." 21 It found
that since "possession bears the closest relationship to the personal com-
pulsion forbidden by the Fifth Amendment," the taxpayer could not seek
its protections where her documents were in her accountant's possession.22
The Couch Court declined to establish a per se rule that actual posses-
sion is necessary and noted that factual situations may arise wherein con-
structive possession is so obvious or the surrender of actual possession is
so "temporary and insignificant" that the personal compulsion will remain
unaffected.2 3  However, the Court provided no clear standard for deter-
tax returns were in possession of taxpayers) ; United States v. Egenberg, 443 F.2d 512,
518-19 (3d Cir. 1971).
The other line of cases has read Hale, Wilson, and White as controlling
only in instances involving impersonal organizations and persons acting as their repre-
sentatives. These courts required only that the accused be in personal possession in
order to be protected. See, e.g., United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464, 467, 472
(9th Cir. 1967) (court refused to compel production of accountant's work papers
held by taxpayer).
18. 409 U.S. 322 (1973), noted in 19 VILL. L. Rzv. 186 (1973).
19. Id. at 323. In addition to her fifth amendment claim, the petitioner argued
that the production of her business records would violate her fourth amendment rights.
Id. at 335. The Court rejected this argument saying that there exists no accountant-
client privilege under federal law, and that the taxpayer had no valid expectation of
privacy when her business records were handed to the accountant because she knew
the information therein would be divulged in the preparation of her income tax return.
Id. at 335. See, e.g., Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 864 (1953). See generally 8 WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2286, at 530 n.13.
20. 409 U.S. at 336.
21. Id. at 331. The Court said that "[t]o tie the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion to a concept of ownership would be to draw a meaningless line," because it would
place too much emphasis upon the form of communication to the accountant without
regard for the real purposes of the fifth amendment. Id.
22. Id. at 333. An individual not in actual possession of documents cannot be
exposed to the governmental compulsion that the fifth amendment prohibits. Id.
23. Id. at 333-34. In an attempt at clarification, the Court cited two cases which
stood as examples of factual situations in which personal compulsion would remain:
Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833
(1956) (attorney closed offices and left materials with third party corporation in
solely custodial capacity) ; United States v. Guterman, 272 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1959)
(taxpayer stored personal records in corporation's office safe to which only taxpayer
and his codefendant had access). 409 U.S. at 333-34 n.16.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan indicated that the privilege would
also be available:
to one who turns records over to a third person at the inducement of the Govern-
ment, Stuart v. United States, 416 F.2d 459 (CA5 1969); to one who places
records in a safety deposit box or in hiding; and to similar cases where reasonable
steps have been taken to safeguard the confidentiality of the contents of the records.
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mining when such compulsion would be deemed to exist. Although great
emphasis was placed upon actual possession throughout the opinion, the
Court specifically declined, in the context of either actual or constructive
possession, 24 to "decide what qualifies as rightful possession enabling the
possessor to assert the privilege.
'25
It was this issue that the Fisher court addressed. Writing for the
majority, Judge Aldisert stated that to assert the privilege against self-
incrimination, the taxpayers "must convince us" that 1) had they retained
actual possession of the documents, they could have refused production
upon the grounds that they were in rightful and personal possession, and
2) that they should not be held to have lost the privilege upon relinquish-
ing possession of the documents to their attorney to aid in his representa-
tion of them in connection with the tax investigation.2  It is submitted
that the Third Circuit's holding that these requirements were not met27
presents three separate analytical problem areas: 1) the use of an expec-
tation of privacy to determine whether the compulsion exerted upon the
taxpayers was personal; 2) the consideration of ownership and "limited"
possession in examining a claim of compelled self-incrimination; 3) the
attorney-client relationship's bearing upon the significance of the posses-
sion stressed in Couch.
2s
1. Determination of Presence of Personal Compulsion by Analyzing the
Expectation of Privacy.2
9
While attempting to define the parameters of the privilege against
self-incrimination, the Fisher court, in its reading of Couch, United
24. While denying that the taxpayer had had constructive possession, the Couch
Court considered the accountant's independent contractor status and the length of his
possession of the documents, some of which had been in his office for 14 years.
409 U.S. at 333-35. See also note 23 supra.
25. 409 U.S. at 330 n.12, 336 n.20.
26. 500 F.2d at 689.
27. In his dissent, Judge Hunter expressed the thought that the majority never
really answered the questions it posed for itself; at the very least, he was unable to
understand the reasoning by which the majority reached its result. Id. at 695, 699-700
(Hunter, J., dissenting in part). Further evidence of the perplexity caused by the
opinion is provided by the fact that one of the questions upon which certiorari was
granted by the Supreme Court was the suggested failure of the Third Circuit to
determine whether the taxpayers would have been protected from compelled dis-
closure had they remained in possession of the documents, as the petition asserted
that the Fisher court had failed to answer the question posed by the case. 43 U.S.L.W.
3412 (U.S. Jan. 28, 1975).
The discussion of the three analytical problems in the instant text is an
attempt to impose a more traditional order upon what seems to be a rather uncon-
ventionally constructed majority opinion.
28. See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
29. Some writers believe that invasion of privacy is not one of the evils the fifth
amendment was intended to proscribe. For example, Judge Friendly listed the follow-
ing objections to the use of privacy as a fifth amendment standard: 1) if privacy is
the standard, it is paradoxical that the privilege protects only self-incriminating
statements; 2) it is difficult to reconcile a fifth amendment notion of privacy with
immunity statutes that mandate the relinquishment of privacy; 3) when an individual
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States v. White,30 and Bellis v. United States,3' detected a shift in em-
phasis from property to privacy in the Supreme Court's treatment of the
fifth amendment in relationship to the compelled production of docu-
ments.3 2 The court reasoned that absent a reasonable expectation of
privacy, the personal compulsion against which the fifth amendment is
intended to protect cannot exist. 3s The court seemed to find that due to
the taxpayers' "temporary and insignificant" possession, they could not
maintain an expectation of privacy.3 4 Therefore, it concluded, since no
personal compulsion existed, the documents could not have been protected,
even if the taxpayers had been in actual possession.
3 5
This line of reasoning, however, misuses the concept of privacy,
which had been employed in earlier fifth amendment analyses to deter-
mine not whether compulsion existed, but whether the compulsion in a
is arrested for murder, rape, or kidnapping, he is not "morally justified" in asserting
the privilege upon the basis of privacy; and 4) it would be paradoxical that the fourth
amendment's protection of privacy does not protect against reasonable searches and
seizures, "whereas the fifth amendment applies with accelerating force as the reason-
ableness of the state's belief in guilt increases." Friendly, supra note 9, at 688-90.
See In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 85-86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1052 (1973).
See also United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464, 471 (9th Cir. 1967). But see Couch v.
United States, 409 U.S. 322, 339-42 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United States
v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444, 449 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 906 (1975)
(No. 74-611).
30. 322 U.S. 694 (1944). See note 16 supra.
31. 417 U.S. 85 (1974). The Supreme Court held the privilege unavailable to a
partner in a small law firm who attempted to withhold the firm's records by asserting
that they would incriminate him personally. Id. at 101.
32. 500 F.2d at 690. Judge Hunter, however, disagreed and suggested that the
majority confused a shift from ownership to possession, with a shift from property
to privacy. Id. at 701 (Hunter, J., dissenting in part). Judge Hunter's approach seems
to be the more apt of the two in light of the use of the concept of privacy in White
and Bellis. See notes 36-42 and accompanying text infra. The majority relied upon
language in White which stated specifically that the only documents protected by the
privilege were private papers, or papers which "were at least in his possession in a
purely personal capacity." 500 F.2d at 690, quoting United States v. White, 322
U.S. 694, 699 (1944). However, rather than indicating a trend towards privacy, White
said merely that one asserting the privilege against self-incrimination need not be the
owner of the documents sought. See 500 F.2d at 606 (Hunter, J., dissenting in part).
In Couch, the Court emphasized the importance of possession, not privacy.
See notes 20-22 and accompanying text supra. The Couch Court discussed the tax-
payer's expectation of privacy in relation to the constructive possession of her records,
and the fact that the contents of her records would be made public in her tax return,
but it is not clear whether the discussion related to a consideration of the petitioner's
fourth or fifth amendment arguments. 409 U.S. at 332, 335. The Court stated that"no Fourth or Fifth Amendment claim can prevail where, as in this case, there exists
no legitimate expectation of privacy and no semblance of governmental compulsion
against the person accused." Id. at 336 (footnote omitted). Judge Hunter interpreted
this statement as meaning that the fourth amendment was unavailable because the
taxpayer could show no expectation of privacy, and that the fifth amendment was
unavailable because she was not subject to any governmental compulsion. 500 F.2d
at 701 n.23 (Hunter, J., dissenting in part). Therefore, it would appear that Couch
was addressing the question of "governmental compulsion," whereas Bellis and White
involved a determination of whether the compulsion was personal. See notes 36-40
and accompanying text infra.
33. 500 F.2d at 690-91.
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particular set of facts was "personal." B'l1is and whiteexemplified this
rationale, holding that the privilege was unavailable to a person who
possessed records in a representative capacity on belhalf . f an organ'iza-
tion. s6  When an official of a corporation or partnership must produce
incriminating materials, the element of compulsion is present but the
privilege does not apply because the coercion is not personal.37 In Bellis,
the Supreme Court reasoned that a representative of an organization has no
valid expectation of privacy because dominion over the records may be dic-
tated by statute or the internal rules of the organization, and access is ordi-
narily guaranteed to others.38 Since the official has no. authority over the
"content or location" 39 of the papers, his possession of thiem'is not personal;
therefore, personal compulsion is absent.40  Hence, as Bellis' and' White
demonstrate, the expectation of -privacy determines only..whether-t-he-docu-
ments are possessed' in a personl, rather than a iepresent ti*e,' caiadty'
In Fisher, the taxpayers, possession was personal because it was un-
qualified.4 2 They did not hold the work papers as representatives or
agents of the accountant,4 3 and they had a right to immediate possession.
44
36. See notes 16 & 31 supra.
37. 417 U.S. at 89-90; 322 U.S. at 699-700. A practical rationale for the Court's
holdings in White and' Bellis was that since the corporation can act to produce its
records only through its representatives, allowing them to assert the privilege against
self-incrimination would completely frustrate any government attempt to regulate
corporate activities. 417 U.S. at 90; 322 U.S. at 700. Further, Bellis followed White's
reasoning that when individuals act as representatives of an association, they are
not entitled to claim their personal privileges upon its behalf; "[rjather they assume
.the rights, duties and privileges of the artificial entity or association . 417 U.S.
at 90, quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944).
38. 417 U.S. at 92. White did not mention that records may be regulated by
statute, but relied upon the fact that normally other members of the organization have
a. legally enforceable right to inspect the records. 322 U.S. at 699-700. Some courts
have read the White and Bellis cases as indicating that when there is a superior right
to possession in others or in the corporation, the privilege will not apply. See note 17
supra. However, a superior right to possession was not really considered in these
cases; rather, the Court found that where others are free to inspect the documents,
there is .no expectation of privacy. See text accompanying notes 38-40 infra. If the
existence of a superior right to possession alone is enough to negate personal com-
pulsion, then ownership would be necessary for assertion of the fifth amendment pro-
tections, and this requirement was specifically rejected by Couch. See note 21 and
accompanying text supra,
39. 417 U.S. at 92.
40. Id. at 90.
41. In other words, the consideration would be whether the documents are
"private" papers in which an individual may claim the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. The Boyd Court used the term "private papers." 116 U.S. at 630. The Fisher
court may have been hinting at this approach in stating that the petitioners must
convince the court that. the work papers fall into the "required category of their
'private books and papers.'" 500 F.2d at 692.
42. Judge Hunter thought that the majority did not contest that the taxpayers
possessed the records in a purely personal capacity. 500 F.2d at 696 (Hunter, J., dis-
senting in part). However, in view of the emphasis the majority placed upon privacy,
it appears that the Fisher court did inquire into the capacity in which the taxpayers
held the records. See notes 30-35 and accompanying text supra.
43. 500 F.2d at 696 n.7 (Hunter, J., dissenting in part). The accountant even
testified that the taxpayers owned the property. 352 F. Supp. at 734.
44. 500 F.2d at 695 (Hunter, J., dissenting in part).
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Furthermore,, their retention of the records was not subject to regulation
by statute, and they could have demanded their return by the attorney at
any time.45 It is submitted, therefore, that the Fisher court misapplied
the privacy criterion, and that these taxpayers had a valid expectation of
privacy and for that reason held the records in a purely personal capacity.4
2. Use of Ownership and "Limited" Possession in a Determination of
the Existence of Personal Compulsion.
The second problem in Fisher resulted from the court's reliance upon
the accontant's ownership 47 and the taxpayers' "limited" possession in
arriving at its conclusion that this factual context was entirely devoid of
the requisite compulsion. 48 Any notion that ownership of papers determines
who is able to assert the. privilege was refuted by Couch49 and by a case
noted with approval in Couch,50 United States v. Cohen,5 1 which apart
from the constructive possession issue,5 2 is foursquare with the present
case.5 3 In Cohen, the Ninth Circuit upheld the refusal of a taxpayer in
45. Id. at 698. Judge Hunter noted that the only qualification upon their right
to immediate possession would be an attorney's lien, a contingency which was not
present in Fisher. Id. at 698 n.14.
46. In United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted,
420 U.S. 906 (1975) (No. 74-611), the Fifth Circuit confronted a factual situation
paralleling the present case except for the fact that in Kasmir the taxpayer had
actual possession of the records for only a few minutes. Id. at 446. The court held
that the taxpayer could have refused production if the summons had been served
upon him because even during that brief period he had a legitimate expectation of
privacy. Id. at 452. See note 86 infra.
If the Fisher court had been attempting to define rightful possession in
terms of an expectation of privacy, it would have had to equate rightful possession
with purely personal possession. However, while a corporate official may have rightful
possession of records in that he is entitled to hold them, he can have no expectation
of privacy where he holds them in a representative capacity. See notes 37 & 38 supra.
The requirement of rightful possession, set forth in Couch, would seem to be an
additional requirement to be met, rather than merely a restatement of the Court's
position regarding the personal nature of the privilege.
47. 500 F.2d at 691-92. The fifth amendment rights of a nonowner possessor
were dealt with by the Third Circuit in United States v. Egenberg, 443 F.2d 512
(3d Cir. 1971), where, in an investigation of the accountant's tax liability, the court
ordered production of taxpayers' papers in the possession of an accountant, since he
held the papers as the taxpayers' agent rather than in a purely personal capacity.
Id. at 516-18. The Egenberg court stated that "[wihere, as here, a third party has a
superior right to possession of the papers, the witness cannot withhold them." Id.
at 517. The Fisher majority purported to reaffirm Egenberg, 500 F.2d at 691, but
Judge Hunter noted that Couch did not overrule Egenberg only because Egenberg
involved possession in an agency capacity. Id. at 700 n.20 (Hunter, J., dissenting in
part). However, Couch appears to limit the applicability of Egenberg, since the exist-
ence of a superior right to possession by itself will not disallow a claim of fifth
amendment privilege. See note 38 and text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
48. 500 F.2d at 691.
49. See notes 20-21 and accompanying text supra.
50. See note 56 and accompanying text infra.
51. 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967).
52. For a discussion of this issue see text accompanying note 26 supra and text
accompanying notes 70-80 infra.
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possession of his accountant's work papers to produce them in response
to a summons. 54 The Cohen court rejected the Government's contention
that the case should be remanded for determination of ownership because
it found that governmental compulsion may exist when one is merely in
possession of the records sought.55 In this connection, the Couch Court
noted with approval the Cohen court's holding that a finding of com-
pulsion depended not upon ownership, but upon possession.56 Thus, these
cases stand for the proposition, which was acknowledged but not followed
in Fisher,5 7 that no weight should be placed upon the lower court's finding
that the accountant owned the records.
58
In characterizing the taxpayers' possession of the documents as
"limited," the Fisher court considered the length of and purpose for their
actual possession.5 Perhaps this was an attempt to establish indicia for
defining "rightful possession," a concept which Couch left uncertain.60
However, the length of possession, and its purpose, are not pertinent to
fifth amendment analysis, since once an individual has established purely
personal possession, be it either actual or constructive, that person is
potentially subject to the compulsion against which the fifth amendment
is designed to protect."' It is submitted, therefore, that personal posses-
54. 388 F.2d at 472. After being contacted by the Internal Revenue Service,
Cohen obtained the records pertaining to his tax liability from his accountant, and
later declined to return them at the request of the accountant who had been visited
by an agent of the Internal Revenue Service. Id. at 465. Cohen had been in actual
possession of the records for approximately 2% months when the summons was
served upon him. Id.
55. Id. at 468. The Cohen court noted that "[flack of title does not free" a
person from the "cruel trilemma." Id. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
56. 409 U.S. at 330 n.12, citing United States v. Cohen, 338 F.2d 464, 468 (9th
Cir. 1967).
57. 500 F.2d at 689-91.
58. See note 5 supra. In United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. granted, 420 U.S. 906 (1975) (No. 74-611), the Fifth Circuit also rejected the
argument that ownership was a prerequisite to the invocation of the privilege, but
stated that ownership might be pertinent in ascertaining a taxpayer's expectation of
privacy when he was not in actual possession of the records. Id. at 450 n.3.
59. 500 F.2d at 692. The court also described the taxpayer's possession as "tempo-
rary and insignificant." Id. at 691. The majority, however, misapplied this language
from Couch, because Couch viewed these considerations as part of a determination
of constructive possession. 409 U.S. at 333. Fisher, on the other hand, seemed to
use them in a determination of rightful possession, or possession in a purely personal
capacity. 500 F.2d at 691.
60. See notes 24 and 25 and accompanying text supra.
61. 500 F.2d at 695 (Hunter, J., dissenting in part). United States v. Kasmir,
499 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 906 (1975) (No. 74-611), im-
plicitly rejected time and explicitly rejected purpose as standards for assertion of the
privilege. Id. at 450-51. In discussing time, the Fifth Circuit stated that the taxpayer
was entitled to fifth amendment protection as soon as he obtained actual possession.
Id. at 451. With regard to purpose, the court rejected the Government's argument
[VOL. 20
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sion, once shown, is not vitiated by either the duration of, or purpose
for, the possession.
In his dissent from the instant opinion, Judge Hunter noted that
there was no implication in Couch that length of actual possession deter-
mines the reach of the privilege. 62 Further, it seems that one who pos-
sesses records for only a brief time prior to transferring them to his
attorney is no less subject to the "cruel trilemma" 3 than is an individual
who holds written material for an extended period.64 Moreover, the fifth
amendment's policy of maintaining a fair state-individual65 balance should
not be allowed to fluctuate in relation to the dual factors, length and pur-
pose, upon which the Fisher majority relied.
As Judge Hunter noted, a more meaningful inquiry should focus
upon the "quality of possession, i.e., rightful possession in a purely per-
sonal capacity." 66 That the nature of the taxpayers' possession was "purely
personal" has already been established. 7 Therefore, assuming that the
taxpayers were in rightful possession,68 it is submitted that had the sum-
mons been issued when they actually had possessed the work papers,
they could have successfully refused production. 9
3. Effect of the Attorney-Client Relationship Upon Couch.
Although the attorney-client privilege could not have been invoked
in the instant case, 70 it was material to a consideration of the construc-
tive possession issue left unresolved by Couch. The relevance of the
that the taxpayers were not in rightful possession because the pre-summons transfer
was an attempt to avoid the summons. Id. The court said:
[I]t would be highly improper and a serious derogation of the Fifth Amendment
right if we were to test the [taxpayers'] contention by asking whether they have
attempted to keep evidence out of the hands of the investigators. For every suc-
cessful claim of privilege frustrates to some extent the government's ability to
gather evidence. In this context, the Fifth Amendment privilege demands that
the government "shoulder the entire load" in its contest with the individual.
Id. (citation omitted).
62. 500 F.2d at 695 (Hunter, J., dissenting in part).
63. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
64. 500 F.2d at 695 (Hunter, J., dissenting in part).
65. See notes 11 & 61 and accompanying text supra.
66. 500 F.2d at 695 (Hunter, J., dissenting in part). Judge Hunter said that
this determination was required by Conch. Id.
67. See notes 42-46 and accompanying text supra.
68. Judge Hunter thought the case should have been remanded for a determination
of whether the taxpayers had had rightful possession. One factor he thought should
be considered was how assertive the accountant had been, upon receiving the summons,
in his request that the taxpayers return the work papers. 500 F.2d at 696-97 (Hunter,
J., dissenting in part). In Cohen, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Government's
argument that a mere request by the accountant sufficed to render the possession
"wrongful." 388 F.2d at 469-70.
69. Thus, the taxpayers would have satisfied the court's first requirement that
they be in rightful and personal possession of the disputed documents and it would
have become necessary to determine whether the privilege had been lost in the subse-
quent transfer to their attorney. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
70. 500 F.2d at 691. Presumably, a claim of an attorney-client privilege would
have been defeated by the "pre-existing document" rule which excludes from the pro- 85
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relationship was noted by the Fisher court "as an indicia of the degree of
privacy and freedom from compulsion" that the taxpayers might have
expected when they turned the documents over to their attorney. 71 The
court, however, did not need to decide whether constructive possession
was present upon these facts, because it had already concluded that the
taxpayers could not have asserted the privilege even had they been in
actual possession.72 Therefore, since its inquiry was limited to the issue
of whether the attorney-client relationship created any rights, the court
held only that papers not protected in the hands of the taxpayers do not
become privileged by a transfer to their attorney. 73
Arguably, even if it had been found that the Goldsmiths had rightful
and personal possession, constructive possession would not have been an
issue because of the general rule relied upon by the majority, that a
client's rights in written material will not be lost by relinquishing posses-
sion to his attorney in the course of representation. 74 If this rule were
not followed, a client could be required to choose either to turn over the
papers to his attorney, and thus sacrifice his or her privilege against self-
incrimination, or to refuse to relinquish possession of the records and
tections of the privilege documents written prior to the establishment of the attorney-
client relationship. See generally 8 WIGMORE, supra note 8, at § 2307; MCCORMICK,
supra note 8, at § 89.
71. 500 F.2d at 691. The majority distinguished the present case from Couch
because of "the additional question of the reasonable likelihood of privacy and freedom
from compulsion expected by the taxpayers" when they gave the work papers to their
lawyer. Id. at 689.
72. Id. at 691.
73. Id. The general rule has been stated as follows:
[W]hen the client himself would be privileged from production of the docu-
ment, . . . as exempt from self-incrimination, the attorney having possession of the
document is not bound to produce. Such has invariably been the ruling. On the
other hand, if the client would be compellable to produce . . . by subpoena . . .
then the attorney is equally compellable, if the document is in his custody, to
produce under the appropriate procedure.
8 WIGMORE, supra note 8, at § 2307 (footnotes omitted). Compare United States v.
Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 466-67 (9th Cir. 1963) (even if taxpayer is not party to the
action, attorney has standing to assert taxpayer's privilege against self-incrimination
to refuse production of client's documents, given to him in furtherance of his legal
representation) ; Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1962) ; Applica-
tion of House, 144 F. Supp. 95, 99-100 (N.D. Cal. 1956) ; with Bouschor v. United
States, 316 F.2d 451, 458-59 (8th Cir. 1963) (attorney does not have standing to
assert taxpayer's fifth amendment privilege to refuse production of client's papers
when client is not a party to the proceeding to compel production); In re Fahey,
300 F.2d 383, 385 (6th Cir. 1961) ; United States v. Boccuto, 175 F. Supp. 886, 890
(D.N.J.), appeal dismissed, 274 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1959). See generally Lay, Attorney's
Assertion of His Client's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Criminal Tax
Investigations, 21 U. MIAMi L. REV. 854 (1967) ; Note, The Attorney and His
Client Privileges, 74 YALE L.J. 539 (1965).
74. 500 F.2d at 691. See note 73 supra.
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accept the consequential loss of adequate legal representation, 75 thus
jeopardizing his or her sixth amendment right to counsel.
70
In the past, the Supreme Court has not permitted an individual to
be placed in a situation where he must sacrifice one right to preserve
another. 77 To effectuate this principle, it would seem necessary to fix
the client's rights when he actually possesses the documents, so that any
subsequent transfer would neither delete nor add to any right already
present.78  This reasoning appears particularly compelling when one
realizes that the complexities of our tax laws make it mandatory for a
taxpayer to seek counsel if investigated, and, if he is to secure adequate
representation, to supply the attorney with all documents relating to tax
liability. 79 Failure to recognize rightful and constructive possession in
75. The Supreme Court has recognized that the sixth amendment right to counsel
would be nugatory if an individual did not have "a reasonable opportunity . . . to
consult with counsel." Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 10 (1954). See also Avery v.
Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940). It could be successfully contended that impeding
the flow of pertinent documents between taxpayer and attorney by requiring the client
to sacrifice his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination would deny the
client a "reasonable opportunity" to communicate with his attorney.
Further, a taxpayer's right to assistance of counsel would seem to be ren-
dered illusory if his counsel cannot prepare an adequate defense because he is not in
possession of relevant material. An attorney might hesitate to request this material if
he was aware that the transfer of the documents would be accompanied by disclosure
to prosecuting or investigating authorities. See also Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
322, 342 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas said that the same diffi-
culty would arise when records were transferred to an accountant to aid in preparation
of a tax return. Id.
76. The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defence."
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
77. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968). The Simmons Court
held that self-incriminating testimony made in the course of pursuing a pretrial
motion to suppress evidence, allegedly seized in violation of the witness's fourth amend-
ment rights, was inadmissible at trial to prove his guilt unless he did not object. Id.
The Court, in reasoning that a statement is not voluntary when made to preserve a con-
stitutional right, stated that one such right should not have to be surrendered in order
to preserve another. The Simmons approach seems to be applicable to the present set of
facts because the taxpayer herein was faced with the choice of disclosing incriminating
documents, or sacrificing his right to assistance of counsel. See also Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322, 342 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas cited two
cases to support his observation that the Supreme Court does not condone government
action compelling individuals to trade off rights: Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273
(1968) (state may not discharge police officer for refusing to waive his fifth amend-
ment right during grand jury investigation of bribery and corruption in police depart-
ment), and Uniformed Sanit. Men Ass'n. v. Commissioner of Sanit., 392 U.S. 280
(1968) (municipality may not discharge employees solely for refusing to waive fifth
amendment right in grand jury investigation of corruption). See Student Symposium:
Recent Developments in Individual Rights, Fifth Amendment Rights of a Client
Regarding Documents Held by His Attorney, United States v. White, 1973 DUK-E
L.J. 1080, 1091-92.
78. United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444, 452 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted,
420 U.S. 906 (1975) (No. 74-611).
79. United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 468 (1963). The Ninth Circuit in
Judson explained the considerations in this area:
Few areas of the law draw so many individuals in contact with the govern-
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this context would penalize a taxpayer for exercising his sixth amendment
right to counsel.80
A second analytical problem involving the attorney-client relation-
ship is presented by the Fisher majority's application of the principle
articulated in Couch that when a third party is in possession of a tax-
payer's documents, no personal compulsion is exerted upon the taxpayer
by coercing the documents' production.8' The taxpayer in Couch was
unable to assert the privilege against self-incrimination because she lost
her right to invoke it when she transferred records to her accountant.
8 2
The Fisher court noted that in the instant case, actual possession was in
a third party at the time the summons was issued, and then stated that
"unless the attorney-client relationship intervenes, this case is squarely
controlled by Couch."'8 3 Since the court found that the attorney-client
relationship did not control,8 4 it appears that the Third Circuit afforded
some weight to the fact that possession was in a third party when the
summons was issued. However, in Fisher, the taxpayers' attorney held
the records, and therefore, because no rights are lost by the transfer of
papers to an attorney in the course of legal representation,8 5 the Couch
third-party-possession analysis is inapplicable to Fisher.80 For this reason
and the one that constructive possession vas apparent, it is submitted that
the issue actually raised by the facts in Fisher was whether the taxpayers
the law's "bramble bush." The ramifications of tax law are often a stubborn
challenge to the most expert legal practitioner. The very nature of the tax law
requires taxpayers to rely upon attorneys, and requires attorneys to rely, in turn,
upon the documentary indicia of their clients' financial affairs. In light of these
realities a very real danger would be created if we were to sustain the govern-
ment's position.
Id. See also Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 342 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing) ; 500 F.2d at 698-99 (Hunter, J., dissenting in part) ; Lay, supra note 73, at 846.
80. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 342 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
81. 500 F.2d at 691.
82. See United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444, 452-53 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
granted, 420 U.S. 906 (1975) (No. 74-611).
83. 500 F.2d at 691. It is unclear whether the court was continuing its privacy
analysis or whether it was stating that, as in Couch, where a third party is in posses-
sion of the documents, there is no compulsion against the accused and therefore no
privilege to be claimed.
84. Id. at 691-92.
85. See note 73 supra.
86. The Fifth Circuit agreed with this proposition, but relied upon the notion
that a taxpayer has an expectation of privacy when he turns over documents to his
attorney. United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444, 452 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted,
420 U.S. 906 (1975) (No. 74-611). The Fifth Circuit distinguished Kasmir from
Couch upon the basis that, whereas an accountant has a duty to disclose information,
"the attorney has a strict ethical obligation to prevent disclosure." Id. at 453 (emphasis
added). The court also noted that if the records were privileged in the hands of the
taxpayer, the Government should not be able to compel production of the papers
indirectly by effectively forcing the taxpayer to rely upon counsel and then summoning
the papers from the attorney. Id. at 454-55. See also United States v. Judson, 322
F.2d 460, 468 (9th Cir. 1963).
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could have asserted the privilege when they were in actual possession
of their accountant's work papers.
87
While the Fisher court's analysis cannot withstand close scrutiny,
the court should not be criticized too harshly, because from a policy view-
point, this case involved serious ramifications for the Internal Revenue
Service's ability to enforce the tax laws.8 8 If the court had held the
privilege against self-incrimination available to these taxpayers, future
attempts to apprehend fraudulent taxpayers would have been greatly
hindered: once a taxpayer learned of an inquiry into his tax liability,8 9
he could easily frustrate that investigation by seeking fifth amendment
protection by means of obtaining records from his accountant, briefly
taking actual possession of them, and subsequently transferring them to
the attorney retained in that investigation. By holding that the privilege
was unavailable in Fisher, the court avoided this result.90
87. Therefore, it is further submitted that the court adopted the appropriate
analysis when it proposed to deal first with the taxpayers' rights when they were in
actual possession of the papers, and then with the effect of the attorney-client rela-
tionship upon those rights. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
88. In 1972, the Internal Revenue Service examined 1.3 million individual income
tax returns out of more than 70 million filed. Over 132,000 allegations of federal
criminal tax fraud were considered by Special Agents of the Intelligence Division.
The agents completed 8,900 tax fraud investigations of which more than 1,750 were
referred to the Internal Revenue Service prosecution division. Subsequently, 1,355
prosecution recommendations were forwarded to the Department of Justice. Symposium
on Federal Civil and Criminal Income Tax Fraud Investigations: Law and Order
vs. the Constitution, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 130, 133-34 (1974), citing 1972 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE.
If the taxpayers in the instant case had been able to assert the privilege, the
Government would have had to resort to more difficult and time-consuming methods,
such as the net-worth and bank-statement methods, to establish the taxpayers' income.
See Edgar, Tax Records, The Fifth Amendment and The "Required Records Doc-
trine," 9 ST. Louis L.J. 502, 502-03 (1965). If Internal Revenue agents are freed
from this extra burden, they may devote more time to a greater number of more
thorough investigations.
89. Many cases in this area involve a transfer of possession of records after the
taxpayer has been contacted by the Internal Revenue Service to discuss tax liability.
See, e.g., United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444, 446 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted,
420 U.S. 906 (1975) (No. 74-611); United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464, 465 (9th
Cir. 1967).
In the case of United States v. Turner, 480 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1973), the
court held that the Internal Revenue Service could summon from an accountant a list
of persons for whom he prepared tax returns. Id. at 279. The motivation behind the
summons was not clear, but one may speculate that by using this device, the Internal
Revenue Service was attempting to circumvent the initial contact with the taxpayer
and the problems caused by the possibility of a transfer of documents.
90. Thus, the Fisher court has fulfilled one writer's prediction of Couch's impact:
In all probability, the courts will allow the Internal Revenue Service to make
greater use of the administrative summons during a tax fraud investigation than
formerly would have been thought possible. . ..
We, as tax practitioners, can expect Intelligence Division offices to become
more and more aggressive because the Special Agents can accurately conclude
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On the other hand, the court failed to provide any clear standard for
future application of the fifth amendment in similar situations. There-
fore, it is uncertain how taxpayers and attorneys can best protect clients'
rights when documents are involved. Because of the court's reliance upon
the length and purpose of the taxpayer's possession, 91 the real impact of
the decision will not be realized unless the Supreme Court clarifies this
area of the law when it considers the case later this term,92 or until the
Third Circuit is presented with other factual circumstances which will
provide an opportunity to clarify the instant decision.
Stephen D. Brown
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - BELATED
PROSECUTORIAL DISCLOSURE OF MISLEADING TESTIMONY IS PREJU-
DICIAL TO DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BUT Is NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHERE OBJECTION WAS WAIVED BY SUBSEQUENT DEFENSE IN-
ACTIVITY.
United States v. Harris (1974)
In a federal prosecution for narcotics offenses,' defense counsel made
unsuccessful attempts during cross-examination to show that the key Gov-
ernment witness had been induced to testify in return for a promise that
give greater weight to statutory and administrative conclusions and place less and
less of a strict construction upon the words in the Bill of Rights ....
Coffee, Supreme Court's Couch Decision Signals New Directions in Guarding Clients'
Records, 38 J. TAX. 258, 259-60 (1973). Cf. United States v. Turner, 480 F.2d 272,
277 (7th Cir. 1973).
The summons power of the Internal Revenue Service has been augmented by
three decisions: United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964) (no necessity of show-
ing probable cause in order to obtain enforcement of summons) ; Donaldson v. United
States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971) ; and Couch. See 19 VILL. L. REv. 186, 191 n.33 (1973).
See also note 6 and text accompanying notes 18-25 supra. The Fisher decision is a
further expansion of the use of the summons by the Internal Revenue Service. Perhaps
herein lies the practical rationale for the court's holding and reliance upon duration
and purpose of possession as criteria for assertion of the privilege against self-
incrimination. Rather than stating that it is offensive to transfer summoned papers
to an attorney, the court implied that it would not permit taxpayers to purposefully
evade the summons and thereby negate the expanded powers granted to the Internal
Revenue Service in Powell, Donaldson, and Couch.
91. These two factors are particularly troublesome because the attorney,
accountant, and taxpayer are provided with no clue as to whether 3 weeks or 3 years
would be a sufficient length of actual possession. Neither do they know what would be
a proper purpose for possession that would enable the taxpayer to assert the privilege.
92. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in both Fisher, see note 3 supra,
and United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S.
906 (1975) (No. 74-611).
1. United States v. Harris, 368 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Pa. 1973). After the trial
which was the subject of the instant case, the defendants were convicted of various
violations of the Federal Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 843(b), 846 (1970). 368 F. Supp. at 702.
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an effort would be made to minimize her sentence in a related state prose-
cution. Specifically, the witness insisted that she had entered into no such
agreements with federal authorities;2 However, the day after this cross-
examination was completed, the prosecuting attorney admitted at side-bar
that he had promised the witness that federal officials would do whatever
they could to influence the state court to grant her favorable treatment at
the time of her sentencing. 3 In post-trial mfiotions following their convic-
tions, the defendants contended that they had been denied due process
because the government had failed to take timely action to correct its wit-
ness' false testimony, and thus were entitled to new trials. 4 In affirming
the denial of these motions,5 the United States Court of Appeals for the
2. United States v. Harris, 498 F.2d 1164 rehearing denied, 498 F.2d 1172 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 655 (1974). Important. to the: Government's case at trial
was the testimony of an informant and unindicted c6conspirator who testified under im-
munity. Testimony adduced at trial revealed that she had pleaded guilty to related
narcotics charges brought in the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
but that sentencing upon these charges had been deferred. until the completion of her
testimony in the instant case. 498 F.2d at 1166.
In an effort to impeach the witness' credibility, defense counsel cross-
examined her as to whether' she had "any agreements or understandings" with the
Government. Id. at 1167 n.6 (emphasis supplied by.the court). Upon her first day
of cross-examination, the witness was questioned and responded as follows:
Q. Now, have you been promised by anyone other than the public defender
that you would receive favorable treatment from the court in these three cases
because you are in fact cooperating with the police and the federal authorities?
A. No.
Id. at 1166 n.5. The following day, this colloquy occurred:
Q. Now, did you have any agreement with the Marshals or with the U.S.
Attorney's office as to what would happen in your case?
A. No.
Q. Do you have any agreements or understandings with anyone in the State
Government, State authorities [relative to your testimony in court today]?
A. No.
Id. at 1167 nn.5 & 6.
3. 498 F.2d at 1167. There was confusion regarding precisely what it was to
which the parties had agreed. The Assistant United States Attorney trying the case
had advised the witness to plead guilty to the state charges. The day following
the completion of the witness' testimony, he admitted at side-bar: "[W]e sat down
and talked with her and it was agreed that she should go and plead guilty and we
would do anything, whatever we could, to influence the [state] court at the time of
sentencing to give her a break for what she has been able to do." Id. (emphasis
supplied by the court). On the other hand, the Assistant District Attorney for Phila-
delphia had also joined in advising the witness to plead guilty to the state charges.
In his testimony he stated that the only agreement was that "sentence [on the state
charges] would be deferred and an opportunity would be given to the Government
to explain to the Court the degree of her cooperation." Id. at 1170 n.9. In contradic-
tion to the federal attorney, the state attorney could not say that the state prose-
cutor's office would not oppose leniency to the witness. Id. at 1170.
4. The witness had testified upon the second and third days of the 11-day trial.
Disclosure was made upon the fourth day, 2 days after the original misstatement.
Id. at 1169. Consequently, defendants contended that disclosure was untimely because
not made while the witness was testifying and that the lack of timely correction
denied them a fair trial and was thus reversible error. Id. at 1166.
5. 368 F. Supp. at 699. The district court based its denial of the motions for
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Third Circuit held that when the prosecutor fails to perform his affirmative
duty to disclose to the court in a timely manner that his witness is giving
substantially misleading testimony, the defendant, by subsequent conscious
inactivity, waives his right to object to the resulting prejudice. United
States v. Harris, 498 F.2d 1164, rehearing denied, 498 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 655 (1974).
Harris is the latest development in an evolving doctrine regarding the
effect of false evidence upon a defendant's right to due process of law in
both state and federal criminal prosecutions.6 The seminal case was Mooney
v. Holohan,7 where the Supreme Court of the United States recognized
that the prosecution's deliberate use of perjured testimony denied a fair
trial to the accused." Thereafter, it was established that when the prosecu-
tion, although not soliciting it, knowingly allowed false evidence to go
uncorrected, a conviction based upon such evidence must fall.9 In Napue
v. Illinois,1° the Supreme Court expanded the Mooney doctrine by ruling
that it was not necessary that the false evidence be concerned directly with
the question of guilt, for even though it bore only upon the credibility of a
witness, false evidence, such as false testimony, might have had the effect
of depriving the defendant of a fair trial." Finally, the Supreme Court
note 20 infra) and the fact that the prosecution had corrected the misstatements dur-
ing the trial (see note 4 supra). 368 F. Supp. at 714.
6. The United States Constitution forbids both the federal government and the
states to deprive any person of life, liberty or property without "due process of law."
U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV § 1. The Supreme Court of the United States has
construed "due process" to be that quantum of fairness which is "consistent with the
fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil
and political institutions .... " Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926). The
concept has its roots in the American ideal of fairness in the treatment of all.
Howard v. United States, 372 F.2d 294, 301 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 915
(1967). It is intended to protect every citizen from arbitrary action, and to secure
equal and impartial justice for all. United States v. Yount, 267 F. 861, 863 (3d Cir.
1920). The essence of due process for the criminal defendant is fair trial procedure
as exemplified in the following statement: "Society wins not only when the guilty
are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of
justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87 (1963). For a brief survey of the historical development of the concept of fair
trial procedure, see R. MORRIS, FAIR TRIAL (1952).
7. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
8. Id. at 112. In Mooney, the conviction of the defendant was set aside when
subsequent investigation revealed that all of the state's witnesses had lied and that
the district attorney had knowledge that the testimony was perjured. The Supreme
Court noted in dicta that a conviction obtained through the knowing use of false
evidence was incompatible with rudimentary demands of justice. Id. The Mooney
principle was adopted in Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942), a case in which
prosecuting officials coerced and threatened witnesses into perjuring themselves.
9. Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957). The prosecutor did not solicit the
false testimony of his witness in Alcorta, but remained silent when he knew that the
witness was giving false testimony. The Supreme Court found that the acquiescence
in the perjury denied the defendant due process. Id. at 31-32.
10. 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).
11. Id. at 272. In Napue, the principal state witness in a murder trial testified
in response to questioning by a state attorney that he had received no promise of
consideration in exchange for his testimony. The state attorney knew that this state-
ment was false but did nothing to correct it. The Supreme Court, in holding that
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recognized in Giglio v. United States12 that the doctrine applied irrespective
of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. In that case the Court
held that a prosecuting attorney's good faith nondisclosure of an-other
government attorney's promise of leniency for the testimony of a key wit-
ness, and false testimony regarding that promise, constituted reversible
error per se.
13
The instant case presented the Third Circuit with a variation of the same
factual situation that had existed in both Napue and Giglio. Unlike those
two cases, however, where disclosure had been made after conviction,' 4 in
Harris the false testimony had been corrected during the trial, although not
until after the witness had completed her testimony and had left the stand. 15
Furthermore, the testimony in the instant case .arguably was not false.' 6
Hence, the question presented to the Third Circuit was whether belated
disclosure, during trial, of misleading testimony regarding Government
agreements with key witnesses was also reversible error.
Regarding the misleading testimony, it should be noted that the testi-
mony of accomplice witnesses usually presents problems of credibility.'
false testimony about plea bargains could affect the judgment of the jury and thus
"may have an effect on the outcome of the trial," found that the failure to correct
the perjury was reversible error per se. Id' The Court: noted that
[tihe jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may
well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as
the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's life or
liberty may depend.
Id. at 269.
12. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
13. Id. at 154. The petitioner in Giglio was convicted largely upon the testi-
mony of an unindicted coconspirator, who falsely testified that he had had no agree-
ments with the Government regarding bargains for his testimony. After the convic-
tion, however, the Government attorney who had presented the case to the grand jury
admitted that he had promised the witness freedom from prosecution in exchange for
testimony both before the grand jury and at trial. The attorney who had prosecuted
the case had been unaware of the promise and therefore had failed in good faith to
disclose its existence and correct the false testimony. Id. at 152-53. The Supreme
Court noted that the Government's case relied heavily upon the one witness and that
his credibility had been, therefore, an important issue. Thus, evidence of any agree-
ment regarding a future prosecution would have been relevant to his credibility and
the jury was entitled to this information. Id. at 155.
14. In Napue, the defendant became aware of the nondisclosure several years
after his conviction when the prosecuting attorney filed a petition for a writ of error
coram nobis on behalf of the witness, requesting that the court effect the agreement
between the state and the witness. 360 U.S. at 266-67.
In Giglio, evidence of the false testimony was discovered while an appeal
from the defendant's conviction was pending. An affidavit filed as part of the
Government's opposition to the defendant's motion for new trial confirmed the evi-
dence. 405 U.S. at 150-52.
15. The Third Circuit recognized that total nondisclosure would have required
automatic reversal under Napue and Giglio if the defendants had shown that the testi-
mony could "in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury."
498 F.2d at 1169 (citations omitted).
16. In Harris, it was questionable whether the witness had in fact committed
perjury, or whether her testimony, although given in good faith, was simply mis-
leading. See notes 20 & 21 and accompanying text infra.
17. See generally Comment, Immunity Given to the Accomplice Witness, 21
DRAKE L. REv. 331 (1972). 93
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Bargains for testimony present substantial temptations to witnesses to per-
jure themselves. Thus, defense counsel has the right to show that the
testimony of an accomplice witness was given in 'reliance upon a promise
of a lighter sentence recommendation or other preferential treatment.' 8
It was in exercising this right that defense counsel in the instant case asked
during cross-examination whether there had been made any "agreements
or understandings."' 9 The district court had concluded that the witness had
not knowingly and intentionally testified falsely in response to the questions
of defense counsel,20 and, on appeal, the Government contended that because
there had been no intent to lie, there had been no duty to disclose.2 1 The
Third Circuit held, however, that the prosecutor had an affirmative duty
to correct at trial not only false testimony of his witnesses, but also testi-
mony which he knew to be substantially misleading.
22
In placing this burden upon the prosecutor; the court did not deal
with the issue of when during the trial correction had to be made. It
decided only that if made during trial, belated disclosure was not reversible
error per se.23 The court thus placed upon the defendant the burden of
18. United States v. Migliorino, 238 F.2d 7, 10 (3d Cir. 1956) ; United States v.
Hogan, 232 F.2d 905, 907 (3d Cir. 1956).
19. 498 F.2d at 1167 n.6. For relevant excerpts from the witness' testimony, see
note 2 supra.
20. 368 F. Supp. at 714. If perjury were not involved, then, under a strict read-
ing of Napue and Giglio, disclosure would not be required.
21. 498 F.2d at 1168. It was the Government's contention that when the witness
was asked whether she had any "agreements or understandings" with the federal
authorities, she may have misunderstood this phrase. This phrasing, it was argued,
led her upon cross-examination to believe in good faith that "agreements or under-
standings" referred only to specific promises as to the result of the state sentencing
procedure, promises which the Government could not and did not make. Although
the witness had been told that her cooperation would be made known to the state court
at the time of her sentencing, she had been told repeatedly that the Government could
not promise her anything. Hence, because she had not had the intent to lie, a neces-
sary element for a perjury conviction, the argument concluded that there had been
no duty to correct the testimony, even if it had misled the court. Id.
22. Id. at 1169. The Third Circuit recognized the possible correctness of the
Government's version of the facts (see note 21 supra), but decided that under the
reasoning of Giglio and Napue it did not matter whether the testimony was actually
perjured or only substantially misleading. Id. The court strenuously asserted its
position that
the prosecution's duty to disclose false testimony by one of its witnesses is [not]
to be narrowly and technically limited to those situations where the prosecutor
knows that the witness is guilty of the crime of perjury. Regardless of the lack
of intent to lie on the part of the witness, Giglio and Napue require that the
prosecutor apprise the court when he knows that his witness is given testimony
that is substantially misleading .... [W]hen it should be obvious to the Govern-
ment that the witness' answer, although made in good faith, is untrue, the Govern-
ment's obligation to correct that statement is as compelling as in a situation where
the Government knows that the witness is intentionally committing perjury.
Id.
23. 498 F.2d at 1170. This ruling is consistent with Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18 (1967), which held, inter alia, that a rule of automatic reversal shall not
apply for all federal constitutional errors, because "there may be some constitutional
errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant
that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless.
386 U.S. at 22.
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proving that the untimely disclosure had caused such prejudice as to have
denied him his constitutionally protected. right to a fair trial. After con-
sidering whether this burden had been satisfied in the instant case, the
court noted that although the defendants had suffered prejudice, 24 defense
counsel had deliberately taken no corrective action following the belated
disclosure, even though there were several opportunities still available
during the trial to do so. 25 Had counsel made such attempts, the court
would have been able to evaluate the effect of any residual prejudice upon
the fairness of the trial.26 Thus, the court concluded that by virtue of their
counsel's deliberate inaction, the defendants had waived their objections to
the Government's impropriety.2 7 By so concluding, the court placed upon
defense counsel in criminal cases the burden of assuming an active role in
protecting their clients from possible prejudice due to false testimony.
These developments by the Third Circuit are logical extensions of the
Mooney doctrine. Under Napue and Giglio, total nondisclosure of false
testimony is reversible error per se when the testimony could "in any
reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury. '28 A new
trial is automatic because such prosecutorial misconduct denies the accused
24. 498 F.2d at 1169. The court speculated that even if defense counsel had exer-
cised their best efforts, they still may not have been able to minimize the prejudice to
such a degree that reversible error could have been eliminated. Id. at 1171. The
court could only speculate upon this point, however, because counsel had taken no
action following the disclosure.
25. Id. The district court had agreed with counsel that the prosecutor's offer to
stipulate to the fact that a promise had been made was inadequate. Id. at 1169-70.
The court had expressed a willingness to take remedial action and had explicitly told
counsel that it would permit leading questions concerning the agreement. Id. at 1170.
Further, the witness was subject to recall at any time for the purpose of bringing
the agreement to the jury's attention, and defense counsel could have examined the
prosecutor because he possessed information vital to the defense. Id. See also Nash
v. Illinois, 389 U.S. 906 (1967), discussed infra at note 26, and United States v.
Johnson, 487 F.2d 1318, 1323-24 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974), where,
upon facts similar to those of the instant case, the witness' attorney was called to
the stand to reveal the bargain to the jury, and the trial judge directed the jury to
consider the bargain in its evaluation of the witness' credibility. These remedial pro-
cedures were held sufficient to mitigate any prejudice which otherwise might have
denied due process to the defendant. 487 F.2d at 1324. The case was remanded for
consideration of whether other newly discovered evidence required a new trial.
Id. at 1325.
26. 498 F.2d at 1171. Compare People v. Nash, 36 Ill. 2d 275, 222 N.E.2d 473
(1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 906 (1967). In Nash, the defendant had been convicted
of murder largely upon the testimony of a witness who had denied being promised
anything for his testimony. The prosecutor, knowing this was false, said nothing.
Later in the trial, the defense called the prosecutor and the witness' attorney to
testify, and both admitted that promises of leniency had leen given in exchange for
the testimony. Id. at 283, 222 N.E.2d at 477. This diligent action by defense counsel
allowed the Illinois Supreme Court to evaluate the residual prejudice. The court found
that the defendant had not been denied due process. Id. at 284, 222 N.E.2d at 478.
27. 498 F.2d at 1171. On the doctrine of waiver, see generally Comment, Waiver
of Constitutional Rights by Counsel in a Criminal Proceeding, 1 JOHN MARSHALL
J. PRAC. & P. 93 (1967).
28. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972), quoting Napue v. Illinois,
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the fair trial which the due process clause guarantees.29 The purpose of
the Mooney doctrine "is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a
prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. '3 0 Thus, in a
situation like that in Harris a new trial is not necessarily required to assure
the defendant due process of law. When disclosure has been made at trial,
there are still remedial procedures available to minimize the effect of the
false testimony upon the judgment of the jury and thereby avoid an unfair
trial. As a result, it is submitted that the Third Circuit's decision not to
apply the per se rule of Napue and Giglio was consistent with the rationale
of those cases.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Harris decision, that which
is most likely to undergo future development, was the court's extension of
the prosecutor's duty of disclosure to include substantially misleading testi-
mony.3 ' This extension seems to follow logically from the policy of Napue
and Giglio, because even misleading testimony may have an effect upon the
judgment of the jury and hence the outcome of the trial. However, a pos-
sible problem in this area may be that of determining the parameters of the
duty. The court explicitly noted that the prosecutor need not take the
place of defense counsel and explain all the ambiguities in his witness'
responses. 32 But the question left unanswered by Harris is at what point
should the prosecutor realize that certain ambiguous testimony may be
"substantially misleading." Discussion of this issue was precluded because
there had been disclosure at the trial, although the prosecution had been
tardy in fulfilling its duty.
The belated correction offered the court an opportunity to rule upon
when correction must be made. Belated disclosure causes prejudice because
29. In a concurring opinion in Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967), the
rationale was aptly described by Mr. Justice Fortas in his discussion of the more
general prosecutorial duty to disclose exculpatory evidence:
A criminal trial is not a game in which the State's function is to outwit and en-
trap its quarry. The State's pursuit is justice, not a victim .... In my view, a
supportable conviction requires something more than that the State did not lie.
It implies that the prosecution has been fair and honest and that the State has
disclosed all information known to it which may have a crucial or important
effect on the outcome.
Id. at 100-01 (Fortas, J., concurring).
30. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). In Brady, the Supreme Court
held that "the suppression by the prosecution of [material] evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process ... irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution." Id. This holding exemplified another evolving doctrine
regarding prosecutorial disclosure - revelation of exculpatory evidence. The em-
phasis in Brady was upon the effect of suppression upon the defendant's trial prepara-
tion, whereas in Mooney, Napue, and Giglio, it was upon the effect of false testimony
upon the jury's judgment. See Comment, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to
Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136 (1964).
31. The Third Circuit had previously faced a situation where it was questionable
whether an accomplice witness had testified falsely about promises given in exchange
for his cooperation. United States ex rel. Dale v. Williams, 459 F.2d 763 (3d Cir.
1972). The court did not reach the issue, however, because in that case the testimony
had not been essential to the prosecution's case but had been merely corroborative
of the victim's testimony. Id. at 763.
32. 498 F.2d at 1169.
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it inhibits the conduct of the defense function at trial. It is strategically
important to defense counsel to be able to impeach the credibility of a key
government witness while he is still being examined, rather than by recall-
ing him. 33 Although upon learning of the prior misstatements of a witness,
a jury could properly discount such testimony, it is more likely that once
the jury has accepted the truthfulness of a witness' statements under the
impression that he was not receiving benefit for his testimony, a subsequent
recantation may not adequately overcome the jury's initial impression of
the defendant.3 4 While recognizing that belated disclosure inhibits the de-
fense function,35 the court chose not to rule upon how diligent the prose-
cutor must be, but rather chose to adopt a balancing-test approach to the
problem by placing upon the defendant the burden of showing that the
untimely disclosure caused such prejudice that it precluded a fair trial.3
This approach was probably taken for two reasons: fist, the possible varia-
tions in the time of disclosure and the effects which can accrue therefrom in
different factual situations make case-by-case treatment appropriate; and
second, the numerous opportunities still available at trial, after disclosure,
to ameliorate the prejudice at that level. Indeed, the principal difference
between Napue and the instant case is that after discloure in the latter,
there remained an opportunity to avoid the delay and expense of a new trial
by taking remedial steps to reduce the prejudice perhaps to the point of
harmless error.37 The court, then, not only recognized the opportunities
available to the defense to reduce the prejudice; it also placed a burden
upon counsel to take advantage of such opportunities. 8
In neither Napue nor Giglio had the Supreme Court faced the issue
of defense counsel's diligence, but the Third Circuit's assignment of this
duty to the defense was clearly consistent with the reasoning of similar
rules requiring affirmative action by the defense in several other areas.
For example, it has often been held that when defense counsel are of the
opinion that prejudicial errors have occurred, it is their obligation to inter-
pose timely objection and to seek corrective action. 9 The rationale under-
33. Id. at 1171.
34. See Nash v. Illinois, 389 U.S. 906 (1967) (denial of certiorari). In dissent-
ing from the denial of certiorari in that case, it was the opinion of Mr. Justice Fortas
that a prosecutor's subsequent recantation could not overcome the jury's initial im-
pression, and that therefore even belated disclosure at trial should be deemed per se
reversible error. Justices Warren and Douglas concurred in this dissent. The rationale
of this view is that "[tihere is no place in our system of criminal justice for prosecu-
torial misconduct." Id. at 907. For a brief discussion of the facts of Nash, see
note 26 supra.
35. 498 F.2d at 1171.
36. Id. at 1170.
37. See note 25 supra.
38. This policy is implicit in the instant court's finding of waiver. See 498 F.2d
at 1170-71.
39. Failure to fulfill this obligation has led to findings of waiver in situations
involving: perjured testimony, see, e.g., McGuinn Y. United States, 239 F.2d 449
(D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 942 (1957) (defense could have called an
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lying these holdings is that of avoiding, whenever possible, the necessity of
a time-consuming, expensive new trial by providing the trial judge an
opportunity to correct any errors at the trial level.4 0 When prejudice arises
which diligent action could minimize, the accused should not be allowed
to remain silent as to that situation during the entire trial hoping to gain
an acquittal, and thereafter expect to have a second chance because of a
situation which he could have prevented. To allow the defendant to chal-
lenge his conviction by asserting prejudice which he deliberately chose
not to mitigate would seriously interfere with the proper, orderly adminis-
trati-on of the criminal law. While the Government carries the burden of
proving the defendant's guilt and ensuring him a fair trial, defense counsel
carries the burden of protecting the defendant's rights, and the extent of
this protection must be balanced against the need for judicial economy.
41
Classically stated, a cr.ifiinal defendant is entitled only to a fair trial, not
a perfect one,42 and although the judge plays a vital role in a criminal trial,
counsel for the parties are also essential elements. Thus, as the court recog-
nized, 43 when error appears and counsel have an opportunity to attempt to
eradicate it but choose not to do so, defendants should not be allowed to
place the burden of error onto the trial judge.
Bogish, 204 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1953) ; suppression of evidence and denial of discovery,
see, e.g., United States ex rel. Felton v. Rundle, 410 F.2d 1300 (3d Cir. 1969) (en
banc), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 993 (1970) (pretrial statements of robbery victim):
instructions to the jury, see, e.g., United States v. Chicarelli, 445 F.2d 1111 (3d Cir.
1971); and improper prosecutorial remarks about the defendant, see, e.g., United
States v. Hohensee, 243 F.2d 367 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 976 (1957).
40. See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. Ruiz, 495 F.2d 1175 (3d Cir. 1974), where the
defendant's pretrial statement was not disclosed by the prosecution until the defendant
had taken the stand. Remedial action by the trial court was held to have prevented
reversible prejudice. Id. at 1178.
41. In dissenting from the instant court's denial of rehearing en banc, 498 F.2d
at 1172, Chief Judge Seitz, joined by Circuit Judges Gibbons and Weis, questioned
why it should be the duty of the defense to bring to the jury's attention the false
testimony of a prosecution witness. In his view, Napue required the prosecutor to
disclose false evidence not only to defense counsel, but to the jury. Thus, Chief Judge
Seitz disagreed with the finding of the panel (Judges Rosenn, Biggs, and Aldisert)
that the defense must take affirmative steps to inform the jury when the prosecution
has failed to do so. Id. at 1173. This view is consistent with the view of Supreme
Court Justices Fortas, Warren and Douglas that belated disclosure is reversible error
per se. See note 34 supra.
However, it is submitted that while the Chief Judge was upon solid ground
in his interpretation of Napue, his interpretation of the panel's holding to mean that
counsel had waived the defendants' rights to a fair trial was not so well founded.
The panel held only that the defense had waived its right to object to the prejudice
caused by the prosecutor's misconduct. Since the duty to ensure a fair trial is as
much that of the defense as it is of the court and the prosecution, when the prosecutor
performs his disclosure duty inadequately and the defense is aware of the possible
prejudicial effect, it is the duty of counsel at least to object and demand that the
court take remedial action. It is submitted that the panel's holding did not necessarily
require that the defense take all possible remedial procedures; but it did at least
require counsel to demand that the court take such procedures.
42. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968) ; Lutwak v. United States,
344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953).
43. 498 F.2d at 1170.
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The, Third Circuit's rulings in Harris, it is submitted, are consistent
with the proper functions of the prosecution and the defense in our ad-
versary system of justice. The primary duty of the public prosecutor is
not to convict, but to see that justice is done. 4 The primary duty of defense
counsel in a criminal trial is to protect and assert the rights of his or her
client. In defining the meanings of these duties as they apply to the factual
situation in Harris, the Third Circuit expanded the disclosure requirement
'of Napue and Giglio to misleading as well as perjured testmony, recognized
that prejudice results from merely belated correction of that testimony, and
expanded not only the prosecutor's, but also the defendant's duties in this
area. The court's decision may thus be the precursor of the next major
steps in the evolution of the Mooney doctrine.
Michael Nelson Becci
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FIFTH AMENDMENT DOUBLE JEOPARDY
- DISMISSAL OF INDICTMENT BASED UPON FACTS ADDUCED AT TRIAL
OPERATES AS AN ACQUITTAL AND GOVERNMENT APPEAL IS BARRED BY
THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE.
United States v. Wilson (1974) (rev'd, 95 S. Ct. 1013 (1975))
Defendant was charged with the federal statutory crime of embezzling
funds of a labor organization' in an indictment which alleged that, as busi-
ness manager of a union, he had converted money by means of a check
signed by two other union officers.2 Although the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation completed its inquiry into the subject matter of this indictment
in June, 1969,3 subsequent evaluation of the results by the Organized Crime
44. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 5. See also ABA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Ethical Consideration 7-13; Disciplinary Rule 7-103B.
1. Defendant was charged with violating the following provision:
Any person who embezzles, steals, or unlawfully and willfully abstracts or con-
verts to his own use, or the use of another, any of the moneys, funds, securities,
property, or other assets of a labor organization of which he is an officer, or by
which he is employed, directly or indirectly, shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned for more than five years, or both.
29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1970).
2. United States v. Wilson, 357 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. Pa. 1973). The indictment
alleged that the check was used to pay a portion of the expenses of a wedding recep-
tion for defendant's daughter. Id. at 619-20.
3. United States v. Wilson, 492 F.2d 1345, 1346 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 95 S. Ct.
1013 (1975). The trial court stated in its opinion that the investigation was completed
in June, 1968. 357 F. Stipp. at 620. However, this appears to be an error because
both the district and appellate courts stated that the investigation had begun in April,
1968, and the trial court noted that there had been a sixteen month delay between
the completion of the investigation and the returning of the indictment in October,
1971. Thus, if the district court's date were correct, the investigation would have
been conducted for only 2 months. Furthermor6, the delay before returning the
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Strike Force and the United States Attorney's Office delayed return of
the indictment until October 28, 1971. 4 Defendant's pretrial motion for
dismissal of the indictment upon the grounds of prejudicial delay was denied,
and the case proceeded to trial.5 After the jury returned a guilty verdict,
defendant moved for arrest of judgment, judgment of acquittal, and a new
trial, partly upon the grounds that the court erred in denying the motion
to dismiss.6 The district court, pursuant to rule 48(b) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, 7 dismissed the indictment because the facts adduced
at trial revealed that the pre-indictment delay, which resulted in the un-
availability of the two signatories of the check,8 was, in fact, substantially
prejudicial9 and therefore a denial of due process.' 0 The Third Circuit
determined that the district court's decision was not appealable under the
Criminal Appeals Act," and entered an order dismissing the Government's
appeal. Upon the Government's petition for rehearing,' 2 the appellate
court, sitting en banc, determined that the dismissal of the indictment was,
in effect, an acquittal, 18 and held that the appeal was barred by the double
jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution.' 4 United States v.
Wilson, 492 F.2d 1345 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 95 S. Ct. 1013 (1975).
The double jeopardy doctrine is based upon the English common law
principle that no person's life should be brought into jeopardy more than
once for the same offense.' 5 This principle had both a substantive and
4. 492 F.2d at 1346-47. The indictment was not returned until three days before
the running of the statute of limitations. Id.
5. 357 F. Supp. at 620.
6. Id. at 619-20. "The defendant presents to the Court six points in support of
his Motion for a New Trial. The first point is whether the Court erred in denying
Defendant's Motion to Disrfiiss." Id. at 620. This point was the only one considered
by the trial court. Id. at 621.
7. FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b) (dismissal by the court for unnecessary delay in
bringing down an indictment, filing an information, or bringing a defendant to trial).
The Third Circuit stated that the district court had acted pursuant to this rule in
making its order. 492 F.2d at 1347. However, it is not clear from the opinion of the
trial court that this was so. See 357 F. Supp. at 620-21.
8. Defendant established at two pretrial hearings that one signatory had died
and the other had become terminally ill. 357 F. Supp. at 621.
9. The court, during the course of trial, concluded that the testimony of the two
signatories was critical to defendant's case and that one of the signatories had become
unavailable as a direct result of the undue prosecutorial delay. Id.
10. 492 F.2d at 1347; 357 F. Supp. at 621.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1970). See note 44 and accompanying text infra.
12. The Third Circuit treated the request as a petition seeking rehearing of
their prior dismissal of the Government's appeal. However, the court emphasized
that the document submitted did not meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Appel-
late Procedure 40(b) in that it had neither a cover nor a title. In addition, it com-
bined in one instrument a petition for rehearing and a petition for writ of mandamus.
The Wilson Court expressly condemned this procedure, and denied the request for
mandamus. 492 F.2d at 1346 n.1.
13. Id. at 1347-48.
14. The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment provides:
[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb ....
U.S. CON ST. amend. V.
15. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 4335. 100
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procedural effect :16 the former in that it precluded a person from being
punished twice for the same crime ;17 the latter in that the state was pro-
hibited from harassing a defendant by repeatedly bringing criminal pro-
ceedings against him for an offense of which he had been acquitted. 18 This
doctrine was adopted into the common law of this country 9 and codified in
the fifth amendment.2 0 Thus, it traditionally has been accepted that a
person either convicted or acquitted of an offense could not be retried for
that same offense.
2 '
However, double jeopardy considerations did not bar Government ap-
peals from an acquittal2 2 until the Supreme Court of the United States, in
Kepner v. United States,2 3 dismissed such an appeal on the grounds that
it was equivalent to a retrial and therefore violated the double jeopardy
clause. 24 After Kepner, Government appeals from a verdict or decision
16. E.g., Note, Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New
Life for a Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, 65 YALE L.J. 339, 339-44 (1956);
Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262 (1965).
17. The plea in bar of autrefois convict (former conviction) was used to imple-
ment this policy. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 15, at *336.
18. This prohibition was enforced by the plea in bar of autrefois acquit (former
acquittal). Id.
19. The principles of English common law adopted by the colonies varied from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. However, as the colonies became more concerned about
the dominance of the crown in the second half of the eighteenth century, the rules
of common law, such as double jeopardy, involving the protection of individual rights
were universally accepted. See, e.g., LAW & AUTHORITY IN COLONIAL AMERICA (G.
Billias ed. 1965). After the revolution, the judicially accepted view was that the
colonies had been bound by English common law except when a rule of law was in-
applicable to the situations arising in the New World. See, e.g., Van Ness v. Packard,
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137, 144-45 (1829).
20. The documentary history of the double jeopardy clause suggests that it was
meant to be an expression of the common law rule at the time of adoption. See United
States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868, 873 (2d Cir. 1973), and references cited therein.
For the specific language of the double jeopardy clause, see note 14 supra.
21. There were exceptions to the double jeopardy rule which did allow retrial in
some situations. E.g., Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1891) (jury
dismissed after a showing of bias destroying impartiality); United States v. Perez,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824) (jury unable to reach a verdict) ; United States
v. Riley, 27 F. Cas. 810, 811 (No. 16,164) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1864) (jury impaneled
and dismissed before defendant had pleaded).
22. In the early English common law, neither the defendant nor the state had
any right of appeal, although the defendant could petition the crown for a pardon.
See, e.g., Miller, Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases, 36 YALE L.J. 486, 490
(1927). Since double jeopardy pleas were developed before appeals existed, they
were originally used only in a subsequent action at the trial court level. 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 15, *335-36.
23. 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
24. The reason for equating an appeal of an acquittal with a retrial is not
apparent, and it has been contended that an appeal is part of the trial process, part
of a single jeopardy. See id. at 134 (Holmes, J., dissenting). In Kepner, the defendant
had been acquitted in the trial court, but the appeals court reversed, finding him
guilty and sentencing him. The Kepner language can support the conclusion that the
decision should be limited to its facts. The Supreme Court stated that "to try [the
defendant] again upon the merits, even in an appellate court, is to put him a second
time in jeopardy . . . ." Id. at 133 (emphasis added). However, the Court, in later
decisions, advanced the rule that the bar to appeals applied even when the only
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rendered after the jury had been impaneled or, in a nonjury trial, after the
court had begun to hear evidence,2 5 were constitutionally prohibited, unless
there was an arrest of judgment 25 or a dismissal of the indictment during
trial.27 Even with respect to these exceptions, recent Supreme Court de-
cisions indicated that substance, rather than form, should govern, so that
an arrest of judgment or dismissal of an indictment may be, in effect, an
acquittal and not appealable. 28  In United States v. Sisson,29 the Court
held that the test to determine if a decision was, in substance, an acquittal
was whether it was based on "facts adduced at trial relating to the general
issue of the case" 30 which were "'actually an element of the Government's
case ......' 31
In determining whether a decision is subject to appeal by the Govern-
ment, the double jeopardy clause limitation is only one factor to be con-
sidered. 2 There is also a statutory question since, absent an enabling act,
the Government has no right of appeal in a criminal case.33 The first such
statute passed by Congress was the Criminal Appeals Act of 190734 which
originally allowed appeals directly to the Supreme Court from either a
dismissal of an indictment or an arrest of judgment which was based on
(1957) ; Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 344-45 (1954). Today appeals from acquittals
are not allowed no matter how egregious the trial court's error may be. Fong Foo v.
United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962).
25. Jeopardy is said to have attached when the jury is impaneled or when the
court begins to hear evidence. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188
(1954); United States v. Pecora, 484 F.2d 1289, 1293 (3d Cir. 1973).
26. After a guilty verdict, the court must, on motion of the defendant, arrest
judgment if the indictment fails to state an offense or if the court lacked jurisdiction
of the offense charged. FED. R. CRIM. P. 34. See note 64 infra.
27. Until it was changed by the Supreme Court, the common law rule had been
that a person could be retried if, at any time following the first trial, the indictment
was found to have been defective. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896).
The theoretical justification for this rule was that a trial upon a faulty indictment
did not actually put the defendant in jeopardy. Id. at 666-67. The Ball Court stated
that there was jeopardy, even though the indictment had been found, after trial, to
have been flawed. However, it did not change the rule that jeopardy was eliminated
by a finding during the trial that the indictment was bad.
28. E.g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 506-07 (1972) ; United States
v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1971); United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267,
280-86, 288-90 (1970).
29. 399 U.S. 267 (1970).
30. Id. at 290 n.19.
31. Id. at 301, quoting United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 324 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
32. For an example of one of the few cases where a court expressly recognized
the dual nature of the question of appealability, see United States v. Esposito, 492
F.2d 6, 7-8 (7th Cir. 1973). This case is discussed in notes 60 & 61 and accompany-
ing text infra.
33. In United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310 (1892), the Supreme Court, after
a thorough review of the case law in both the United States and England, decided
that the Government had no common law right of appeal. Id. at 312-19.
34. The 1907 Act provided in pertinent part:
An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the United States from the district
courts direct to the Supreme Court of the United States in all criminal cases
in the following instances:
From a decision or judgment setting aside, or dismissing any indictment or
information, or any count thereof, where such decision or judgment is based upon
[VOL. 20
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the invalidity or construction of the statute establishing the basis for the
indictment; the Act also permitted a Government appeal of a judgment
sustaining a motion in bar, 5 provided jeopardy had not attached.86 As
interpreted by the courts, the 1907 Act gave the Government a right of
appeal only when jeopardy had not attached, and therefore, was more
restrictive than the limitation imposed by the double jeopardy clause.3
7
Although the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907 had proven difficult to
apply, 8 it had remained substantially unchanged 9 until 1971, when Con-
gress amended it to read:
In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a
court of appeals from a decision, judgment, or ,order of a district court
dismissing an indictment or information as to any one or more counts,
except that no appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of
the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution.
the invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictment or in-
formation is founded.
From a decision arresting a judgment of conviction for insufficiency of the
indictment or information, where such decision is based upon the invalidity or
construction of the statute upon which the indictment or information is founded.
From a decision or judgment sustaining a motion in bar, when the defendant
has not been put in jeopardy.
Law of Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246, as amended 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1970).
35. A motion in bar was a plea by the defendant which, if granted, made it un-
necessary for him to answer the indictment. The principle examples were the pleas
of former acquittal and former conviction. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 15, at *335.
See notes 17 & 18 supra.
36. See note 34 supra.
37. See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868, 875 (2d Cir. 1973). Appeal
from a judgment sustaining a motion in bar was expressly limited by the statute to
cases where jeopardy had not attached. See note 25 supra. The same limitation was
also held to apply to appeals from a dismissal of an indictment. Taylor v. United
States, 207 U.S. 120, 127 (1907). An arrest of judgment must be a decision, based
only upon the face of the record, that the defendant never should have been tried,
United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 266, 281-82 (1970), and therefore, implies that the
defendant was never technically in jeopardy during trial. United States v. Ball, 163
U.S. 662, 666 (1896); Cf. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 124-25 (1966);
United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466-68 (1964). An appeal, therefore, could not
be made under the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907 unless jeopardy had not attached,
and it is only when jeopardy has attached, that is, when the defendant has been once
put in jeopardy, that the possibility of being twice put in jeopardy, in violation of the
double jeopardy clause, exists.
38. The Criminal Appeals Act caused problems for two reasons. First, it estab-
lished classifications of appealable decisions based on outdated common law distinctions,
such as that in the motion in bar provision. See United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267,
207-08 (1970). Second, it specified an arbitrary allocation of appellate responsibility.
See note 39 infra. For an example of the difficulties that the prosecuting attorney may
encounter in trying to decide where to take his appeal, see 116 CONG. REc. 35659-60
(1970) (remarks of Senator Hruska) and cases cited therein. See generally Frieden-
thai, Government Appeals in Federal Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. REv. 71, 83-
88 (1959).
39. The most significant change, made in 1942, allowed appeals to a court of
appeals from a dismissal of an indictment or an arrest of judgment where there was
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The provisions of this section shall be liberally construed to
effectuate its purposes.
40
Both the courts41 and the Office of the Solicitor Genera 4 2 have applauded
the new Act as clarifying the extent of the Government's right of appeal,
but recent cases reveal that problems still exist with the statute's appli-
cation.43 While the amendment was intended to eliminate technical rules
and impose only the constitutional limitation of double jeopardy upon Gov-
ernment appeals, 44 questions arise because, unlike its predecessor, the
amended statute explicitly requires a consideration of the constitutional
issue.
45
Before the Third Circuit could consider this issue, it had to deal with
the Government's argument in its petition for rehearing that the court,
in dismissing the appeal, had ignored the legislative intent behind the 1971
amendment to the Criminal Appeals Act "to authorize an appeal from
all post-conviction orders except where prohibited by the double jeopardy
clause." 46  The court disagreed, stating that the amendment should be
construed as establishing an absolute limit upon the appealability only of
dismissals of indictments. 47 This interpretation, debatable in view of legis-
lative history,48 was merely dicta since the Third Circuit decided that the
trial court's decision was, in effect, an acquitta 4 9 and appeal therefore, was
barred by the double jeopardy clause.50 In reaching this conclusion, the
Third Circuit noted that the trial court's ruling had been made in response
to a motion for judgment of acquittal,"' and the court quoted United States
v. Sisson's2 language that a judge's disposition is an acquittal if it is made
upon the basis of facts adduced at trial relating to the general issue of the
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1970), formerly ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246 (1907).
41. E.g., United States v. Weller, 401 U.S. 254, 255 n.1 (1971).
42. S. REP. No. 1296, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 32-36 (1970).
43. E.g., United States v. Southern Ry., 485 F.2d 309, 311-12 (4th Cir. 1973)
(dismissal of information made upon the basis of evidence developed at pre-trial hear-
ing not appealable); United States v. Rothfelder,- 474 F.2d 606, 608 (6th Cir. 1973)
(trial court considered records in defendant's Selective Service file in dismissing
indictment before trial, and therefore, appeal from the decision was barred).
44. The act had been originally intended to allow an appeal from any judgment
except an acquittal on the merits. S. REP. No. 1296, supra note 42, at 32-36; 116
CONG. REc. 35658-60 (1970) (remarks of Senators McClellan and Hruska). It must
be noted, however, that the bill originally proposed and under consideration in the
above cited materials had included in the class of appealable decisions any order
"terminating a prosecution in favor of a defendant," whereas the enacted bill did not.
Id. at 35658.
45. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
46. 492 F.2d at 1347.
47. Id.
48. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
49. 492 F.2d at 1347-48.
50. Id. at 1347.
51. Id. However, the Third Circuit also said that the district court had been
acting pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b). See note 7 supra.
52. 399 U.S. 267 (1970).
[VOL. 20
104
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1975], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss2/7
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
case.58 Since the lower court relied upon facts brought out in trial testimony
to support its conclusion that the prosecutorial delay was substantially
prejudicial, 54 its disposition satisfied the Wilson court's interpretation of
the Sisson test, and was an acquittal not subject to appeal.55
The Government also argued that the court's dismissal of the appeal
was in conflict with the holdings in United States v. Pecora,56 and United
States v. Esposito.57 In Pecora, the trial court had dismissed the indictment
before trial, having decided upon the basis of facts stipulated by the Gov-
ernment that the defendant had not committed the offense charged.58 The
Pecora court allowed an appeal upon the grounds that there could be no
double jeopardy problem since jeopardy had never formally attached. 9
In Esposito, the Seventh Circuit held that a post-trial arrest of judgment
could be appealed.60 After deciding that an arrest of judgment fell within
the scope of the Criminal Appeals Act,61 the court resolved the double
53. 492 F.2d at 1347, quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 478 (1971),
quoting United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 290 n.19 (1970). It is unclear why
the court did not quote Sisson itself, especially since Sisson appears more relevant
factually to the instant case than Jorn, which involved an appeal from a dismissal
based on a pre-trial motion in bar. For a discussion of Sisson, see notes 67-72 and
accompanying text infra.
54. 357 F. Supp. at 621.
55. 492 F.2d at 1348.
56. 484 F.2d 1289 (3d Cir. 1973).
57. 492 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1973).
58. In Pecora, the defendant, a union officer, was charged with violating 29
U.S.C. § 186(b) (1970), which prohibits accepting payments from an employer. The
trial court, on the basis of the Government's pre-trial stipulation of facts, decided that
the money received by the defendant was not a payment within the meaning of the
statute and therefore that the statute had not been violated. 484 F.2d at 1290-91.
59. 484 F.2d at 1293. In reaching its conclusion in Pecora, the Third Circuit had
to decide that United States v. Findley, 439 F.2d 970 (1st Cir. 1971), and United
States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972), which cited Findley with approval, were
no longer good law. As in Pecora, the trial court in Findley had determined, on the
basis of a pre-trial stipulation of facts, that the Government would be unable to prove
its case, and the appellate court, relying exclusively upon Sisson, concluded that the
trial court's ruling was unappealable. 439 F.2d at 972-73. Therefore, in order to
reach the opposite result and allow the appeal, the Pecora Court had to bypass the
Findley holding. On its face, Findley no longer appears to be good law since the
court therein expressly stated that they believed that it was the statute which had
barred the appeal, rather than the double jeopardy clause. Id. at 973. However,
the Findley Court relied substantially upon the language and reasoning of that part
of the Sisson opinion in which the Supreme Court had considered the constitutional
question, not the statutory one. Thus, the Findley result cannot be invalidated by
simply noting a change in the statute. See notes 67--83 and accompanying text infra.
60. 492 F.2d at 10. The defendant in Esposito was charged with selling cocaine
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1970). After the defendant was found guilty at
trial, the judge decided that an element of the offense was a sufficient connection with
interstate commerce to justify federal regulation. Since such a connection was neither
alleged in the indictment nor demonstrated at trial, the judge arrested judgment.
492 F.2d at 7.
61. 492 F.2d at 7-8. The court adopted this relatively liberal construction of the
Act even though it had previously decided that the Act should be narrowly construed
on the basis of cases decided under the old act, such as Sisson, which had held that
section 3731 should be strictly construed against the Government's right of appeal.
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jeopardy issue by noting that the arrest of judgment had been based on
the face of the record, 62 rather than on facts adduced at trial about an
element of the Government's case. 3 Thus, since it had not been an acquittal
under the test laid down in the Sisson opinion, jeopardy had never techni-
cally attached, 4 and double jeopardy could not arise. 5 The Wilson court
distinguished both these cases emphasizing the "facts adduced at trial"
language in Sisson, and noting that in both Pecora and Esposito the trial
judges reached their decisions on the basis of facts developed before the
trial started.
66
It is not clear that the Third Circuit was justified in placing its em-
phasis on the concept that a trial court's dismissal of the case must be based
upon facts adduced at trial to be the equivalent of an accquittal. The court
deduced this principle :from Sisson, which involved an alleged violation of
the Selective Service Act 7 for ,failure to report for induction. 6  After the
jury returned a verdict of guilty, the trial judge decided, upon the basis
of evidence adduced at trial, that Sisson was a nonreligious conscientious
objector, and that, because the Selective Service Act, as applied to Sisson,
was an unconstitutional abridgment of his right to free exercise of religion, 9
the indictment failed to state an offense.70 Therefore, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 34,71 the court arrested judgment.72 The
was added to specifically counteract those earlier decisions. S. REP. No. 1296, Supra
note 42, at 18. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
Arrests of judgment can logically be included within the scope of the 1971
Act, since an arrest of jtidgment can be made only on grounds which are sufficient
for dismissing the indictment. Compare FE_. R. CRIM. P. 34 (arrest of judgment)
with FED. R. CRIM. P. 12 (motions for dismissal). An arrest of judgment possesses
other similarities to a dismissal of an indictment. See note 64 infra.
62. The face of the record includes only the indictment, the plea, the verdict,
and the sentence. United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 281 n.10 (1970). That an
arrest of judgment should be based only on the face of the record was the original
common law rule, 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 15, at *393, and it has been preserved
in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 34. 399 U.S. at 281-82.
63. 492 F.2d at 8-9. It is interesting to note that the court reached its con-
clusion on the grounds that the trial judge could and should have based his decision
on the face of the record, rather than on the grounds that he in fact did so. Id.
64. An arrest of judgment implies that the defendant should never have been
tried and was, theoretically at least, not in jeopardy during the trial. See, e.g., United
States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868, 875 (2d Cir. 1973). In this sense, an arrest of
judgment is similar to a dismissal of an indictment. See note 27 supra.
65. 492 F.2d at 9. Cf. note 37 supra.
66. 492 F.2d at 1347-48.
67. 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (Supp. IV, 1969).
68. 399 U.S. at 271.
69. The district court also held that the conscientious objector exemption of the
Selective Service Act violated the establishment clause of the first amendment. United
States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 911 (D. Mass. 1969), appeal denied, 399 U.S. 267
(1970). The Supreme Court did not consider this holding upon appeal. 399 U.S.
at 284 n.16.
70. United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 911-12 (D. Mass. 1969), appeal
denied, 399 U.S. 267 (1970).
71. FED. R. CRIM. P. 34 (arrest of judgment due to indictment's failure to charge
an offense).
72. United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 912 (D. Mass. 1969), appeal
denied, 399 U.S. 267 (1970). The trial court expressly noted that its decision, which
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Supreme Court noted that, under the trial court's interpretation of the
law, Sisson's conscientious objector status was an element of the Govern-
ment's case which could have been submitted to the jury for consideration
in reaching their verdict, and therefore decided that this decision was,
in effect, an acquittal.
73
Later cases clarified this point. In United States v. Marion,74 the
Court allowed an appeal from a pretrial dismissal of an indictment not
because it was not based upon facts adduced at trial, but rather because
it "rested on grounds that had nothing to do with guilt or innocence or the
truth of the allegations in the indictment. ' 7 5 United States v. Brewster0
involved a pretrial dismissal of the indictment based upon the trial court's
decision that the defendant was constitutionally protected from prosecu-
tion.7 7 The Supreme Court allowed an appeal because the trial court's
decision had not been based upon facts which "would constitute a defense
on the merits at trial."178  It would appear, therefore, that the deter-
mination that a trial court's disposition has the effect of an acquittal should
be based upon whether the court has made a finding of fact that establishes
the defendant's innocence under the lower court's interpretation of the
law, and not whether that fact happened to be adduced at trial.7 9 In a
recent case, United States v. Jenkins,80 the Second Circuit seemed to
recognize that emphasis should be placed upon determinations of inno-
cence. After an exhaustive review of double jeopardy law, the Jenkins
court, referring to Sisson and Kepner, decided that a post-trial dismissal
of an indictment was not appealable when grounded upon the existence
of a valid defense to the criminal charge.8 ' The court observed that "the
it characterized as an arrest of judgment based upon the invalidity of the statute upon
which the indictment was founded, was directly appealable to the Supreme Court
under the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907. 297 F. Supp. at 912.
73. 399 U.S. at 289.
74. 404 U.S. 307 .(1971). Defendants had been indicted for 19 counts of con-
sumer fraud 3 years after the alleged commission of the last offense. The trial court dis-
missed the indictment on the grounds that the pre-indictment delay was in violation
of defendants' sixth amendment right to a speedy trial. Id. at 310.
75. Id. at 312.
76. 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
77. Id. at 503-04. The trial court had decided that the bribery statute under which
the indictment was brought was unconstitutional as applied to the defendant who,
as a United States Senator, was protected from prosecution by the speech or debate
clause of the Constitution. Id. The Supreme Court reversed this decision. Id. at 528-29.
78. Id. at 506.
79. In United States v. Findley, 439 F.2d 970 (1st Cir. 1971), the Government's
appeal was dismissed because the trial court's decision had amounted to an acquittal
on the merits even though it had been based on stipulated facts and there had been
no trial at all. Id. at 971-72. This would seem to settle the question of whether the
"facts adduced at trial" language in Sisson was important, except that the Third
Circuit had held that Findley was no longer good law. See note 59 supra. A number
of other courts have, however, reached the same conclusion as the Findley Court,
even under the new act. See, e.g., cases cited in note 43 supra.
80. 490 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd, 95 S. Ct. 1006 (1975) (argued in tandem
with Wilson).
81. The defendant was charged with willful refusal to submit to induction in
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trier of the facts [had] rendered a legal determination of innocence 'on
the basis of facts adduced at trial,' ",82 and this was the type of judgment
which could not be appealed under the double jeopardy clause."3
Since, in Wilson, the trial court's ruling did not rest upon such a
determination of innocence, but rather upon a denial of due process quite
apart from the merits of the case,8 4 there is a serious question as to whether
the Wilson decision will be affirmed by the Supreme Court. One can,
however, understand the Third Circuit's concern, since the motion for
dismissal had been granted, in effect, only after a full jury trial, and allowing
the Government's appeal would require Wilson to reargue his case through
the appellate courts, and perhaps even face a possible remand to the trial
court for a further factual determination. 5 This appears to be the type of
Government harassment of a defendant that the double jeopardy clause
and Kepner were meant to prevent.80
Unfortunately, however, double jeopardy case law generally has not
analyzed the countervailing factors of the defendant's interest in remaining
free of the burdens, embarrassment, expense, and ordeal of continuing
prosecution and the Government's interest in enforcing the sanctions of
the criminal law against those members of society who have violated them.
Instead of making an ad hoc examination of the policy behind the double
jeopardy doctrine, the cases have been decided on the construction, analysis,
and application of rigid definitional rules.8 7 There are, of course, a few cases
in which the court has considered the policy interests underlying the double
jeopardy clause,88 and in other areas of constitutional law it is not un-
fused to submit because he had been in the process of filing a conscientious objector
claim. The trial court decided that the fact of filing a conscientious objector claim was
a valid defense to the criminal charge. United States v. Jenkins, 349 F. Supp. 1068,
1070-73 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), appeal denied, 490 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd, 95 S. Ct.
1006 (1975).
82. 490 F.2d at 880, quoting United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 290 n.19
(1970) (emphasis added).
83. 490 F.2d at 879-80. The Jenkins Court expressly noted that it was "not
dealing with cases where a trial is aborted after jeopardy has attached but before a
conclusion of innocence or guilt." Id. at 880. The court felt that it was compelled to
reach its conclusion as long as Sisson and Kepner were valid, but expressed its dis-
satisfaction with those cases. 490 F.2d at 880.
84. 357 F. Supp. at 621. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
85. 492 F.2d at 1348.
86. See text accompanying notes 16-19 supra.
87. An example of the relatively fixed nature of the double jeopardy rules appears
in the Supreme Court's opinion in Sisson. Mr. Justice White, dissenting, suggested
that the fact that the defendant would not be asked to assume the burden of a retrial,
even if the trial court were reversed, should be taken into account in deciding whether
an appeal is to be allowed. 399 U.S. at 333-35 (White, J., dissenting). The rest of
the Court, however, did not consider this argument, since the rule that acquittals are
unappealable is inviolate. The development of such invariant rules has resulted in a
body of double jeopardy law which is often obscure and occasionally inconsistent.
See Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy, and Res Judicata, 39 IOWA L. REv. 317
(1954); Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions,
74 HARv. L. REV. 1, 3-15 (1960); Miller, supra note 22, at 486.
88. E.g., United States v. Jor, 400 U.S. 470, 479-87 (1971) (retrial after jury
dismissed without defendant's consent); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466
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common to find decisions made on such a case-by-case basis.89 Generally,
however, the double jeopardy rules have remained rigid. This is particularly
hard to justify because the relative protection required by the interests
underlying the double jeopardy doctrine has shifted. 90 The procedural
rights of the criminal defendant have been steadily expanding since the
double jeopardy doctrine was established. These protections, extending
from the right of the defendant to bring witnesses in his own behalf9 ' to
the more recently recognized right of an indigent to be provided with
counsel,9 2 have made the trial process much less burdensome and one-
sided than it once was.93 On the other hand, in our increasingly complex
and interactive society, it is arguable that Government's role as a maintainer
of societal order has become increasingly important.9 4 There would appear
(1964) (retrial after conviction set aside) ; cf. Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184 (1957) ; United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896). The Court in Jorn demon-
strated how a decision may be based on policy grounds. Although considering a
different area of double jeopardy law than that involved in Wilson, the Jorn Court
did say that "bright-line rules . . . would only disserve the vital competing interests
of the Government and the defendant." 400 U.S. at 486.
89. For example, the "clear and present danger" test, developed in Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919), to define the scope of protection given to free
speech by the first amendment, involves a case-by-case balancing of the interests of
the individual against the interests of the society as a whole. See, e.g., Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508-10 (1951). Even in areas where a rigid rule has
been established, the Supreme Court has engaged in an examination of the under-
lying policy considerations in a particular case. In Michigan v. Tucker, 94 S. Ct. 2357
(1974), the Court declined to apply strictly the rule of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), in cases where the interrogation had occurred before the Miranda decision.
94 S. Ct. at 2367-68. Although the Tucker case concerns a Court-made rule designed
to protect a constitutional right rather than a rule mandated by the Constitution itself,
it is a good example of the Supreme Court's balancing of the interests involved in a
constitutional area. The Court, in reaching its conclusion, noted that:
[W]e must weigh the strong interest under any system of justice of making
available to the trier of fact all concededly relevant and trustworthy evidence ...
[W]e also "must consider society's interest in the effective prosecution of crimi-
nals .. " These interests may be outweighed by the need to provide an effective
sanction to a constitutional right . . . but they must in any event be valued.
94 S. Ct. at 2367, quoting Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 221 (1969) (cita-
tions omitted).
90. E.g., Note, supra note 16, at 343-44.
91. 1 Anne 2, c. 9 (1702). See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
92. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963). The indigent's right to
be provided with counsel has been extended to any case in which he is deprived of
liberty. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
93. E.g., Note, Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New
Life for a Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, 65 YALE L.J. 339, 343-44 (1956).
94. There are a number of well-documented examples of the expanding role of
formal institutions in the enforcement of normative behavior. For a study of this
phenomena with reference to child-rearing problems, see Bronfenbrenner, The Origins
of Alienation, 231 SCIENTrIc AMERICAN, August, 1974, at 53 (discussing, inter alia,
the shift in dependence for the implementation of the primary socialization function
from the extended family to formalized social institutions, such as day care centers
and juvenile court systems).
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to be advantages, therefore, in having the double jeopardy doctrine imple-
mented by an evolving body of law whose explicit rules change in response
to a changing society, according to an evaluation of the strengths of the
conflicting interests involved.95
While the Wilson decision may be criticized because it appears to rely
upon a questionable analysis which utilizes rigid rules,96 its scope is
limited, reaching only the quesion of whether the Government can appeal a
dismissal of an indictment when the trial court's decision was based upon
facts adduced at trial.97 Since a dismissal of an indictment is frequently
ordered before trial,98 there will only be a few situations in which the
Wilson rule can be applied. The Wilson case itself, which was, in effect,
a dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b), 9
is one example. In addition, dismissals under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 12(b) 100 for lack of jurisdiction or the running of the statute
of limitations, could fall within the scope of the Wilson rule. Such dis-
missals can be made by the court, or upon motion by the parties, at any
time during the trial, and even in relatively trivial cases may depend upon
facts which were not developed until after the trial commenced. As a final
example, a dismissal on the grounds that the statute under which the prose-
cution is proceeding is unconstitutional, as applied, may very well depend
upon facts adduced at trial. Even if the issue is raised in a pretrial motion,
95. For an argument in favor of the fixed set of rules based on the value of the
certainty that adhering to precedent supplies, see Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184, 215 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also Gore v. United States, 357
U.S. 386, 392 (1958). It is true that some of the certainty of rigid rules would be
lost if double jeopardy law were to be based upon an evaluation of conflicting in-
terests, since the rule to be applied in a given situation would depend on the em-
phasis placed upon the different interests. For example, the Third Circuit could justify
the rule set forth in Wilson, by claiming that, given the difficulty of gathering and pre-
serving evidence, reproving facts at trial is 'a burden that a defendant should never
'be -required to undertake.
On the other hand, the rule developed in Sisson, that an appeal should be
allowed unless the trial court's decision amounts to a determination of the defendant's
innocence, could also be justified if it were decided that, where the trier of fact has
found on the merits that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged, the state's
interest in applying the sanctions of law to a proven criminal is sufficiently great to
justify allowing an appeal on questions of law decided in defendant's favor, even if
the disposition of the case was based on facts adduced at trial. An analysis of the
policy behind double jeopardy could even lead to the conclusion that Government
appeals should not be barred at all. See Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 134
(1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Miller, supra note 87, at 486; Cf. Palko v. Con-
necticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937).
96. The Third Circuit may in fact have based their decision upon policy con-
siderations. See text accompanying notes 85-86 supra.
97. The language of the opinion could support the argument that the holding
should be limited to the particular factual situation in Wilson, since the court said
that it reached its decision "[u]nder the totality of the circumstances." 492 F.2d at
1348. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
98. See, e.g., United States v. Covington, 395 U.S. 57, 60 (1969) ; Shotwell Mfg.
Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341, 362 (1963).- See also FED. R. CRiU. P. 12(b).
99. FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b). See note 7 supra.
100. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b).
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the trial court will not be able to reach the constitutional question until
the defendant has been found guilty at trial. 1 1 Thus, there are a number
of possible situations in which the Wilson rule will be applicable. 10 2
The limited applicability of the Wilson decision does not increase its
validity. Whether it will stand will be decided by the Supreme Court
in its upcoming review.'0 3 It would be salutary for the Court to decide the
appeal with a well-reasoned analysis and evaluation of the policy con-
siderations behind double jeopardy, for this approach might add some clarity
and reason to what has sometimes been an obscure area of the law.
W. Preston Granbery
101. A case should not be decided on constitutional grounds if it can be dis-
posed of without reaching the constitutional issue. Thus, technically, an indictment
cannot be dismissed on constitutional grounds until after the nonconstitutional issue
of the truth of the allegations in the indictment has been decided. H. BLACK, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 36 (3d ed. 1910); cf. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S.
207 (1960).
102. Prosecuting attorneys have often worried that a procedural rule will allow
defendants and trial judges to make decisions unappealable because of a technicality.
S. REP. No. 1296, supra note 42, at 12. The Wilson decision creates this possibility
since the defendant or trial judge can refrain from making or acting upon a motion
for dismissal until after commencement of the trial and make sure that the decision
rests on facts which although capable of establishment at pre-trial hearing, were in
fact adduced at trial, thus making the decision unappealable. Of course, defendant's
use of this procedure is limited by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)
(defenses and objections based on defects in the institution of the prosecution or in
the indictment or information must be raised before trial).
103. The Supreme Court recently reviewed the Wilson and Jenkins decisions.
United States v. Jenkins, 95 S. Ct. 1006 (1975) ; United States v. Wilson, 95 S. Ct.
1013 (1975). Essentially following the reasoning of Mr. Justice White's dissenting
opinion in Sisson (see note 87 supra), the Court decided that double jeopardy does
not bar "Government appeals, at least where those appeals would not require a
new trial." United States v. Wilson, 95 S. Ct. at 1021. Thus, without reaching the
question of whether the lower court's ruling had actually been an acquittal, id. at 1018,
the Court was able to reverse the Third Circuit's dismissal of the appeal, since a
successful Government appeal would merely result in a reinstatement of the guilty
verdict without a retrial. Id. at 1026-27. Conversely, double jeopardy barred the
appeal in Jenkins because successful appeal would require, if not a full retrial, at
least "further proceedings of some sort, devoted to the resolution of factual issues
going to the elements of the offense charged." 95 S. Ct. at 1013. In application, this
new rule will yield substantially the same results as that which had previously been
interpreted as the requirements of double jeopardy, that Government appeals were
barred when the defendant had been acquitted under the trial court's interpretation of
the law. See notes 73-79 and accompanying text supra. In general, further proceedings
will be required if and only if the defendant has been acquitted, although the Court
mentioned that an appeal would now be allowed in the rare case where the trial court
not only has found the defendant not guilty under its interpretation of the law, but
has also made specific findings on "all the factual issues necessary to support a finding
of guilt under the correct legal standard." United States v. Jenkins, supra at 1012
(emphasis added). The real importance of these decisions lies not in their application,
but in their shift in emphasis from a technical analysis of the attributes of an acquittal
to a consideration of the burdens which an appeal would place on the defendant.
The decisions suggest that it will be an evaluation of this burden which will determine
just how much of a necessary "further proceeding" is required to invoke the protection
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